India's unwavering opposition to third-party mediation on the Kashmir issue is the product of hard lessons drawn from history, rooted in legal agreements, and shaped by evolving strategic considerations. This approach reflects a deep-seated national consensus that spans political ideologies and governments, and continues to guide India’s foreign policy today. This position was most recently reaffirmed by External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar, who, in response to US President Donald Trump’s repeated offers to mediate, declared unambiguously that “our relations and dealings with Pakistan will be strictly bilateral. That has been a national consensus for years, and there is absolutely no change in that.”
Speaking after the inauguration of the Embassy of Honduras in New Delhi on Thursday, Jaishankar further emphasised that the Prime Minister Narendra Modi had made it clear that talks with
Pakistan could only be held on the issue of terrorism. Rejecting equivalence between the two nations, he stated, “the attacker and the victim” were being unfairly placed in the same bracket, highlighting the asymmetry between Pakistan's role as a state sponsor of terrorism and India's role as a state combating it.
To understand the significance of the Indian position on no mediation, it is necessary to revisit the origins and trajectory of the Kashmir conflict. The dispute dates back to 1947, when the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir acceded to India following an invasion by tribal militias supported by Pakistan. This decision, formalised through a legal document known as the Instrument of Accession, is seen by India as a final and binding agreement that determined the constitutional status of Kashmir within the Indian Union.
Yet, from the earliest days, the international community, especially the Western powers, attempted to involve themselves in resolving the dispute. The United Nations supervised a ceasefire in 1949, drawing a line—later called the Line of Control (LoC)—that temporarily divided the territory. India, however, resisted calls for a plebiscite and gradually moved to internalise the Kashmir question as one of sovereignty and territorial integrity, not an unresolved international dispute.
This inclination toward bilateralism was codified in the Simla Agreement of 1972, signed between Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and Pakistani President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto following the Indo-Pakistani War that led to the creation of Bangladesh. The Simla Agreement represented a major diplomatic milestone. It stated that India and Pakistan would resolve their differences “through peaceful means and bilateral negotiations,” and further established the sanctity of LoC. It also explicitly prohibited either side from unilaterally attempting to alter the situation or seeking outside intervention. Since then, India has anchored its foreign policy on Kashmir in this agreement, consistently citing it as a basis to reject any offers of mediation or arbitration. In India's view, any third-party involvement is not just unnecessary but also legally inappropriate and strategically unwise.
This position has been reinforced by a long history of disillusionment with international mediation efforts, particularly those involving the United States. In the early years after independence, India watched warily as the United Nations' involvement appeared to internationalise a matter it regarded as a bilateral concern.
In the 1960s, especially after the Sino-Indian war, India was pressured into talks with Pakistan under US and British mediation. The role of US Ambassador J K Galbraith, who even floated proposals to divide the Kashmir Valley, deeply upset Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, leading to a complete breakdown in talks.
Later, during the 1971 war, the US, under President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, openly sided with Pakistan, even deploying the Seventh Fleet to the Bay of Bengal in an act of intimidation toward India. This alignment with Pakistan in a time of regional upheaval—and when India was supporting the liberation of Bangladesh—further entrenched Indian skepticism toward American neutrality.
By the 1990s, attempts to revive international interest in the Kashmir issue only served to reinforce India’s resolve. When U S Assistant Secretary of State Robin Raphel questioned the legality of Kashmir’s accession to India in 1993, India responded with uncharacteristic firmness. According to then Joint Secretary (Americas), now Union Minister Hardeep Singh Puri, India “read the riot act” to the U S administration and issued a strongly worded protest. This became a defining moment in India’s foreign policy, drawing a clear red line around Kashmir: no outside interference would be tolerated. That line has held firm, even during the most turbulent episodes in India-Pakistan relations. In the Kargil War of 1999, when Pakistani forces crossed the LoC into Indian-held territory, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif sought U S intervention. But this time, the United States, under President Bill Clinton, declined to mediate and instead asked Pakistan to withdraw unconditionally. While India welcomed the support, it continued to avoid crediting any resolution to external actors.
Similarly, after the 2001 Parliament attack and the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks, the United States helped de-escalate tensions, primarily to prevent war between the two nuclear-armed neighbours. But even in these cases, India rejected any suggestion of mediation. The US role was tolerated—if not welcomed—only because it occurred quietly, behind the scenes, and did not impose a formal framework for dialogue.
In more recent years, particularly under the Narendra Modi government, India's position has become more pronounced. The official line is that there is no room for negotiation over the status of Jammu and Kashmir. Any talks with Pakistan, if they are to take place at all, will be exclusively on the issue of terrorism and the return of Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (PoK). This marks a significant shift as the focus for New Delhi now firmly is on cross-border terrorism and national security. The Trump administration tested these boundaries when the President, in his characteristic style, offered to mediate on Kashmir. Despite his claims that India had requested such involvement—a claim India flatly denied—New Delhi responded firmly. Indian officials, including Jaishankar, reiterated that there is no room for third-party involvement.
India's reaction was not merely procedural. The suggestion of equating Pakistan and India, especially after a series of terrorist attacks such as Pulwama and Pahalgam, was deeply offensive to Indian sensibilities. To treat the “attacker” and the “victim” as equal parties requiring mediation, as Jaishankar pointed out, betrayed a lack of understanding of the ground realities. New Delhi, therefore, views such offers not as helpful gestures but as false equivalencies that undercut its fight against state-sponsored terrorism.
At the heart of India’s refusal lies a broader assertion of its strategic autonomy. As India's global stature has grown—bolstered by economic strength, military modernisation, and diplomatic partnerships—so has its confidence in handling its own security matters. Accepting mediation would not only be seen as a surrender of agency but also as a dangerous precedent that might encourage future interference.
There is also an overwhelming national consensus: mediation is not an option. Any resolution, if it is to come, will do so not through international goodwill, but through direct engagement—when and if terrorism ends, and trust is rebuilt. Until then, the message from India remains unchanged: Kashmir is not on the table for the world to negotiate.
