India's new foreign secretary Vikram Misri completed his maiden official visit to Bhutan last week where he met the Prime Minister, foreign minister and foreign secretary. He also co-chaired the third Bhutan-India Development Cooperation Talks of the 13th Five Year Plan along with his counterpart Pema Choden. The visit was a perfect fit for Bhutan, which received crucial financial support for a range of projects as part of the 13th Five-Year Plan. It appears that India has achieved a closer and stronger relationship with its neighbour.
According to Bhutan's statement, it has been assured that the necessary funds for its most crucial initiatives, as envisaged in the previous development plans, will continue to be received without interruption. This commitment serves as a testament to the strong ties between the two countries and a promising sign of the direction of their relations. The Bhutanese government also expressed heartfelt gratitude to the Indian government and its people for their unwavering support.
In keeping with its strategic 'neighbourhood first policy', India sees this visit as a turning point in the continuous high-level contacts between the two nations. This policy reflects India's dedication to building solid and mutually beneficial ties with its neighbours.
Bhutan's challenges, such as the 17-hour internet blackout during a cyclone disaster in 2020, as mentioned in its 13th five-year plan, require immediate attention and understanding. The plan's proposal to establish a separate route for the third international internet gateway underscores the need to ensure the country's resilience. Bhutan's reliance on a single international internet gateway through the Siliguri corridor in India is a matter of concern that needs to be addressed.
The reforms being considered, including simplifying customs and administrative processes, improving service provision and addressing non-tariff barriers, have the potential to boost Bhutan's economy significantly. These changes will streamline business operations in Bhutan and enhance its competitiveness in the global market, paving the way for a more prosperous future.
Given its future requirements and aspirations, Bhutan will probably go beyond India and interact, to some degree, with other countries, including China. But it won't happen right away since Bhutan mostly depends on India's financial backing. For the 13th five-year plan (2024–29), the total grant is anticipated to be BTN (Bhutanese ngultrum) 125,000 million, representing 27% of total resources and financing at least 51% of capital expenditures. The Indian government provides a sizeable share of the external grant (BTN 85,000 million); the balance (BTN 40,000 million) is the projected contribution from the European Union (EU), Japan, UN agencies and other development partners. Given the volume of support from India, Bhutan is set to keep the bilateral relationship on a strong footing.
As China's rapid advance in the disputed area makes clear, Bhutan clearly cannot offer any resistance even if both countries assert that no Chinese Xia Kong villages are in Bhutanese territory.
Bhutan aims to resolve the conflict with China amicably and continue following the MoU on the three-stage road map developed in October 2021. Held on the margins of the 13th Expert Group Meeting (EGM) in August 2023, the Joint Technical Team on the Delimitation of Bhutan-China Boundary attended its first meeting. The impact of this meeting and the subsequent 25th Round of China-Bhutan Boundary Talks held in October 2023 remains to be seen. Progressive measures have, however, been taken to define the line between the two nations.
Figure 1 shows the two sites disputed between Bhutan and China. The dispute on the west of Bhutan is marked as A, and the dispute on the north of Bhutan is marked as B. The author prepared the map; the source is Google Earth.
The two main contested areas—one in the north and another in the west of Bhutan—are India's main worries (see Figure 1). There is conjecture that Bhutan may relinquish the region under Chinese occupation, which is of great military relevance and borders India. According to the satellite pictures, the Doklam plateau and surrounding important sites are concentrated with a Chinese influence.
Figure 2 illustrates critical geomorphological characteristics in the Doklam region. The red line represents China’s claim, while the yellow line denotes the actual boundary between India, China, and Bhutan—source: Takshashila Geospatial Bulletin.
Figure 3 shows the PLA's presence in the disputed Doklam region. The sites where PLA presence is exhibited are numbered SP1, SP2, etc. The map was adapted from the Takshashila Geospatial Bulletin.
Although our earlier research shows that military developments at the standoff point Doka-la are negligible post-Doklam, the expansion has extended to other important sites, including Sinche-la, Merug-la, and Batang-la land along the river Mochu (refer to the Takshashila Geospatial Bulletin for detailed analysis on the topic).
The dispute between Bhutan and China in the west is over an area of nearly 600 sq. km, while the dispute in the north covers an area of almost 400 sq. km. There is a concern that China may demand the 600 sq. km in the west while resurveying the area and offer the 400 sq. km in the north. The disputed territory in the west includes Doklam and adjacent areas.
If this were to happen, the land over which India fought for Bhutan when the PLA advanced in Doklam will come under the legal control of China. This will cause the tri-junction to become a bi-junction, thereby changing the Doklam plateau's situation. India can suffer significantly from the PLA's presence in that disputed territory since it compromises the Siliguri corridor and the chicken's neck that links the rest of the country with the northeast.
Bhutan should aim to retain control of the land connected to India in the Doklam plateau without ceding it to China. India is likely to maintain excellent relations with Bhutan and prevent any potential effort to expose the Siliguri corridor. India will wait for the outcome of the forthcoming meetings between China and Bhutan before making its next move.
The 13th five-year plan, which does not directly depend on China and primarily focuses on its growth and prosperity, "aims to transform Bhutan into a high-income country with a GDP of USD 5 billion by innovation and sustainability by 2029." Thus, any immediate change in Bhutan's foreign policy is unlikely until 2029. Bhutan intends to focus on its growth and building a trustworthy governance ecosystem that advances economic development, improves people's lives and enhances the nation's sovereignty, security, unity and economic prosperity.
Given Bhutan's need for help, China's vested interest, its geographical proximity to Bhutan, and the fast urbanisation and infrastructure developments in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), it could extend support to Bhutan at any time, somewhat lessening the reliance on India. Bhutan may find China a substitute for India to keep its choices open and gain from both sides. Hence, it is imperative to constantly observe developments on this front even if Bhutan may not act quickly as it depends more on India.
(Dr Y Nithiyanandam heads the geospatial programme at Takshashila Institution)