Reports from Washington indicate that American officials are discussing the possibility of supporting Kurdish militias and other Iranian opposition groups as tensions with Tehran intensify. According to reporting by CNN and The Wall Street Journal, US officials have explored contacts with Kurdish leaders operating near the Iranian border. The idea — reportedly under discussion within the CIA and the White House — would involve backing Kurdish forces along the mountainous frontier between Iraq and western Iran.
The discussion points to a deeper dilemma confronting American planners. Air strikes can damage nuclear facilities, but eliminating a nuclear programme entirely is far more difficult.
Iran’s nuclear infrastructure was deliberately designed after the Iraq experience to be dispersed, hardened and difficult to destroy from the air. Facilities such as the Natanz Nuclear Facility and the deeply buried Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant form part of a network intended to survive aerial attack. Some enrichment facilities, including Fordow, were constructed deep inside mountains — estimates suggest roughly 80 to 90 metres beneath rock — precisely to withstand bombing campaigns.
Iran has also accumulated significant stocks of enriched uranium. According to reporting by the International Atomic Energy Agency, some material has been enriched to levels approaching 60 per cent purity — still short of weapons-grade but far closer to it than ordinary civilian enrichment. Such material could potentially be enriched further if facilities survived or were rebuilt.
As former IAEA director general Mohamed ElBaradei once remarked when discussing nuclear proliferation, “you cannot bomb knowledge.”
History offers a revealing precedent. After the Gulf War, inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency and the UN Special Commission began one of the most intrusive disarmament operations ever attempted. Teams spent years tracking down and dismantling Iraq’s nuclear infrastructure.
Facilities missed during the bombing campaign were gradually uncovered through inspections, document seizures and interviews with Iraqi scientists.
Boots on the ground in Tehran? Who will substitute for the US?
Diplomats and inspectors involved in the process recall that mapping Iraq’s nuclear programme took more than two years despite the destruction caused by the bombing campaign. Hidden centrifuge components, technical designs and research networks continued to surface long after the war had ended.
As former chief weapons inspector David Kay later observed, inspectors discovered far more of Iraq’s programme than had initially been expected because large elements had been concealed from outside scrutiny. Diplomats involved in the inspections recall that dismantling Iraq’s nuclear infrastructure became a painstaking process that continued for several years after the war. The lesson was clear: bombing destroyed buildings, but dismantling the programme required physical access on the ground.
Military planners have long recognised the same challenge. As former CIA director Michael Hayden once put it, “air strikes can set a nuclear programme back, but they rarely eliminate it.” And if nuclear materials or equipment must be secured, that task inevitably requires forces on the ground. As former US defence secretary James Mattis once remarked when discussing proliferation risks, “if there are weapons of mass destruction, you have to secure them on the ground.”
Yet a direct American ground invasion of Iran would be vastly more complex than the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Iran’s population of nearly 90 million is far larger than Iraq’s was, its terrain is mountainous and defensible, and its military capabilities more formidable. Politically, the appetite in Washington for another major Middle Eastern ground war is extremely limited.
Against this backdrop, the discussion now emerging in Washington about supporting Kurdish militias reflects a broader search for alternatives to a direct ground intervention. Kurdish groups operate along the rugged frontier between Iraq and Iran, and several maintain armed wings opposed to the Iranian regime.
Even if Kurdish forces were able to challenge Tehran’s control over parts of western Iran today, they would face enormous practical limitations. Locating sensitive nuclear materials, securing enrichment facilities and dismantling complex infrastructure requires specialised expertise, technical equipment and sustained international oversight.
The implications extend well beyond the West Asia. India, for example, has long tried to balance relations with Iran while strengthening security ties with both the United States and Israel. New Delhi has seen Iran’s Chabahar port as a potential gateway to Afghanistan and Central Asia, though its involvement has become increasingly cautious under the pressure of US sanctions.
Any prolonged instability inside Iran could further complicate that strategy. At the same time, disruption in the Gulf would directly affect India’s energy security, making the outcome of the confrontation far from a distant regional issue.
The debate now surfacing in Washington therefore reflects a difficult strategic reality, a dilemma watched closely far beyond the region. Air strikes may delay Iran’s nuclear ambitions and proxy forces might weaken the regime’s grip on power. But dismantling a nuclear programme is a far more complex undertaking. It involves locating materials, securing facilities and dismantling infrastructure piece by piece. Even if key facilities were damaged, the technical knowledge, personnel and networks behind the programme would remain. Nuclear programmes are sustained not only by buildings and equipment but by scientists, engineers and supply chains. In the end, nuclear programmes do not disappear from the air. They disappear only when someone controls the ground beneath them.
Shyam Bhatia
Senior journalist based in London, author of ‘Nuclear Rivals in the Middle East’.