To paraphrase the memorable words of Justice Frankfurter: We speak of the Court as though it were an abstraction. The Court surely is an institution, but it is composed of persons who with all their diversities of endowment, experience and outlook and other qualities determine its actions and responses and the course of its working and destiny. The history of the Supreme Court is not the history of an abstraction, but the analysis of individuals acting as a court who make decisions and lay down doctrines; and of others -- their successors -- who refine, modify and sometimes even overrule the earlier decisions, reinterpreting and transmuting their doctrines. In law, as in life, men make a difference.
Undoubtedly, Dhananjaya Chandrachud’s tenure of nearly a quarter of a century on the Bench expanded the universe of judicial discourse and has left an indelible imprint on the law and the nation. The stream of litigation that flowed through the Courts during the years of his incumbency enabled him to fertilize the whole field of law.
Justice Chandrachud has retired just a few days ago: it may not be wise or appropriate to make an appraisal of the man and the judge and his work so soon thereafter. There is a dust that follows the flying feet of years which prevents us from seeing clearly and assessing objectively the happenings close at hand. The proximity of time and closeness to events might impart an element of exaggeration either way, unless the perceiver shades his eyes from the glare of immediacy.
There is an added disadvantage: I have known and enjoyed close friendship with him and even more the great affection and goodwill of his parents, particularly his revered father Chief Justice Yeshwant Chandrachud. However, he had himself raised the issue as to how history would judge him and what would be his legacy. Hence this survey; but I am doubly cautious and restrained in my appraisal and writing.
Child is father of the man
There are many high points in Justice Chandrachud’s life and career. Born in a brilliant lineage he had the best of education and he did splendidly well. The child is father of the man. Even as a student he authored a remarkable article, Evolving Trends in Locus Standi: Models for Social Justice Dispensation [Journal of the Bar Council of India, Vol VIII (4), 1981, p. 672] which was referred to by Justice Bhagwati in the 7-judge bench case of S.P. Gupta v Union of India, 1981 Supp SCC 87, para 21 at 216. He had a brilliant academic career and a successful law practice. But here we are focusing on his time and work as a judge and head of the judiciary and his contribution in that realm.
He was appointed a judge of the Bombay High Court on March 29, 2000 and Chief Justice of the Allahabad High Court on October 31, 2013. Elevated to the Supreme Court on May 13, 2016, he took over as Chief Justice of India on November 9, 2022 succeeding Justice Uday Lalit who in his short tenure ‘filled the unforgiving minute with sixty seconds worth of distance run’. After an eventful tenure -- the longest in over a decade -- he demitted office on November 10.
It may not be wrong to say that his whole life was in a way a preparation for the Supreme Court and his appointment had an aesthetically satisfying inevitability. In response to a casual query, I remember mentioning to the senior Justice Chandrachud way back in March 2003 that it was largely believed that the son would go a long way and end up in the Supreme Court. His appointment came as no surprise and his work and achievements were as generally expected; his non-appointment would have come as a shock and total disappointment.
Almost at the very beginning of his tenure in the Supreme Court, sitting with then Chief Justice Thakur, he enunciated the parameters of the power of judicial review in policing governance: Jurisdiction under Art 32 is not a panacea for all ills but a remedy for the violation of fundamental rights. .. Courts are concerned with issues of constitutionality and legality. Every good perceived to be in societal interest cannot be mandated by the Court. [Santosh Singh v Union of India, (2016) 8 SCC 253].
In Union of India v Rajasthan High Court, (2017) 2 SCC 599 he wrote: In a democracy based on the rule of law, the Government is accountable to the legislature and, through it, to the people. The powers... are wide to reach out to injustice. .. But the notion of injustice is relatable to justice under the law. .. When judicial creativity leads judges to roads less travelled, in search of justice, they have yet to remain firmly rooted in law and the Constitution.
How very profound and well articulated! The rarest kind of power in our troubled world, it is said, is the one recognised but not exercised. Yet, that is the sort of example we have a right to expect from the organ of the state that must define the limits of all organs including its own.
The Constitution envisages the Supreme Court, though at the pivot of a hierarchy of courts, not so much as a general appellate tribunal but as a Constitutional Court to decide constitutional issues of great urgency and importance which are to be heard by a bench of not less than five judges. But unfortunately it became quite common for even two judge Benches to pronounce upon constitutional issues later necessitating reference to a larger Bench and also undermining the authority and certainty that are required to be attached to the Court’s pronouncements.
Over the years, the Supreme Court shed its original essential quality. The structure, composition and the functioning of the Court changed from what the Constitution envisaged. It converted itself into a general court of appeal by a self enlargement of its jurisdiction, most of the Court’s work being confined to considering Special Leave Petitions sitting in Division Benches of two judges and rarely three.
Added to this self enlargement, Parliament also contributed to the dilution of its status, the Supreme Court has been designated as the first appellate court- an appeal court on facts and law- under various special enactments. The net result is that the Court has had no time or inclination for serious constitutional work for which the Court is meant. Presidential references under Article 143 and matters referred to larger Constitution Benches were not being taken up as required. Unfortunately Constitution Benches had become a rarity for some time.
The sage admonition of Frankfurter, J. has to be scrupulously borne in mind: “This is not the supreme court of review for every case decided “unjustly” by every court in the country. .… The Court will be enabled to discharge adequately the vital responsibility it bears for the general welfare only if it restricts its reviewing power to the adjudication of constitutional issues or other questions of national importance, including therein settlement of conflict among the circuits. …. Judicial reflection is a process that requires time and freedom from the pressure of having more work to do than can be well done. … The judgments of the Court are collective judgments. Such judgments are especially dependent on ample time for private study and reflection in preparation for discussions in Conference. Without adequate study, there cannot be adequate reflection; without adequate reflection, there cannot be adequate discussion; without adequate discussion, there cannot be that full and fruitful interchange of minds that is indispensable to wise decisions and persuasive opinions by the Court. Unless the Court vigorously enforces its own criteria for granting review of cases, it will inevitably face an accumulation of arrears or will dispose of its essential business in too hurried and therefore too shallow a way.” [Ferguson v. Moore McCormack Lines Inc.352 US 521 (1957)] (emphasis supplied)
As the Supreme Court has emphasized in the Assembly Dissolution case (1977) 3 SCC 592 and thereafter, it is the function of the Court to uphold constitutional values and enforce constitutional limitations -- the judge’s oath of allegiance to the Constitution entails that responsibility and the faithful discharge thereof. There should be a robust and balanced exertion of judicial power. What is of utmost importance is that ‘in the last analysis, the people for whom the Constitution is meant, should not turn their faces away from it in disillusionment for fear that justice is a will-o’-the -wisp.’ [(1977) 3 SCC 592 @ 646]
Continuing in Justice Lalit's footsteps
Happily with Justice Lalit taking over as CJI that trend was reversed. The Supreme Court seemed to have come into its own. Constitution Bench became a permanent feature throughout the year and final hearing matters being regularly listed and taken up. It is important to bear in mind that miscellaneous work is only incidental and ancillary. Final hearing, and that too of Constitution Bench matters of moment, is the primary work of the Court. Any institution that is consumed by incidental and ancillary work will lose its sheen and significance.
The Court during the stewardship of Justice Chandrachud continued the wholesome practice set in motion by Justice Lalit. He took up matters/references that were pending for years, some for decades. The references were answered, the matters disposed of. It is also heartening that the Court has shown concern for liberty and there has been interference with some orders of High Courts which are unsupportable. One cannot miss mentioning that the Court emphasized the importance of open courts, of not stifling reporting and the need for judges to exercise greater restraint and sobriety in expressing themselves.
The live streaming of the Court proceedings is another welcome step. As Hidayatullah, J. said in Mirajkar, AIR 1967 SC 1 “Hearing in open court …operates as a wholesome check upon judicial behaviour as well as upon the conduct of the contending parties and witnesses.” And we may add of counsel too. Live telecast enhances all this even more. It subjects the judicial process to public scrutiny which is crucial to maintaining transparency and accountability which in turn are critical in establishing people’s faith in institutions: That is so vital in a democracy.
Many seminal decisions as part of Constitution Benches
It is a strange quirk of fate that opportunities do not come to all: There have been many judges of the Supreme Court, particularly in recent times, who have never sat on a Constitution Bench. Justice Chandrachud had such opportunities in abundance. He was ready and prepared and he seized them and by his participation and delivery acquitted himself splendidly. He has to his credit a very large number, or perhaps the maximum number, of Constitution Bench decisions even as the Chief Justice of India.
Justice Chandrachud gave many seminal decisions. Even as a junior judge, he was part of a number of Constitution Benches. Thereafter he headed Constitution Benches, particularly as CJI. Whether he headed the Bench or not, even as a junior member, he wrote his separate judgment in all those matters, be it the leading judgment or a concurring judgment or a dissent on a couple of occasions. Multiple judgments, particularly in such matters, demonstrate the application of mind of the various judges and are welcome. They provide the wellspring of ideas, reflect the diversity and contribute to the healthy growth of the law. Reference may be made to some of his judgments.
Many of Chandrachud’s judgments were great strides in the development of constitutional law whose theme is checks and balances and the idea of law as a means of disciplining public power. The foundation for the development of our constitutional jurisprudence and the expansion of liberties was the discarding of the theory that fundamental rights are water-tight compartments; Arts 14, 19, 21 form a vital trilogy of constitutional provisions whose ethos informs one another.
This was carried forward in the Privacy case (2017) 10 SCC 1 where Chandrachud gave the leading judgment which is trail blazing. It highlighted the position of the individual as the focal point of the Constitution. Development is not merely the process of increasing inanimate objects of convenience. It is really an expansion of people’s freedom. That is the blending of the guarantees in Part III and the objectives in Part IV. He defined the right to privacy as an irreducible foundational requirement of the right to life and liberty.
The judgment underscored the need and the philosophy of having restrictions on entrenched rights. It also rightly cautioned against the danger of construing and equating the jurisdiction of a constitutional court in India with the exercise of substantive due process under the US Constitution while underlining that any law which infringes the right guaranteed by Art 21 should not suffer from manifest arbitrariness. This is indeed wholesome.
His dissenting judgment in the Aadhaar case (2019) 1 SCC 1 held that the Aadhaar Act invaded the right to privacy. More importantly it addressed a larger, significant constitutional issue. It was rightly held that the introduction and passing of that law as a Money Bill was unconstitutional because a Money Bill must contain only provisions dealing with any or every matter in Art 110 (1) (a) to (g); the impugned Act deals with other matters also.
That constitutional question has been referred to a larger bench. It was expected, and the Chief Justice too had indicated, that this important constitutional issue would be taken up and decided. Possibly it was the paucity of time that prevented it, and it may also be that he did not want to be seen as attempting to convert his dissent in the Aadhaar case into the opinion of the Court.
Kalpana Mehta (2018) 7 SCC 1 while ruling that it was permissible for the Court to look into reports of Parliamentary Committees, spoke of the complementarity of institutions and their work; that separation of powers, as a principle, constitutes the cornerstone of our democratic Constitution, but its application in the actual governance of the polity is nuanced and the significant precept is that no institution is entrusted with absolute power.
NCT of Delhi, (2018) 8 SCC 501 neatly dealt with issues of cardinal significance touching the constitutional interpretation and nuances of our parliamentary form of government. The special constitutional provisions dealing with NCT and the consequential Act and Rules were correctly analysed and interpreted with precision. Matters to be referred by the Lt. Governor to the President are essentially those not within the competence of the Delhi legislature and hence executive power being co-extensive with legislative power, the Ministry would not be competent to advise the Lt. Governor.
All references must be tempered by the awareness that the Lt. Governor is not to supplant the constitutional structure. He spoke of the balance between idealism and pragmatism in interpreting the Constitution to make it workable. In the second NCT of Delhi case (2023) 9 SCC 1, he tersely spoke of the triple chain of accountability and command in a cabinet form of government which ensures democratic accountability: civil servants accountable to ministers, ministers to the legislature and the legislature to the electorate-the people.
The distinctions between constitutional provisions which clothed an order with finality and ousted the court’s jurisdiction and those which expressly excluded judicial review and conferred immunity from court proceedings were pithily articulated by him in Rojer Mathew (2020) 6 SCC 1 dealing with tribunalisation.
State of Punjab v Governor of Punjab (2024) 1 SCC 384, for the first time, expounded the correct constitutional position regarding assent by the Head of State to bills duly passed by the legislature. It was held that while the Governor, as an unelected head of the state, is entrusted with certain constitutional powers, he cannot thwart the normal course of lawmaking by the state legislatures. He cannot refuse assent. The Governor is not at liberty to withhold his action on the Bills which have been placed before him. He has no avenue but to act in a manner postulated under Article 200- return the bill for reconsideration.
The judgment -- (2024) 1 SCC 407 -- enunciated two equally important aspects for the functioning of a parliamentary democracy. It was laid down (in the context of the Governor and the Chief Minister) that the failure of a constitutional authority to fulfill its constitutional obligation under a distinct constitutional provision [Art 167-Governor’s power to seek information and the Chief Minister’s obligation to provide such information] does not furnish a justification to another to decline to fulfill its own constitutional obligation [the Governor to act on the advice of the cabinet]; and secondly, important as is the fundamental value embodied in Article 19(1)(a), constitutional discourse has to be conducted with a sense of decorum and mature statesmanship. Political differences in a democratic polity have to be worked upon and sorted out with a sense of sobriety and maturity.
Chandrachud also dwelt upon and expressed that independence of judiciary is independence of each and every judge, that the judges are independent of their judicial superiors and colleagues in Somesh Chaurasia v State of M.P., (2021) 19 SCC 480. Re: open court proceedings, he commended the right to comment and restraint on judicial language- CEC v M.R. Vijayabhaskar, (2021) 9 SCC 770. He enunciated the idea of democratic dialogue between the different wings as a middle way to discover the constitutional meaning, to ensure each wing performs its constitutionally assigned role and to operationalise the doctrine of separation of powers in a nuanced way and help the court tread the middle path between abdication and usurpation in Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. v Amit Gupta, (2021) 7 SCC 209.
Not all judgments beyond reproach
However, it is not as if every judgment of his can be said to be beyond reproach. His leading opinion in Krishna Kumar Singh, (2017) 3 SCC 1 when it deals with judicial review of the satisfaction of the President/Governor in promulgating Ordinances lays great store by the passing observation of Y.V. Chandrachud, C.J. in A.K. Roy referring to the Assembly Dissolution case that judicial review is not totally excluded in regard to the question relating to the President’s satisfaction.
But the Rajasthan Assembly case was concerned with imposing President’s rule under Article 356 which is exercise of executive power as contrasted with Ordinance making power which it is well settled is purely legislative and an Ordinance is plenary law which position is reiterated in the present case (Krishna Kumar Singh) also. S.R. Bommai relied on was also regarding Article 356- executive power. All the tests referred to and relied upon are tests regarding judicial review of exercise of executive power. It is well settled that these are not the tests for judicial review of exercise of legislative power. The judgment appears to have overlooked this. It leaves many questions unanswered. Repeated repromulgation of Ordinances is undoubtedly bad. But would even one or two repromulgations necessitated by some contingencies make it unconstitutional? To take a textual and short sighted view of the Fundamental Charter is impermissible and self-defeating.
Article 370 judgment an act of statesmanship
Some decisions, it is perceived, did not go the whole hog as one would expect of a judge like him: like the Article 370 case-2023 SCC OnLine SC 1647. Here he seems to have performed an act of statesmanship -- a delicate balancing of different interests and requirements, even of legerdemain, to borrow the language of Granville Austin in his Working of a Democratic Constitution.
It is not easy to understand, appreciate and accept the position that the President has the power to unilaterally issue a notification under Article 370(3) and that concurrence of the state government is not necessary for exercising power under Article 370(1)(d). This interpretation treats some provision or part thereof as otiose. If power under Article 370(3) could be exercised unilaterally without any condition, then the substitution of ‘Legislative Assembly’ for ‘Constituent Assembly’ was not required and Para 2 of CO 272 being held as ultra vires was inconsequential. It can be supported only if the alternative argument of the Union of India that the power under Article 370(3) subsists independent of the proviso after the Constituent Assembly of the state was dissolved in 1957 is accepted in which case the invalidity of the substitution to the proviso to Article 370(3) would not affect the exercise of power by the President resulting in CO 273.
But the Court does not appear to have accepted that contention expressly. It is eminently arguable that the power of the President under Article 370(3) cannot be controlled by the proviso, particularly when the Constituent Assembly has ceased to exist: the law does not expect doing something impossible. The recommendation of the Constituent Assembly is an impossibility, but the abrogation of Article 370 which was only a temporary provision could not be rendered impossible. This stance also has not been endorsed.
The observation and finding that the effect of the exercise of power under Article 370(1)(d) and Article 370(3) is the same in that both achieve the extension and application of the whole Constitution to J&K is an over-simplification. It overlooks the fine but real distinction which the Court itself has highlighted that the exercise of power under one is reversible while it is irreversible under the other. If CO 272 accomplished what was to be achieved, namely, application of all provisions of the Constitution to J&K, then CO 273 was unnecessary and superfluous. While the extension and application of the whole Constitution to J&K may be achieved by exercise of power under both the provisions, issuance of orders under Article 370(1)(d) extending and applying all provisions of the Constitution to J&K, would still keep Article 370 alive and operable.
Therefore it was necessary to issue CO 273 under Article 370 (3), but it was done without fulfilling the requirements therefor. The declaration, relying on the resolutions of Parliament that Article 370 would cease to exist violates the spirit of Article 370, though perhaps not its letter. The abrogation of Article 370 and the extension and application of all provisions of the Constitution to Jammu & Kashmir is indeed a welcome and long overdue step. But at least a part of the reasoning in upholding its validity seems to be a labyrinth.
The question of whether Parliament can extinguish the character of statehood by converting a state into one or more Union territories in exercise of power under Article 3 was left open. This was a pre-eminently fit case for deciding that issue.
What was required here was not reading more into Article 356 or rewriting it, but tempering it with constitutionalism. Article 356 is invoked when the government of a state cannot be carried on in accordance with the Constitution and the powers of the state legislature are exercisable by or under the authority of Parliament; it is after all a temporary measure and what is normally expected is the discharge of normal law-making functions for the day to day running of the state.
Exercise of power under Article 3 re: formation of states or alteration of areas, boundaries or names of states is not a normal law-making function for the running of the state and not something that has to be done so expeditiously without waiting for the legislative assembly to be in place in a few months. Adopting a stratagem to achieve it during the subsistence of Article 356 proclamation would be repugnant to the constitutional scheme and ethos and may be a fraud on the Constitution. The ruling in this behalf does not commend itself.
The finding that the views of the state legislature are not binding on Parliament in terms of the first proviso to Article 3 and that they are only recommendatory and therefore Parliament can exercise the power when Article 356 is in operation without securing the views of the state legislature is again not sound. Like observance of natural justice is mandatory whatever the outcome of such hearing and whether or not, not hearing would cause any prejudice, so too the Constitutional prescription of ascertaining the views of the state legislative assembly is mandatory even though the views are only recommendatory and not binding. Getting the views of the legislative assembly cannot be dispensed with. The judgment is a blow to federalism.
Though the impugned action may be irreversible politically, yet having taken up and heard the matter and rendered judgment the Court should have declared the correct constitutional position instead of simply upholding the impugned orders and action. It is true that a constitutional court would generally lean in favour of upholding a legislative or executive action. But it would not go that far as would make the constitutional guarantees a mere rope of sand. A judgment, it is settled, ought to be based ‘on well recognized legal principles, reasoned in an intellectually coherent manner to the result and rest on reasons with respect to all issues in the case, reasons that in their generality and neutrality transcend any immediate result that is involved’. Viewed from that perspective it is not easy to say that the judgment commends itself.
In the Maharashtra floor crossing and new government formation matter -- Subhash Desai v Governor of Maharashtra 2023 SCC OnLine SC 607 -- also, he did not carry it to its logical end. Some judgments may have run counter to the better judgment of the community. Sabarimala case (2019) 11 SCC 1 is one in point. There is more rhetoric in the judgment. It is a moot question that if the Court is to decide what religious beliefs, practices, traditions, customs are or should be, then anyone other than the Court may decide what the law is. Moreover, locus is not merely technical. The petitioners were not those who claimed to be devotees who wanted to worship and were denied doing so but they were those who were keen to defy tradition without any faith in religion.
It is true that two different views are always possible. And in cases of constitutional law, it is almost always a value judgment. It has been perceptively said that the content of justiciability depends upon how the judge’s value preferences respond to the multi-dimensional problems of the day; an awareness of history is an integral part of those preferences.
This holds good in decisions like taxing mineral rights -- Mineral Area Development Authority v Steel Authority of India 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1796, regulating industrial alcohol -- U.P. v Lalta Prasad Vaish 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3029, the Aligarh Muslim University case -- Aligarh Muslim University v Naresh Agarwal 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3213 or Art 39(b) -- material resources of the community -- Property Owners Association v State of Maharashtra, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3122. The point is not whether a judgment is right or not, it is that the case was taken up, heard and disposed of. The judge’s willingness to take up matters and hear and dispose them of is what is important and laudable. And Justice Chandrachud acquitted himself remarkably well.
One more comment may not be out of place. A good judgment is characterized by brevity and precision. Chandrachud’s opinions too like many judgments these days are very lengthy, verbose and tiring, one tends to lose the focus. They are more like research theses. Many a time it is difficult to know what exactly has been decided. Of course, he has an elegant style of crafting his opinions. But read the judgments of senior Justice Chandrachud and see and admire the profundity of ideas and the elegance of expression, all that done pithily with precision.
Impeccable deportment, proverbial patience
A sense of humility and unrest mark the approach to their tasks of the greatest lawyers -- that ‘repose is not the destiny of man’ and that the least they can seek is also the most they can win, ‘an echo of the infinite, a glimpse of its unfathomable limits, a hint of the universal law’. As Julius Stone observes in Human Law and Human Justice, it is not given to any generation to complete the task of human improvement and redemption, but no generation is free, either, to desist from them. Chandrachud was conscious of this vital truth and worked accordingly.
His behaviour and deportment in and out of court have always been impeccable. His patience is proverbial. Patience and gravity of hearing is an essential part of justice, remarked Bacon, L.C. What is really necessary and important is listening. The most effective level of listening is when true communication takes place. The listener is attentive to what is said, he searches to fill any gaps in his understanding by asking questions when appropriate. Even a junior could appear with confidence and present the case assured of a full and fair hearing. Judging, it is said, is not a job, it is a mission, a way of life. It is a tough job, though Learned Hand referred to it as ‘a delectable calling’. It is an art, and Chandrachud developed and practised it.
What Prof. Upendra Baxi said in a tribute to the father Chandrachud, may be said to apply to the son as well: “In many ways Chief Justice Chandrachud represented the best traditions of the Indian Bar. In this sense he will always be recalled, with high esteem, as a lawyer’s judge. Unfailingly polite, urbane to a fault, widely read, not wearing his learning on the sleeve, insistent on justice according to the law and solicitous of language and diction, Yeshwant Chandrachud cherished the dignity of the discourse as the principal reassurance for doing justice.”
There was some baseless criticism of his having pulled up a lawyer who went on saying 'yea, yea'. Certainly that is not language and response appropriate to a court room. The Chief Justice rightly frowned upon such expression. The father Chandrachud had asked someone to leave the court room for being very inappropriately dressed. Such action, far being open to criticism, is welcome and necessary to maintain the decorum and dignity of the court.
On the administrative side too, he did generally well. Improving the infrastructure, improvising procedures, introducing technology have all been welcome. There were some murmurs about problems regarding listing of cases. There has been no greater transparency in judicial appointments than earlier, and, of course, it may not be easy or advisable to have more transparency. Consequently appointments are not seen as being exemplary always. These problems and the blame perhaps go with every Chief Justice in some degree or other.
He made a statement that the High Court Bar in different places complained that their best judges were snatched away from them (on elevation to the Supreme Court). This was perceived as both unnecessary and undesirable. It is too well known that those who reach the Supreme Court are not necessarily the best material. For various reasons, the best judges do not come to the Supreme Court sometimes. That happens in all jurisdictions. However, it may not be wrong to say that on the whole the Court under his leadership acquitted itself well as the guardian of the Constitution and protector of people’s rights.
Aberrations cannot efface achievements
Every judge is human, so is he. It has been felt in some quarters that he courted publicity and talked too much. Fali Nariman used to say that the senior Justice Chandrachud said time and again that a judge must be seen and heard only in the court room. The relationship between the judiciary and the other wings has to be correct and proper, not cordial. Some struggle and tension is inevitable. Reciprocal influence is a continuing process.
Indeed, writing about judicial independence, it has been observed that even unavoidable interactions between the top echelons of the judiciary and the executive can be harmful to judicial independence. Views have been expressed that the Prime Minister visiting the Chief Justice’s home for some worship was not quite appropriate. We may be certain that there was nothing more to it. But public perception matters. Such controversies could have been wisely avoided.
All this only shows he is human and human beings like stars in the sky have their dark spots. These perceived foibles do not detract from his greatness otherwise. It simply brings into focus the different facets of human nature. Some aberrations cannot efface the many endearing qualities and achievements. For, after all perfection is an attribute of the divine nature, to endeavour towards that to the utmost of our abilities is the glory of man.
Chandrachud did contribute substantially to the intellectual discourse in the judiciary, especially in the Supreme Court, during his tenure both as a puisne judge and as Chief Justice. Having filled the scales on either side, his stellar contribution to jurisprudential thought and the development of law will remain undiminished and the 50th CJI’s place among some of our most eminent judges is secure.
