“The law may not always find the truth, but it must never stop searching for it.”
- Justice Felix Frankfurter
When the verdict in the 2017 actress abduction case came, the banner headline was of Malayalam actor Dileep walking free with a broad smile.
Six others were convicted in the case, which drew nationwide attention and once again highlighted the enduring institutional weaknesses repeatedly compromising the pursuit of justice in India.
The verdict, which The New Indian Express said 'stirred up feelings of disbelief, agony and pain among large sections of people who had rooted for the survivor', has sparked a deeper conversation. One about the chronic fragility of India's criminal justice system.
The prosecution's case, built on allegations of conspiracy, abetment, coordination among several accused, and interference with digital material was inherently dependent on testimonial consistency and reliable digital evidence.
However, public trial records show that the evidentiary foundation of the charge that Dileep masterminded and financed the crime as an act of personal vengeance steadily eroded.
Witnesses departed from their original versions; inconsistencies surfaced during cross-examination; and digital data—already compromised by procedural lapses—lost coherence.
Under the Indian Evidence Act, courts cannot convict on suspicion or fragmented proof; the standard of "beyond reasonable doubt" demands structural evidentiary stability, which was evidently lacking.
Hostile witnesses and the collapse of truth finding
Few features of Indian criminal trials are as destructive as the phenomenon of hostile witnesses.
In this case, multiple witnesses altered or diluted their prior testimony, fundamentally destabilising the prosecution's narrative. Although perjury is criminalised, enforcement is virtually nonexistent, and witness protection remains inadequate.
The shifting stands of many witnesses incidentally came in a case that saw one of the investigation officers undergo witness examination for what is believed to be a record 109 days.
The misleading comfort of 'only 28 hostile witnesses'
A misconception that circulated in public discourse—that "only" twenty-eight witnesses were declared hostile—deserves correction.
This is not a trivial number.
Even a single key hostile witness can fracture the prosecution's chain of proof. Twenty-eight hostile witnesses represent not a minor deviation but a catastrophic evidentiary breakdown.
Under the Indian Evidence Act, credibility matters far more than quantity; each hostile witness is a rupture in the continuum of proof. Hostility is rarely neutral—it is often the product of intimidation, inducement, or absence of protection. This systemic failure must be taken seriously.
Digital evidence and India's forensic deficit
Modern criminal trials, including this one, increasingly depend on digital footprints—metadata, device extraction reports, cloud backups, call logs and video files. Yet India's digital-evidence framework remains alarmingly underdeveloped.
Section 65B certification is frequently mishandled; hash values are omitted; devices are accessed multiple times without forensic discipline; and chain-of-custody documentation is often incomplete or nonexistent.
In contrast, courts in the United Kingdom and United States require secure forensic imaging, tamper-proof documentation, and strict evidence-handling protocols that adhere to international standards. The UAE employs specialised digital forensic laboratories with robust procedural safeguards.
India's evidentiary system, by comparison, remains technologically ill-equipped, rendering truth not merely difficult but sometimes legally inaccessible.
The difficulty in proving conspiracy in India
The acquittal of one alleged conspirator alongside the conviction of others in related proceedings raises an important doctrinal question—one that does not depend on the unreleased judgment.
Indian and comparative jurisprudence, including Kehar Singh, Navjot Sandhu, United States v. Falcone, and R v. Siracusa, makes it clear that conspiracy is an independent offence requiring distinct proof of participation against each accused. Thus, while the factual narrative may suggest a coordinated offence, evidentiary insufficiency with respect to one accused can result in acquittal without negating the underlying conspiracy.
This doctrinal nuance exposes a structural weakness: India's investigative processes often fail to sustain the complex evidentiary architecture that conspiracy prosecutions demand.
Why the survivor's pleas to change the judge went unheard
An additional dimension of this case concerns the survivor's apprehension about the presiding judge—a matter she placed before both the High Court and Supreme Court.
Her concern was not an accusation of bias but a request for psychological assurance in a trauma-laden prosecution. The courts adhered to India's orthodox recusal doctrine, which requires demonstrable likelihood of bias.
However, comparative jurisdictions adopt more flexible standards.
The United Kingdom sometimes reassigns judges in sexual-offence cases to preserve the appearance of fairness. The United States follows the "appearance of justice" doctrine, recognising that legitimacy depends partly on perception. The UAE routinely reassigns sensitive matters to maintain public trust.
India's rigid standard raises a pressing policy question: should survivor-centric considerations influence judicial administration in sensitive cases?
Better deals only for the accused?
This question becomes sharper when one considers instances where Indian courts have reassigned judges or transferred trials at the request of accused persons, even in far less sensitive matters.
The Best Bakery retrial, the Mohammad Hussain de novo proceedings (proceedings that began anew), and the multiple judge changes in the Asaram Bapu litigation demonstrate substantial judicial flexibility. High Courts such as those in Allahabad and Calcutta have similarly transferred cases upon the apprehension of the accused.
The inconsistency is structural rather than personal: the system has historically been more responsive to concerns raised by accused persons than to those raised by the victims of serious crimes. This critique does not question judicial integrity; it questions doctrinal adequacy.
The crying need for modernisation
Underlying all these systemic failures is a deeper problem: India’s persistent reluctance to modernise its investigative, forensic, and evidentiary systems.
Criminal litigation today requires expertise in digital forensics, metadata interpretation, cyber-evidence authentication, and advanced evidentiary methodologies. Without sustained institutional investment in training, technology, and forensic infrastructure, the justice system will continue to rely on outdated tools to adjudicate technologically sophisticated crimes.
Wanted: A reboot
The verdict in the actress abduction case—irrespective of the reasoning that the forthcoming judgment may reveal—must be understood then as a prism reflecting the systemic deficits of India's criminal justice apparatus.
This case exposes foundational weaknesses in witness protection, digital-evidence handling, prosecutorial rigour, conspiracy jurisprudence, and victim-sensitive judicial administration.
Unless India embarks on comprehensive reforms, the justice system will continue to falter not because courts lack resolve, but because the system lacks the evidentiary and technological capacity to uncover and prove the truth.
The question raised by this case is not about one individual alone; it is about whether the Indian criminal justice system, in its current form, is structurally capable of delivering justice at all.
(The author is the Founder & Chairman of Musthafa & Almana, a global law firm.)