Afghanistan has been the theatre, where three superpowers of their times have fought prolonged wars, only to exit in vain.
Britain failed to position a friendly ruler in the First Anglo Afghan War (1839-1842) and got drawn into the Second Anglo Afghan War (1878-1880), suffering huge losses. Eventually in the Third Anglo Afghan War in 1919, Afghans invaded and secured independence from Britain.
In December 1979, the Soviet Union intervened in Afghanistan, to establish a friendly regime. Soviets remained trapped for a decade, unsuccessfully fighting an Islamic insurgency sponsored by the US. Ultimately, they withdrew in 1989 without achieving their goals.
After sponsoring Afghan Mujahideen through the 1990s, in 2001, the US switched sides to fight the ‘Global war on Terror’ in Afghanistan, against Al-Qaeda, and Taliban. Paradoxically, the prime target, Osama bin Laden, was not found in Afghanistan, but in a safe sanctuary provided by the US ally Pakistan. Finally, on August 15, 2021, the US abandoned the Afghanistan War.
India invariably gets affected by the outcomes of Afghan Wars. In the 1980s, Afghan Mujahideen fought the Soviet forces, in a jihad directed by neighbouring Pakistan, with money and weapons from the US. The NWFP of Pakistan was the strategic base, and the jihad ideologically steered by Deobandi Ulema. Madrasa Haqqania provided the network for training fighters.
Zia-ul-Haq, then President of Pakistan, unleashed irregular warfare to wrest Kashmir from India, emboldened by the jihad’s success against the Soviet Union. Pakistan actively provided arms and training, and motivated terrorists.
With the current US withdrawal, there is a sense of déjà vu in India; can Pakistan exploit the situation once again to foment trouble in Jammu and Kashmir?
Unlike the 90s, there are several factors now that deny Pakistan a free hand to manipulate the situation to its advantage. First, the US-China rivalry, and Russia’s interests in Afghanistan and CAR, have raised stakes manifold, restricting Pakistan’s freedom to manoeuvre.
Second, the Taliban have been in talks with several countries and are taking charge directly, unlike the post-Soviet withdrawal chaos involving multiple Mujahideen groups. How long the Taliban will play ball with Pakistan is questionable.
Third, the internal security situation in Pakistan, and linkages amongst terrorist groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan, make for a complex labyrinth. Besides, with its economy in a shambles, Pakistan’s capability to act independently is constrained.
Fourth, unlike direct military dictatorship in the past, Pakistan’s military rules by proxy now, with inherent limitations. On India’s part, both from a military and political standpoint, the country is far better prepared to deal with the situation. The counter-infiltration grid based on the anti-infiltration obstacle system, and deployments along the line of control are formidable. Security in the hinterland is far sharper, with continuity and experience of the Rashtriya Rifles grid. The 2016 and 2019 surgical strikes, followed by the repeal of Article 370 in August 2019, clearly demonstrated strong political will.
Nonetheless, three issues are fundamental to India’s security concerns: One, China-Pakistan collusion to exploit the situation; two, measuring up to the expectations of the Afghan people and securing India’s investments; and three, deepening Islamic radicalisation as a consequence of the Taliban win.
Psychological impact of the triumph of a relatively much smaller force over superpower US and others can be profound and wide-spread. In the 1990s, there were cries of ‘Aamra Hobo Taliban’ (We will be Taliban) in neighbouring Bangladesh. With social media, internet, and dark web, psychological subversion could perhaps be even more damaging than physical infiltration.
Lt Gen (Retd) Subrata Saha
PVSM, UYSM, YSM, VSM**
Former Deputy Chief of Army Staff, Member of the National Security Advisory Board, and Kashmir Corps Commander