A recent message from a former foreign secretary offered a striking metaphor: India, she suggested, might be at a Lagrange point. Not having been the most attentive science student, I had to look the term up. A Lagrange point is one of five positions in space where the gravitational forces of two large orbiting bodies—say, the Sun and Earth—balance out. This equilibrium allows a smaller object, like a spacecraft, to remain stable between the two, requiring minimal fuel to stay in place. These points are often described as ‘parking spots’ in space.
It’s a compelling image for India’s current geopolitical predicament. In the intricate and often tempestuous world of international relations, few relationships are as complex and consequential as the one between China and the United States.
And India, caught between the gravitational pulls of these two superpowers—an unpredictable and transactional America and an overweening and assertive China—must chart a course that preserves its autonomy, advances its interests, and avoids being drawn too close to either orbit.
The challenge has become more acute in recent months. The current American administration’s approach to India is not only misguided, but destructive too. It risks fracturing a partnership that has been carefully built over three decades and which had enjoyed deep bipartisan support in Washington.
While America’s strategy once rested on the geopolitical imperative of countering China, the new Trumpian transactionalism fails to recognise that India is not a junior partner in someone else’s strategic design. It is a power in its own right—with its own ambitions, constraints, and a fierce commitment, sharpened by 200 years of colonialism, to safeguard its own independence and strategic autonomy.
The belief that India’s need for American partnership is so absolute that it will accept any Trumpian terms is a fallacy. India’s foreign policy has long been guided by the principle of multipolarity—a conviction that no single power should dominate the global order, and that India must engage with multiple actors to secure its interests. This principle explains not only India’s participation in the Quad and its deepening ties with Europe and Japan, but also its recent rapprochement with China. The name of the game in New Delhi is ‘multi-alignment’.
While the American administration and many in the Western media have been quick to attribute the Sino-Indian thaw to US tariff pressure, such a narrow view misses the bigger picture. The de-escalation of border tensions and the push for renewed economic cooperation between New Delhi and Beijing have been quietly underway for months.
This is not a sign of India caving to Chinese dominance. It is a pragmatic recognition that stability and economic engagement serve both nations’ interests. It also signals India’s refusal to be drawn into an exclusive and potentially stifling alliance against China.
The pursuit of a predictable and stable relationship with China, rooted in enhanced economic cooperation, is not a sign of weakness. Unlike the current American approach, which has been characterised by unpredictable tariffs and daily verbal attacks, India’s engagement with China is a product of months of quiet, behind-the-scenes diplomacy. This is a move that resonates with the Indian public, which views it as a sensible way forward to manage its most complex relationship.
Of course, the relationship with China remains fraught. The border remains unsettled and strategic mistrust runs deep. But India’s approach is not to escalate recklessly, nor to outsource its China policy to Washington. It is to engage, deter, and compete—while keeping channels open for dialogue and cooperation. This is not appeasement; it is realism.
At the same time, India must not lose sight of the long-term value of its partnership with the US. Despite recent strains, the US remains India’s largest export destination, a vital partner in science, technology, and education, and a key source of investment in critical sectors. The two countries have built a robust framework of strategic cooperation—spanning defence interoperability, counter-terrorism, intelligence sharing, and maritime security in the Indo-Pacific.
This partnership is not a product of convenience; it is a product of convergence. Both nations share a commitment to democratic values, an interest in maintaining a balance of power in Asia, and a desire to uphold a rules-based international order. These shared interests will outlast any single administration. But they must be nurtured—not taken for granted.
India’s challenge, then, is to remain at the Lagrange point—not by standing still, but by maintaining equilibrium. Strategic autonomy is not about equidistance; it is about clarity. It means engaging China to prevent conflict, but without illusions of partnership. It means negotiating firmly with Washington, but without letting tactical disagreements derail structural alignments. It means building coalitions, not dependencies.
This balancing act is not new to India. From Nehru’s ‘non-alignment’ to Vajpayee’s ‘strategic partnerships’ to Modi’s ‘multi-alignment’, India has always sought to navigate the currents of global power without being swept away. What is new is the intensity of the gravitational forces—and the speed at which they shift. China is more assertive than ever and America more unpredictable. The space for manoeuvre is narrower, but the need for agility is greater.
India must also invest in its own gravitational pull. That means strengthening its own economy, deepening regional ties, and projecting soft power through culture, education, and technology. It means becoming not just a balancer, but a builder—of coalitions, norms, and institutions that reflect its values and interests.
The metaphor of the Lagrange point is apt. It is a place of balance, but also of vulnerability. A slight shift in the forces can destabilise the equilibrium. India must therefore be vigilant, adaptive, and resolute. It must resist the temptation to drift into orbit around any one power, and instead chart a course that reflects its own trajectory.
In the end, India’s role is not to choose between the eagle and the dragon. It is to soar on its own terms—engaging both, aligning where interests converge, and standing firm where they do not. The world is not binary, and India is not a satellite. It is a sovereign actor in a multipolar world. And that, perhaps, is the real meaning of being at the Lagrange point. It’s where India is safest in a turbulent world.
(Views are personal)
Read all columns by Shashi Tharoor
Fourth-term Lok Sabha MP, Chairman of Standing Committee on External Affairs, and Sahitya Akademi-winning author of 24 books (office@tharoor.in)
