For three days General A S Vaidya’s brigade lay siege to ‘General’ Mowu Angami and his forces at Phisame village in Tuensang. At the end of the third night, propelled by the divisions within his ranks along tribal lines, Mowu was forced to surrender. Not a single bullet had been fired. ‘General’ Angami was put behind bars. With his capture, a phase of Naga insurrection had ended.
In 1979, the same soldier, who had tracked Angami from Myanmar to India, entered Myanmar again. This time for an operation from the Tirap-Changlang districts of East Arunachal Pradesh. By then, he had become a Lt Colonel, and one of his missions was to go after S S Khaplang’s men. After Mowu’s arrest, the rebel Naga leaders developed their own spheres of influence, after forming the National Socialist Council of Nagaland, NSCN (IM). Isak Chishu Swu is a Sema Naga whose writ at that time ran in the then Tuensang district, which comprised the present Kiphire district as well. He controlled the tribes up to the border and beyond, into Mon and Tirap-Changlang districts. Thuingaleng Muivah, a Manipuri Tangkhul Naga, controlled Ukhrul, Churachandpur and Chandel, where the 18 Dogra regiment soldiers were killed recently. Muivah held no sway on Sema Naga areas and Semas had no influence on Tangkhul areas. Between these two were the Angamis and the Chakasang, the link between Manipur and Sema Naga areas.
They joined forces with Khaplang because he controlled, like a warlord, the areas along Burma’s border all the way up to the Kunming province in China. The alliance had another dimension: Khaplang was the key link between the smuggling cartels of drugs, precious stones and arms from China. Slowly Khaplang started giving shelter to Ulfa, KLO and also later the Bodos. His reach stretched all the way into Jairampur, 30km inside Arunachal from Myanmar’s border. Later, competing inter-agency interests led to Khaplang being propped up against Muivah and Isak as well. This is how the game was played in the Northeast.
Those days, the Burmese army was stretched. And these were areas so remote that the writ of the government did not run here. Northwards lay Kachin and Shan states seething with insurgencies. The Burmese army had very few posts here. Burmese soldiers did not get their salary regularly; the government didn’t have the money. The signs were everywhere: the poor conditions of their uniforms and gear; many of the soldiers wore rubber flip-flops and lungis instead of uniform. Whatever Indian soldiers gave them, they took gladly, whether it was extra rations or biscuits. A case of rum worked wonders. The trade-off was information and intelligence on Khaplang’s men and their activities. Then our soldiers went quietly across, hit them and came back. This happened regularly. On these clandestine operations, usually a group of 20 soldiers, commanded by either a Major or a Colonel, would take along light weapons, a large amount of bombs, smoke grenades and petrol with the intent to cause maximum damage.
These camps had sentries and guard dogs. The trek from the district headquarter Khunsa to the camps would be about 10 or 11km. Stealth was the way forward for Nagas had giant wooden drums they used to convey messages. The sound of the drums would carry for kilometres. Afterwards they attacked the camps; no one had the time to count the dead bodies. There would be a back-up team waiting on the border if the situation got too ugly. The trick was to hit the camps around three in the morning and get back before daylight. (To be continued)
Sudarshan is the author of Anatomy of an Abduction: How the Indian Hostages in Iraq Were Freed
sudarshan@newindianexpress.com