

HYDERABAD: It’s official now. The Commission of Inquiry on the Kaleshwaram Project, headed by retired Supreme Court Judge PC Ghose, has placed full responsibility on former chief minister K Chandrasekhar Rao for the irregularities in the construction of the Kaleshwaram Lift Irrigation Scheme (KLIS).
While KCR was the sole decision-maker for Medigadda, Annaram and Sundilla barrages, he functioned as administrative executive, directed impounding of water at the barrages’ peril, and is liable for irregularities and illegalities, the report says.
The then irrigation minister T Harish Rao allowed KCR to fulfil his intentions and is thus also liable for the irregularities. The then finance minister Eatala Rajender was described as a tacit perpetrator who remained ignorant of financial implications and rules, it says. The Commission noted that Rajender lacked commitment and integrity in safeguarding state finances.
The state Cabinet discussed the report on Monday. According to a PowerPoint presentation given by Irrigation Minister N Uttam Kumar Reddy during the Cabinet meeting, the decision to construct the three barrages was made solely by KCR.
The Commission observed that there was no formal government decision in this regard.
The initial administrative approvals for the three barrages (GO Rt Nos. 231, 232 and 233, dated March 1, 2016) were not placed before or approved by the Cabinet, thus violating the government Business Rules. The Cabinet did not even ratify them.
Works were awarded and started even before the detailed project report (DPR) by WAPCOS was finalised or vetted by the Central Water Commission (CWC). The CWC was still examining the project’s cost estimate as late as May 2018, well after the administrative approvals were granted in March 2016.
The Commission held that the manner in which the project was planned and executed caused a huge loss to the state exchequer.
What Ghose panel report says
KCR was directly and also vicariously accountable for the irregularities and the illegalities in planning, construction, completion, operation and maintenance of the three barrages
His involvement and directions... are the cause and result of irregularities and the cause of distress to these three barrages
There is rank irregularity from the stage of conceptualisation of the Kaleshwaram project till the issuance of administrative approvals on March 1, 2016. This is not a decision of the government but of individuals
The chief minister was predetermined and bent upon constructing the barrage at Medigadda at his discretion, and the authorities associated with decision-making facilitated him
The decision to construct barrages at Medigadda, Annaram and Sundilla was solely that of the then chief minister
The stated reason for abandoning Tummidihatti — that water was unavailable — was found by the Commission to lack sincerity or honesty
GOs Rt No. 231, 232 and 233 dated March 1, 2016, approving administrative sanction of
`2,591 crore for the Medigadda project, were not placed before the Cabinet. The orders were issued pursuant to the directions of the minister (irrigation) and the chief minister
The Commission saw no urgency in issuing these orders solely by the minister and chief minister, particularly as the Cabinet did not ratify them
The then irrigation minister gave instructions arbitrarily, while the then finance minister displayed apathy towards the financial health of the state. One such example: the then irrigation minister instructed adoption of secant piles at a meeting held on January 9, 2017
Key findings
The Commission concluded that the entire project was marked by rampant and brazen procedural and financial irregularities
Improper planning and flawed estimates
Illegal administrative approvals
Contracts awarded on a lump-sum basis instead of turnkey
Revised estimates with undue benefits to contractors
Collusive extension of deadlines
Faulty design (barrages functioning as dams)
Poor quality control and defective execution
Absence of operational protocols, manuals and agreements
Illegal completion certificates and release of bank guarantees
Severe financial mismanagement, heavy off-budget borrowings and zero revenue from KIPCL
Design deficiencies
The barrages were designed on permeable foundations and used as storage structures, even though this was contrary to accepted engineering norms
Critical studies such as backwater analysis, tailwater rating curves, G-D curves and geophysical investigations were not conducted at the new locations
Designs were prepared without proper field investigations and with unexplained delays
At Medigadda, upstream and downstream RCC cut-offs were designed as separate structures, deviating from the recommended monolithic design
Construction defects
At Medigadda, cavities were found filled with soil instead of sand; plinth slabs and joints were poorly constructed at Pier 20
Only 7,498 concrete samples were tested at Medigadda against the required 37,288 (one for every 50 cubic metres of concrete)
“Shooting flows” with high velocities of 14–20 m/s damaged the downstream apron and CC blocks
This was attributed to inadequate tailwater levels and small gate openings during operations
Decisions that caused financial loss
In a review meeting on December 9, 2017, the chief minister directed that additional works outside the contract scope be given to the same agencies
Main components like guide bunds and flood banks were treated as ‘additional works’ and awarded on a nomination basis
The government allowed execution of coffer dams and guide bunds, which were already part of contractors’ obligations, citing verbal instructions from the chief minister
This led to an additional burden on the exchequer. Works worth
Rs 369 crore were added in RE-1 without any DPR basis
The Commission viewed this as ‘clinching evidence’ of an intent to favour certain agencies
L&T, OTHER AGENCIES HAD 'MALICIOUS INTENT'
They acted with malicious intent, gained undue benefit and must rectify defects at their own cost
False completion certificates were issued