Recalibrating our thinking on strategic defence and diplomacy
Public pressure in a cacophonous democracy is not easy to handle. Particularly when there are elections to be found at every turn. Did the Bihar regiment cross the Line of Actual Control? Or did they valiantly fight back a brutal onslaught to defend a perception? An onslaught where medieval weaponry was used (why do we even spend some Rs 3.17 lakh crore, not counting pension, if it will come down to nails and sticks)?
Either way, it’s time we recalibrate our thinking on strategic defence and diplomacy. Our infrastructure-building on the road to Daulat Beg Oldi could have been accompanied by a pre-emptive military build-up to thwart Chinese summer activity. Now that China has done what it has done, given us all a reminiscence of 1962, New Delhi cannot tread a path of total confrontation, coerced by passion-driven public opinion.
It must take strategic, logical steps. There’s a pandemic to be fought too. And while it can’t be business as usual, India also cannot disengage from business entirely. From yoga teachers to IT behemoths, there are plenty of interests entrenched there. Not to mention other sundry trade, despite a dipping China-bound export graph. Beijing, therefore, must be telling itself: We don’t have much to lose by taking on India.
It’s a multipronged offensive: Nepal opening another front, tariff concessions to Dhaka. What do we have? Donald Trump, as unpredictable as ever, and hinging on that, the Quad (US, Japan, India, Australia).
Beijing is virtually doing what it wants in South China Sea, threatening and bullying neighbours. India has little option but to think for itself. Statements will need to be made meanwhile for domestic consumption—the evacuation of the field of the kind of braggadocio that accompanies Indo-Pak encounters is welcome—but at some stage they stand the risk of being critically evaluated in an open society.