The New Indian Express caught up with US counterterrorism expert and Georgetown University Professor Christine Fair on Operation Sindoor. She spoke on the lack of knowledge about South Asia in the Trump administration, why the international community has failed to address Pakistani-sponsored terrorism, the role of China and more. Here are excerpts of the conversation:
There are various pictures being projected about how the ceasefire was worked upon. India, Pakistan, US and even Turkey have staked a claim for it. What is the clearest picture that we can get?
I don't think that we have a clear picture. The White House has said some things that seem pretty dubious. The Indians have not accepted many of the things that Trump has said. I'm not familiar with Turkey's claim. We know that Saudi Arabia's efforts have largely failed. So I don't clearly know how the ceasefire came to be, but my understanding is that the United States was pushing on open doors, that both sides were seeking off ramps to the escalation.
Trump hasn't even appointed an Ambassador to India and to other key posts in the National Security Council or the State Department. Does it mean that he was briefed in an insufficient, inadequate manner on what is India's strategic position in the whole foreign affairs framework within the US administration?
I think that's true. With the exception of President Biden, who had spent eight years as Vice President, most Presidents come into office without a lot of knowledge about South Asia. Their staff don't have a lot of knowledge about the region. So what we're seeing with President Trump's administration would be very typical of the new president. George W. Bush didn't have a clue about South Asia when 9/11 happened, and they had to scramble. So this is a very common situation with new Presidencies. Now, what we do know of the people that Trump has appointed to his Cabinet is that they're not knowledgeable experts. They're appointed there because of chaaplusi (sycophancy). Basically they do chaaplusi to him. And we see photos of his Cabinet meeting where everyone has the obnoxious MAGA hats. This is the kind of stuff that we expect of North Korea, not what we expect of the United States.
But there was an appointment…
Yes, for the Assistant Secretary of State. That's Paul Kapur. I personally repose a lot of confidence in Kapur, and it's incredibly unfortunate that he hasn't been confirmed before this crisis. I hope that this crisis will escalate the timeline for his confirmation. But I have no idea if that will be the case.
You have seen the briefings from India, Pakistan and the US about Operation Sindoor. Do you think the strike is deterrent enough to stop cross-border terrorism?
No, the strike is not a deterrent to stop cross-border terrorism. For Pakistan, it is an existential issue in a way that it may not be for India. I view the Pakistan army as an insurgent organisation. It can't conventionally defeat India. But how does an insurgent show that it hasn't been defeated, is by episodically conducting terrorist attacks.
These terrorist attacks achieve many of the objectives for the Pakistan army. One, they show that there is no peace in the Valley. This is a key strategic objective of Pakistan.
When these strikes happen, the Indians strengthen their counter-insurgency grid. They are increasingly repressive towards the local Kashmiris. This increases the distance between Kashmiris and the government that claims to represent them. This is also a strategic goal.
Prior to this conflict, Army chief Asim Munir and the army were under considerable disrepute in Pakistan, over the way it had treated Imran Khan. All of that disrepute has evaporated. Now, that will likely come back over the months to come because the issue of Pakistani support for Imran Khan hasn't been structurally solved, and the army wants to keep him locked away forever.
But for the short term, this attack really did achieve many of Pakistan's objectives, irrespective of what may have happened in the battle space.
What will it take for Pakistan to stop cross-border terrorism? Will Pakistan ever stop doing this?
I believe this is only possible with the complete dismemberment of the Pakistan army, and that can only be achieved through a full war in which Pakistan is decisively defeated.
India and Pakistan don't have the capacity to defeat each other because the forces along the LoC are pretty evenly distributed. India's advantages only kick in during a long war, and the long war is going to be too risky, with respect to nuclear escalation.
I'm pretty sympathetic to the plight of the Indians. It doesn't seem really possible to stop Pakistani adventurism.
It's not as if India is not doing anything. India is also engaging in its own sub-conventional operations in Pakistan. What I think would be more effective than these provocative strikes, however, is a successful leadership decapitation of the terrorist groups. And so far I'm assuming, I mean, there have been reports that India has tried. But obviously the proof is in the pudding. India has not succeeded, but I think that would actually be more successful than these provocative strikes propounded by this new doctrine.
In your book on the LeT, you very clearly paint a picture of the organisation. You call them ‘indispensable to the Pakistani government establishment’. Can you tell us about the differences between the LeT and the JeM, why the two organisations exist and why they're indispensable to the Pakistani establishment?
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) operates outside of Pakistan. It has never conducted a single attack within Pakistan. One of the reasons why Pakistan relies upon groups like LeT and Jaish is, there's always plausible deniability. We saw this in the Pahalgam attack. LeT also propagates narratives that are favourable to the Pakistan army. LeT basically does propaganda for the Pakistan army.
Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) is different. It had a big split in membership back at the very end of 2001. In fact, most of the members of JeM defected to another organisation that began attacking the state. So the Pakistan army and the ISI really invested in Masood Azhaar, the rump of his organisation. The reason is, most of the militant groups attacking Pakistan, including the Islamic State, are Deobandi in their origins. And so Jaish-e-Muhammad not only carried out attacks in India, but also in Afghanistan. But some of its spinoff organisations do conduct violence in the state. And so JeM is sort of a Ghar Wapsi programme for wayward Deobandi terrorists. The Pakistan army and the ISI like to encourage these domestic terrorists who are Deobandi to rejoin JeM, so that they can kill Indians.
The Resistance Front (TRF) seemed to come out of nowhere and then stepped back. There have been various theories about it. Why did they have to pick it up and then roll it back?
I don't have a particular theory. I don't know why they did it. It could have been fog of war. It could have been a misjudgment. It could have been that they were told to not take credit for it. Certainly, I don't have evidence for any theory.
India has been trying to corner and isolate Pakistan at international forums over its cross-border terrorism. But it hasn't really worked so far. Do you think there is some coordinated effective strategy that India is lacking?
I don't blame India for this. I blame the world. Here's the crude fact. As soon as the attack on Nur Khan airbase happened, the international community stepped into action. Even the United States stepped into action. Just a day before, JD Vance said there was no inherent American interest in this conflict.
In the same way that Pakistan uses nuclear weapons to coerce India, it also uses its nuclear weapons to coerce the international community. More than anything, the international community believes that Pakistan is too dangerous to fail in large measure because of those nuclear weapons.
So we all know that Pakistan was on the FATF (Financial Action Task Force) grey list. It was never on the blacklist that it richly deserved. Then it was magically removed from the grey list, just as its economy was entering into a free fall. So the reason why it was never put on the blacklist is because once it is there, it doesn't have access to IMF (International Monetary Fund) money.
Pakistan cannot exist financially without IMF bailouts. So, in essence, the world is just too afraid of Pakistan failing. Now, I'm of the belief that Pakistan won't fail. I've spent a lot of time in Pakistan before they kicked me out. What I have seen in Pakistan is an enormous resilience. What happened to India, for example, in 1991, when it had a huge foreign exchange crisis that galvanised widespread reforms, giving way to the economic growth that India has exhibited since then. I think Pakistan is being denied that moment. When confronted with economic insolvency, it would have to undertake the reforms that would be needed to make the state viable. So the international community makes sure that Pakistan never has to face that moment. So I can't fault India. I fault the international community.
India and Pakistan were also re-hyphenated in most global capitals. Even Vladimir Putin re-hyphenated India and Pakistan. The US re-hyphenated India and Pakistan. They essentially acknowledged the legitimacy of the Kashmir dispute which was a huge loss for India and a huge victory for Pakistan.
The China-Pakistan relationship has blossomed a lot since the Kargil war in 1999 and the various skirmishes that have happened since. We saw the use of Chinese weapons in the recent clash. What do you think it means for the future?
As Indians are drawing lessons from this conflict, I imagine that one of the lessons that they're seeking to draw out is, what does it mean for an India-China conflict? For example, if India really did lose between two and five aircraft, as most outside analysts believe is the case, the explanation for that appeared to be the superior radar of the Chinese aircraft. I hope Indians are really reflecting upon what does this mean for a potential China-India conflict, not just what does this mean for future India-Pakistan conflicts. I'm not an avionics expert, so I don't feel it's my place to invade further on that issue.
A lot of things are happening in South Asia. Do you think the Trump administration should spend a lot of time on this region? Not just with respect to the conflict between India and Pakistan but also the happenings in Bangladesh.
Without seeing personnel in place, it's really quite difficult to say what the Trump administration is going to do in South Asia. If Paul Kapur is onboarded and becomes the Assistant Secretary of State, it will be good for the India-US relationship. He will not be very salubrious for the US-Pakistan relationship. And he's not remotely knowledgeable about Bangladesh. That's just not a country that's in his bailiwick. I can't say what that would mean for US-Bangladesh relations.
How do you see the Bangladesh situation playing out with the Awami League being banned?
I know the Indians repose a lot of confidence in Sheikh Hasina and the Awami League, but she was horrible. She was an oppressive autocrat. Under her, democratic norms were retrenched considerably. The Indians knew that. The Indians were perfectly happy to live with democratic repression and diminution of democratic freedoms as long as she did what they wanted, which was a crackdown on Islamist terror. I long told the Indians this is not sustainable. This is going to work in the short term, but it's not sustainable. And I was right. It wasn't sustainable. Now we have, by the nature of this change of government, brought back the worst of Bangladeshi political elements. The BNP and the Jamaat-e-Islami are thoroughly back, driving the truck. It was just a question of time. It wasn't a question whether the Awami League was going to be banned.
From my point of view, this is very unfortunate. Because the reason why we're in this situation was that the Awami League foisted this Constitution upon the Bangladeshis without consultation.
The secularism, as the Awami League reported it in the Constitution, was not the result of broad-based consultation. It was the result of a party that had just come victorious from war. In some sense, what they're doing is that they are repeating a process using different winners than what happened in 1971. And it's not going to be any more broad-based or consensual than the initial Constitution was in 1971. So I am very concerned about this. I don't spend as much time in Bangladesh as I do in India, but I did do a Fulbright at Chittagong University.
I was able to witness first-hand in Chittagong the presence of the Jamaat-e-Islami. But I was also able to witness first-hand the complete terror that people felt at Sheikh Hasina. The outcome of this is not going to be great for Bangladeshis or Indians, or or for anyone else, for that matter in the region. People that are going to do well are Bangladesh's private sector. Bangladesh has a thriving economy. It's an economy that is enviable. They are going to be hit pretty hard by the tariffs. However, their competitors have been hit harder by the tariffs. I don't get the impression that Trump is terribly disposed to negotiate with Bangladesh. The Bangladeshis are hopeful that they can negotiate some deal on the tariffs. I'm a little bit skeptical that that's going to happen. I'm not looking at the developments in Bangladesh with a lot of enthusiasm.
