The Supreme Court gave a landmark verdict on the Governor’s power in the Tamil Nadu case. It ruled that Governor RN Ravi’s decision to withhold assent to 10 key bills was ‘Illegal’ and ‘arbitrary’. It also declared that the bills were deemed to be cleared from the date it was presented to the governor.
It isn’t the first time that governors have worked as political tools of the union government. Many act as if they are viceroys of a distant colonial power reigning over vassal kingdoms instead of being the ceremonial constitutional heads of the state governments. The governor, in theory, is bound by the advice of the council of state ministers and has to serve as the vital link between the union government and state governments.
However, the system of nominating arbitrary people for such a constitutional post is flawed. The president of India, the prime minister of India and the chief ministers of India are elected, but governors are selected. Nominees are bound to remain loyal to those who nominated them. Since 1950, many governors have acted on their obligation to the union government rather than the constitution or morality. There have been instances of blatant partiality by this nominated authority when state legislative elections threw up hung assemblies. Since adopting the Indian constitution in 1950, the union government has used Article 356, which gives it vast powers to dismiss the state governments, 134 times.
Ironically, the champion of democracy, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, inaugurated the practice of dismissing the elected state governments within a year of adopting the constitution that hailed cooperative federalism. He dismissed the Punjab government in 1951, and the Kerala Government of EMS Namboodiripad in 1959. From the 1970s onwards, dismissing elected state governments at the whim of the union government became a common phenomenon. Indira Gandhi imposed president’s rule 39 times based on the reports of governors appointed by her during the period of 1966 to 1977. The Janata Party government that followed tried hard to break this record by dismissing nine state governments in a short two-year period. In all these cases, governors acted more as political agents of the party ruling the union government than a constitutional authority. This has been one of the reasons for the corrosion of cooperative federalism.
In 1994, the Supreme Court established strict guidelines for imposing the President’s rule in its ruling on the SR Bommai vs Union of India case. This reduced the scope of arbitrary usage of Article 356. However, there are other ways to harass, hamper, delay and render elected state governments ineffective by using arbitrary powers. Unfortunately, some of the governors are doing their worst to ensure the same. Strangely, a nominated officer can hamper the working of an elected government in a democracy. The direct results of these nominees’ unethical acts are the degradation of federal governance, schism and separatist tendencies in states, and a lot of resentment.
The role of the governor has become increasingly problematic in modern India’s democratic framework. The position, designed initially as a bridge between state and central governments, now often serves as a tool for political manipulation. The constitution’s architects perhaps never anticipated how this appointed position could potentially undermine elected state governments.
The fundamental issue lies in the constitution’s vague guidelines regarding governorstate interactions during disagreements. When conflicts arise, there’s no clear roadmap for resolution, leading to prolonged deadlocks and administrative paralysis. The recent Tamil Nadu case exemplified this problem, where bills languished without assent or rejection, effectively stalling the state’s legislative process.
The Venkatachaliah Commission recognised these shortcomings and proposed a more democratic appointment process. Their recommendation for a selection committee comprising the Prime Minister, Home Minister, Lok Sabha Speaker, and the concerned state’s Chief Minister would introduce much-needed checks and balances. This committee structure would ensure better representation of both central and state interests in the appointment process.
Moreover, the current system lacks transparency in the removal process of governors. The Commission’s suggestion that the central government must consult with the Chief Minister before removing a governor would add a layer of accountability currently missing from the system.
The absence of specific constitutional provisions regarding governor-state engagement has created a power vacuum that often gets filled with political opportunism. Clear guidelines for conflict resolution, transparent terms of office, and an objective recall process are essential reforms needed to modernise this post that smacks of a colonial-era hangover.
The logical evolution of this constitutional post points toward making it an elected position, similar to the President of India. An elected governor would be directly accountable to the people rather than serving at the pleasure of the union government, which often is under the delusion that it is a central government. This change would align with democratic principles and potentially eliminate the misuse of gubernatorial powers for political gains.