After thousands of people died in the first wave of Covid-19 in 2020, we witnessed more than four times the destruction in 2021. About six months after the peak of the first wave in September 2020, India failed to prepare for the second one until its arrival in March 2021. On the one hand, in several parts of the country, communities reopened malls, cinemas, bars and restaurants. Naturally, people were eager to go out and resume some of their regular activities. A few business firms resumed as though there had been no pandemic during the six-month break. On the other hand, while medical experts advised precautions should continue, including physical distancing, hand-washing, and mask-wearing, many of us threw caution to the winds.
Observers stated that the nationwide lockdown had slowed the growth rate of the pandemic, but a resumption resulted in significant confusion after November 2020. A well-managed phase-wise unlock in the first wave was not seen nationwide during the second. The lockdown decisions were left at the discretion of state governments. While Maharashtra, Punjab, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Kerala and Uttar Pradesh imposed strict curbs, a few other states like Telangana, Gujarat, Andhra Pradesh and West Bengal had only partial lockdowns during the second wave. Inter-state movement of people was disregarded. While lockdowns retarded economic activity, they made no significant improvement case-wise in the second wave without a nationwide shutdown. According to a recent estimate, India’s GDP contracted by 7.3% in 2020-21. The net direct tax collections, an indicator of economic activity, was only 5% higher in 2021 when compared to that in 2020 during the first wave.
While the first wave created a supply problem as the transportation sector was shut down for a few months, the biggest toll of the second wave was in terms of a demand shock—loss of mobility, discretionary spending and employment besides inventory accumulation, according to the Reserve Bank of India. Further, several parts of rural India witnessed Covid-19 cases in the second wave, unlike in the first. Consequently, commodities like vegetables, pulses and coffee supplies were affected.
During the second wave, there was a dearth of oxygen. Governments started several oxygen plants across the country and routed industrial oxygen to increase the stock. However, due to cylinder and tanker shortages, the demands weren’t met on time. Oxygen was transported via trains and flights but on many occasions failed to meet full demand requirements. Consequently, oxygen consumption was only 54% of production capacity in April 2021. In addition, we witnessed a chronic shortage of space in intensive care wards, with many patients’ families forced to drive for miles to find a bed for their loved ones. Before the second wave hit, India had about 0.5 hospital beds for every 1,000 people, compared with a global average of nearly 2.9. While the Indian Railways, several NGOs and government agencies created temporary bed care centres, these were only reactive measures.
Another critical issue was the shortage of RT-PCR tests in a few instances. Several states struggled to detect and isolate the infected. Further, on many occasions, false-negative RT-PCR reports have led to confusion. Amidst the chaos, the best thing that happened in the second wave was the vaccination drive. As of 3 June 2021, 21.3 crore vaccine doses were administered, and 3.2% of the Indian population has been fully inoculated. Though the spread of infection has been showing a declining trend in the second wave since June 2021, it is certainly not the end of Covid-19. Even a single case of infection left unnoticed could spread and repeat the whole cycle of adversity. Are we prepared to handle the third wave? What can we do in the next few months to avoid another disaster?
Be fast and proactive: Even though the 68-day hard lockdown in the first wave appeared to be a control measure, it is unlikely that the empowered groups will recommend such a nationwide step again. Thus, state governments have a critical role to play—they need to gauge basic needs and impose restrictions accordingly. A full unlock may lead to a repeat of the disaster that we witnessed after the first wave. Another proactive measure is to prioritise vaccinations for the people working in critical supply chains. Given that the vaccination drive has opened up for those in the 18-to-45-year age group, some relief could be felt, but with only 3.2% citizens fully inoculated, the pace is still a concern. Thirdly, with rich pharma sector companies and drug and equipment manufacturers in the country, product innovation and R&D should be leveraged for self-testing of infections.
Be open-minded and adaptive: We should learn and adopt best practices from countries that have reported almost nil infections. For example, to support businesses and workers, the government of Australia provided subsidies to firms to keep people employed. Another example is South Korea that learned from its mistakes during the MERS pandemic outbreak of 2015. After an outcry, the country built a new public health system that snapped into action in early 2020 and successfully contained Covid-19. We can also learn from the UK that detected different variants of Covid-19 entering the nation, imposed a ban on visitors and conducted technology-led awareness campaigns on the importance of vaccination.
Be cooperative and responsible: Policymakers and healthcare leaders must focus on driving awareness and creating infrastructure towards promoting citizen-driven responsiveness. While the states and the Centre have an extensive vital role to play to contain the pandemic, the general public needs to cooperate and abide by the rules. Responsible implementation of protocols of pandemic control such as social distancing, constrained citizen mobility, hand washing, in-house toileting and avoiding spitting in open areas requires far more than merely investing in traditional public health systems. Governments, socially responsible corporate giants and NGOs should consider investing in building awareness in citizen communities towards improving their state of living. Without cooperation from the general public, state responsiveness alone will not effectively control the third wave around the corner.
Vijaya Sunder M
Assistant Professor (Practice), Operations Management Department, ISB
Vijaya_SunderM@isb.edu
Milind G Sohoni
Professor, Operations Management Department and Deputy Dean, ISB
Milind_Sohoni@isb.edu