Relations between the US and Turkey -- two NATO members -- have hit a new low.
Ankara’s decision to press ahead with the purchase of Russia’s top-notch S-400 anti-aircraft system, despite strong objections from Washington, has angered the Trump administration.
The US had offered to sell its Patriot missiles to Turkey, but it rejected the offer, citing, inter alia, the absence of a loan agreement.
Given Turkey’s steady plunge to authoritarianism under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and its blossoming ties with Russia –NATO’s top enemy -- many fear the wedge between the US and Turkey may soon be too wide to be closed.
The done deal
On April 2, the US’s acting defence secretary Patrick Shanahan voiced optimism that Ankara may turn back from inking the deal with Russia. However, a day later, all hopes were dashed when the Turkish foreign minister, on a visit to Washington, said, “the deal is done”.
A member state of the NATO buying and integrating a sophisticated Russian military hardware into its arsenal does not sound pleasant to many ears.
The White House has threatened to end Turkey’s participation in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Project as a countermeasure.
The US officials say the operation of the S-400 system in close proximity to F-35 jets could expose the weaknesses of America’s latest stealth fighter to Moscow.
Moreover, the western and eastern weapon systems won’t work in sync, raising questions about the interoperability between the forces of NATO in a future conflict, once Turkey absorbs the S-400 missiles into its arsenal.
“If they accept the S-400, there is the issue that it’s not interoperable with NATO systems, nor is it interoperable inside of our integrated missile defence system,” Gen. Curtis Scaparrotti, who is presently the NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe told the US Senate’s Armed Services Committee.
Has Erdogan found a better partner?
The bromance between Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Turkish counterpart blossomed in the aftermath of an attempted coup d'etat against the latter in 2016.
Putin was the first to congratulate Erdogan for crushing his opponents. In contrast, the US, while expressing support for the Turkish leader, appeared more concerned about the looming purges.
Moreover, by refusing to extradite Fethullah Gulen, a preacher who lives in exile in the US, and is accused by the Turkish government of plotting the coup, Washington has rubbed salt into Turkey’s wounds. Today, many supporters of Erdogan are convinced that the failed takeover bid was organised with the US’s active connivance.
Importantly, as the Turkish president tries to cultivate the country’s Islamists in a bid to cement his grip on power, Turkey’s alliance with the US, which does not bring any tangible benefits to it, stands as an obstacle.
Since the 2003 US invasion and occupation of Iraq, anti-Americanism has made significant inroads into the country. Not just the religious hardliners, but also, a large number of the secular-minded youth have nothing good to say about America.
Sanctions imposed by the Trump administration last year, over Turkey’s refusal to free US pastor Andrew Brunson, who was arrested following the coup against Erdogan, saw the Turkish currency plunge to a record low. It has added to the negative views about America.
A 2017 survey by the Pew Research Centre found that about 72 per cent of its Turkish participants saw the US as a major threat to their country, up from 44 per cent in 2013 (https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/08/01/u-s-power-and-influence-increasingly-seen-as-threat-in-other-countries/) .
If Erdogan is to win their blessings, he needs to maintain a safe distance between him and Uncle Sam.
It may sound like a big price to pay. But, unlike Saudi Arabia or other Sunni Gulf states, the Turkish leader does not count on Washington to prop up his regime. He commands the loyalty of one of the world’s most powerful militaries and has significant public backing. Therefore, he needs no security assurances from foreign powers.
Also, unlike the countries in Eastern Europe that feel threatened by Russia, Turkey has no big foes to speak of. For the regime in Ankara, its only real enemies are the Kurdish separatists and opponents like Gullen-- against whom the NATO wouldn’t pick its sword.
Thus, Erdogan views the alliance as having little use for his country. This has afforded him a greater leeway to chart an independent foreign policy and go as far as cuddling with NATO’s enemies.
For instance, Turkey and Russia have cemented their “multidimensional cooperation” on Syria after the US announced its withdrawal from there last year. The two countries, along with Iran, have held numerous talks -- known as the Astana process -- to find a viable solution to the eight-year-old civil war. The US and Russia have been on opposite sides in Syria. Given that, not many in Washington are happy to see Moscow and Ankara now team up to resolve the conflict on their terms.
Also, for Erdogan, the US war on Islamic State has been a catastrophe. In the process, Washington transferred large catches of arms to the Syrian Kurds, whom he views as having close ties with their brethren in Turkey.
Can NATO count on Turkey?
In 2003, as a US-led coalition was preparing to invade Iraq, the parliament in Ankara rejected a request from Washington to let 60,000 US troops operate out of the bases and ports in Turkey. The reason was the lack of popular support. Close to 90 per cent of Turks were opposed to the looming US war on Iraq, according to CNN.
Likewise, last year, ‘informal’ restrictions imposed the Turkish military made it difficult for the US Air Force to operate the country’s Incirlik Air Base in the fight against the Islamic State. Consequently, some US jets had to be redeployed to Afghanistan.
Today, for the western alliance, Turkey continues to be a valuable partner, thanks to its geo-strategic location. In a future conflict with Russia, the ability to use Turkish bases -- provided Ankara has no objections -- would give NATO a significant edge.
Also, Turkey controls two narrow waterways-- Bosporus and Dardanelles -- that link the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, and through which, a large chunk of Russia’s international trade passes. As per the terms of the 1936 Montreux Convention, Turkey can close the straits to its northern neighbour in the event of a war.
However, given Ankara’s growing ties with Moscow, it remains to be seen if Turkey would fulfil its obligations under Article 5 of the NATO charter if a war breaks out between a member state of the alliance and Russia. It wouldn’t be surprising if it decides to stay out of the fray.
Birds of the same feather
The Russian president appears to profit the most from the latest tiff between the US and Turkey. Not only that the latter has stayed firm on its commitment to purchase the S-400 missiles, but also, the wrangling between the two over it, has served a fresh jolt to their already fractured relationship.
As Turkey moves away from the West, its ties with Russia are likely to improve. Both countries have shared interests in Syria and beyond.
Moreover, given Ankara’s control of Bosphorus and Dardanelles, and Putin’s own ambitions in the Black Sea, he sees cultivating a close relationship with Turkey as serving Russia’s interests. Doing so also lets him weaken NATO from within.
For Turkey, Russia has been an understanding partner, unlike the US. Shared interests apart, leaders of both countries have a mutual outlook on global politics. Both see western liberalism and US hegemony as dangerous trends that need to be countered. Also, as authoritarian leaders, their common disdain for democratic institutions runs deep.
Can Washington break their bromance? For now, it isn’t easy.