Friday's Maharashtra results were a shocker for many, a stunner for others.
The manner in which the Mahayuti swept the polls just six months after the Maha Vikas Aghadi bested them in the Lok Sabha polls left many a seasoned observer fumbling for words. How did it all unravel so fast for the opposition?
First, a look at what went wrong in their camp.
And then the dive into how the Mahayuti capitalised on a multi-pronged strategy involving Hindutva appeals, welfare schemes and micro-caste consolidation to engineer a famous win.
After winning 31 out of 48 Lok Sabha seats in Maharashtra earlier this year, the MVA grew overconfident and seemingly assumed that voters will automatically back them in the assembly polls too. This misplaced overconfidence led to complacency and poor planning.
Instead of focusing on grassroots campaigning, MVA leaders wasted crucial time in seat-sharing negotiations, shuttling between luxury hotels in Mumbai for nearly two months. Even after prolonged deliberations, the alliance prioritised maximising the number of seats each party contested over fielding strong, winnable candidates.
Sharad Pawar's Nationalist Congress Party (NCP), for instance, fought in 86 seats, winning only 10, when they would have been better served if they had focused their efforts on winnable seats.
Meanwhile, Uddhav Thackeray’s Shiv Sena (UBT), which had performed poorly in the Lok Sabha elections, insisted on contesting 95 seats despite having a realistic capacity to fight for only 70–75.
This led to poor candidate selection and internal conflicts, particularly with the Congress.
The Congress-Shiv Sena (UBT) tussle over seats further weakened the alliance. Uddhav Thackeray, aiming to position himself as a chief ministerial candidate, paid scant heed to ensuring a healthy win percentage. His party’s leader, Sanjay Raut, publicly clashed with Congress President Nana Patole, damaging relations within the alliance.
Sharad Pawar, who also exploited these disputes to secure more seats for the NCP, refrained from endorsing Uddhav Thackeray as the MVA's chief ministerial candidate. This was done perhaps in the hope of later positioning his daughter, Supriya Sule, for the role.
The Congress, which had seen a resurgence in the Lok Sabha polls with 13 seats, for its part, overestimated its chances in the state elections. Senior leaders like Balasaheb Thorat lost their seats, reflecting a disconnect from grassroots realities. Thorat, an eight-time MLA, relied on outdated assumptions about voter loyalty and lost by over 10000 votes.
Unlike the Lok Sabha elections, where MVA rallied around the "Samvidhan Bachao" slogan and highlighted farmer distress, the alliance failed to craft a compelling narrative for the state polls.
Instead, it merely reacted to the Mahayuti’s welfare schemes, such as the Ladki Bahin Yojana. Attempts to address issues like farmer anger over soyabean prices, unemployment, and inflation were disorganised and ineffective.
Rahul Gandhi's Bhagya Laxmi scheme, promising ₹3,000 per month to women, failed to gain traction, as voters trusted the incumbent government's ongoing schemes over promises. Delayed announcements, such as a procurement price of ₹7,000 per quintal for soyabeans, did not resonate with the masses.
The limited involvement of national leaders like Rahul and Priyanka Gandhi further hurt the Congress campaign. Their rallies were sporadic and poorly timed, leaving state leaders without sufficient support.
In contrast, the Mahayuti, led by the BJP, executed a well-coordinated campaign.
Learning from its Lok Sabha setbacks, the alliance adopted a multi-pronged approach that combined grassroots outreach, welfare initiatives, and Hindutva messaging.
Union Minister Bhupender Yadav played a crucial role, camping in Maharashtra for over a month to oversee caste-based outreach efforts. The BJP set up welfare boards for OBC communities, giving them funding and members cabinet-level status, which them helped win back alienated groups.
Chief Minister Eknath Shinde focused on dividing the Maratha vote bank that had rallied behind MVA during the Lok Sabha polls.
Simultaneously, the BJP emphasised its Hindutva agenda with slogans like “Batenge toh Katenge" and "Ek hai toh safe hai" to consolidate Hindu votes.
Union Minister Amit Shah and Deputy Chief Minister Devendra Fadnavis leveraged the "Vote Jihad" narrative, citing examples like Malegaon and Shivaji Nagar, where Muslim vote consolidation had allegedly led to MVA victories in the Lok Sabha elections.
This fear-based campaign resonated with Hindu voters, who rallied behind the Mahayuti despite issues like inflation and unemployment.
The BJP also worked to dispel the narrative of reservation being under threat, something that had galvanised Dalit voters against them. They managed to hammer home the message that this was a fake narrative and convinced Dalit leaders that their rights will remain protected under the Mahayuti government.
While MVA floundered due to internal discord, lack of planning, and an absence of a clear narrative, the Mahayuti succeeded through meticulous strategy, targeted outreach, and effective messaging.
The Mahayuti's ability to address caste dynamics, amplify welfare schemes, and invoke Hindutva sentiments then played a decisive role in its victory. They also had far more boots on the ground and better resources too. No wonder it turned out to be the drubbing that was.
