The disbanding of Myanmar’s imprisoned opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy is another recipe for the nation drifting into a quagmire two years after the universally decried coup of February 2021. The polls planned in August this year amidst a prolonged internecine conflict may certainly keep the junta in power for years and leave in its aftermath, a scrappy, balkanised polity. The crisis in Myanmar loomed over the recent annual ASEAN foreign ministers meet at Jakarta marked by the nation's conspicuous absence. In recent months, Myanmar has witnessed martial law being declared in several areas and the international media’s reportage of a ‘silent strike’ ruffled many feathers.
When viewed against the backdrop of wider strategic shifts, Myanmar’s stifled democracy raises two moot questions amidst growing consternation in the global community over the country's path.
First, by sentencing Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi to a cumulative 33 years in custody under umpteen fabricated charges, as most observers point out, the Myanmarese military (Tatmadaw) has signaled that it will not come to terms with a democratic opposition.
Second, this comes despite the recent United Nations Security Council resolution demanding an immediate end to violence in the country and the release of arbitrarily detained prisoners. The Tatmadaw is fully aware that it will require substantial diplomatic backing from Russia and China to shrug off international criticism and authenticate its proposed roadmap for the upcoming polls in 2023 under its drafted provisions.
The multi-party general election slated this year by the Tatmadaw or military junta is subject to ‘peace and stability’ in Myanmar. While the polls may be an upfront effort by the Tatmadaw to legitimise its governance over a strife-torn nation, there is stiff resistance to this proposal from various quarters. The Karen National Union has downright rejected this plea, though a ceasefire between the ethnic Arakan Army and the junta is in the offing. The Tatmadaw is cautiously optimistic that some dissident leaders within Aung San Suu Kyi’s camp and other ethnic groups can be poached to participate in the hustings. But this legerdemain may have its obstacles. The Burma Act 2021, passed by the US Senate, authorises the White House to impose sanctions on the Tatmadaw and offer aid to opposition groups such as the People’s Defence Force and other anti-junta forces in Mynamar.
Hardcore realpolitik remains the flavour of the times. India cannot isolate Mynamar due to its own geopolitical compulsions. In walking a diplomatic tightrope, it may have indirectly glossed over the coup in 2021.
As a regional power in a powder-keg neighbourhood, India is bound to be cautious when dealing with a strategically crucial country like Myanmar. India shares a 1,640 km long frontier with Myanmar cutting across insurgent territory and transnational contraband routes. Experts feel that India may not be able to isolate the Tatmadaw without grave cost, amid China forever cuddling and cosying up to its southern neighbour. The Tatmadaw, at the helm of affairs in Myanmar, remains key to ensuring that the border doesn’t become a source of instability in Northeast India. It is also crucial for sustaining formal trade and connectivity routes linking India to Myanmar and Southeast Asia within the acclaimed Act East Policy framework.
Despite these apprehensions unique to the regional environs, India’s relationship with the junta in Myanmar may be teetering close to recognition when seen in a broader context. Western sanctions targeting the coup leaders and their business entities, coupled with investor exodus, have harmed the junta’s finances. But while the Tatmadaw presides over an economy in disarray, it retains control of vast economic interests, including lucrative natural gas exports. Myanmar’s armed insurgent groups remain mostly divided, with different factions across the country. International support has been elusive, with Western aid galloping to Ukraine and diplomatic parleys largely ineffective.
Many commentators assert that with Sino-Russian support continuing, Myanmar’s military junta may continue with an authoritarian regime surpassing previous dispensations. According to Soe Thura Sun, the shadow National Unity Government’s minister of electricity and energy, "China and Russia only care about their business rather than human rights and democracy. They discussed with the junta to ensure they become early birds for profit-making projects in the long term." So, it may be these lucrative future investment opportunities that make Beijing and Moscow tacitly support the junta in Myanmar.
The regime has also failed to stabilise an economy that contracted 18% in the year after the coup and is witnessing zooming inflation, a weakening currency and shrinking foreign reserves. China remains Myanmar’s largest trading partner with Foreign Minister Wang Yi justifying the partnership as ‘rock solid and unbreakable’ and the China-Myanmar economic corridor taking off. Chairman of the State Administration Council Min Aung Hlaing has increasingly courted Russia for chaperoning, visiting Moscow twice in 2022 and hailing Vladimir Putin as ‘leader of the world.’ Both nations have also inked several economic pacts in an effort to bolster ties. While New Delhi has walked on the proverbial thin ice, Russia and China have shielded Myanmar to a large extent post the February 2021 coup.
Not all is hunky-dory on the road to Mandalay. In recent times, the country has seen death sentences of university students by military courts, inflicting air strikes on a civilian concert organised by ethnic rebels and a divided ASEAN’s political intervention. There have been reports of pushbacks against the junta by ethnic armed groups, decentralised People’s Defence Forces and a parallel civilian National Unity Government comprising former legislators many of whom may be still loyal to deposed leader Aung San Suu Kyi. Despite its strong-arm tactics, one can’t be certain that the military will retain its power for long or that an intra-junta putsch may never happen.
Such dependencies not only alter the current political dynamics in Naypyidaw but also shape the terms of conflict resolution and the nature of Myanmar’s future political fabric. The looming polls assured by the Tatmadaw are unlikely to see a federal democratic union emerge. Amidst the upheaval, the civilian shadow regime has also upped its ante. Even before the announcement, the NLD had decided to skip the regime’s sham elections, calling it a deception to alleviate the myriad crises facing the junta. Myanmar’s ethnic armed groups and revolutionary forces have also vowed to uproot the military dictatorship. As long as violence and instability from Myanmar does not spill over its borders, all external role players may only have a ringside view of the stalemate in Naypyidaw.
(The writer is a commentator on politics and society.)