In a pre-mission briefing of his men from the special CoBRA force, Manoranjan, a newly-inducted young officer, had declared, “It’s a do or die mission, and mine will be the first CoBRA blood to be shed if it came to that.” During his pre-induction interview, I had observed his readiness to give his best for an operation.
He and the brave men of CoBRA knew the challenge of fighting a well-armed, motivated and organised adversary—one who can’t be identified easily even if seen gossiping with local villagers. So, imagine taking him on in his own adda. You cannot disrupt village life, though you are sure an extremist is hiding there. You don’t have Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act in force and your adversary enjoys the rights of a vibrant democracy.
Maoists demonstrate their position by sporadic violence, so that the local population toes their line and joins their militia in large numbers out of fear, most often not knowing the movement’s ideology. Mobile warfare is a decisive stage in guerrilla warfare to liberate pockets of influence. They set up alternative administrative structures where the presence of government agencies is not seen or felt—like in Abujhmad, which literally translates as ‘unknown area’.
Detection and disposal of explosives, especially the improvised explosive devices, are a real challenge. In September 2009, in one of the CoBRA unit’s early major operations, Manoranjan and his men succeeded in outmanoeuvring the IEDs. But he did not survive the ensuing close encounter to tell the tale. For the newly operationalised CoBRA, it was a shock and a warning. But they just could not fail.
The central government had recognised left-wing extremism as the worst internal security threat and had mandated CRPF to raise 10 units (about 10,000 personnel) of Commando Battalions for Resolute Action or CoBRA. The CRPF, seasoned with decades of experience in dealing with insurgency and terrorism, had to identify and develop 10 centres in affected states; and induct, train and equip the personnel recruited with stringent limits on age and physical efficiency.
But formulating a standard operating procedure comprising new operational doctrines and tactical strategies was a daunting task. Without going into the details, I would sum up that the most outstanding features of this new doctrine were massive operational mobilisation and officer-led area domination extending to weeks.
That’s the early background that eventually led to the recently-concluded Operation Black Forest—which lasted 21 days and was carried out in the inhospitable and treacherous terrains of Abujhmad. It can be hailed as heralding the countdown of the Maoist menace. Their supreme leader, himself an explosives expert, and 26 others were killed in fierce encounters. Weapon modifying and manufacturing units were dismantled along with nearly 250 cave formations, besides recovering two tonnes of explosives and several IEDs. The operations, led by senior commanders including the CRPF Director General G P Singh, have yielded unparalleled results. The loss inflicted is so terrible that re-grouping and reviving the movement is almost impossible.
The Maoist menace is both grievance- and ideology-driven. In a country like ours, the scope for spreading such violent ideology cannot be confined to a state or region, unlike terrorism and insurgency. What began as ‘Spring Thunder’ (as described by Radio Peking) in the 1960s in Naxalbari, nurtured by Charu Majumdar and Kanu Sanyal, was almost written off by the time of the Emergency.
But by 2004, resurgence and regrouping had taken place. Splinters of the movement, like CPI(ML) and People’s War Group, had merged and were spreading terror through the ‘Red Corridor’ that stretched from parts of Karnataka to the Nepal border. The leaders, mainly from Andhra Pradesh, Telangana and the area ‘sanitised’ by Operation Black Forest, stand neutralised.
Projects—especially for infrastructure development, which was opposed and disrupted by extremists—should be resumed forthwith, so that the mainstreaming of the afflicted area is fast-tracked. An even distribution of resources and facilities is the ultimate guarantee against the menace’s revival. Welfare of the tribal population and land reforms should be vigorously pursued. Political and administrative steps, already initiated, should be stepped up.
The example of Kerala is, perhaps, the most telling. This traditionally fertile soil for leftist movements has been, by and large, insulated from 2004 regrouping and resurgence of political extremism mainly because of constant welfare programmes and land allocations aimed at redressing grievances of the marginalised. This, coupled with an even spread of development activities including those for education and healthcare, narrowed the urban-rural divide stressed by successive governments. Ironically, the Red Corridor stopped exactly at the borders of the once-communist bastion.
The security forces’ success has a clear imprint of the operational philosophy of CoBRA. From the supreme sacrifice made by Manoranjan to the force’s chief himself leading the recent operations—it all bears the stamp of this new doctrine shaped and reshaped over a decade and a half. The salutary ethos of the general muddying his boots is part of that legacy that has made the difference in operational performance.
The present political leadership should also be credited for providing a matching resoluteness and setting up a timeline for its total eradication, which played no less a role in galvanising the security forces and pooling in of the modern technology available to identify and locate the hotspots in such a vast, dense and dangerous terrain.
(Views are personal)
K V Madhusudhanan | Former Inspector General, CRPF; founder DIG, special operations unit, CoBRA; in charge of four former prime ministers’ close protection teams