What happens when allegations of corruption emerge against a sitting high court judge? Does the judiciary have a transparent and functional mechanism to hold its members accountable? The recent controversy surrounding Justice Yashwant Varma, the second senior-most judge of the High Court of Delhi, has reignited a fierce debate on judicial governance.
It also prompted demands for the restoration of the scrapped National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) Bill that sought to replace the collegium system of appointing judges, with Vice President Jagdeep Dhankhar taking the lead. There is also a push for legislation to mandatorily make all judges declare their assets in public.
The Justice Varma case revolves around the accidental discovery of wads of partially burnt unaccounted cash within the compound of his official residence, an allegation the judge vehemently denies. It puts the lens on regulatory safeguards for probity while maintaining judicial independence.
Landmark 1991 ruling
A crucial legal precedent in determining whether a high court judge can face an FIR or criminal proceedings came from the Supreme Court’s 1991 ruling in K Veeraswami v/s Union of India. The case involved K Veeraswami, a former Chief Justice of the Madras High Court, who was accused of corruption. The main issue was whether a high court or Supreme Court judge could be prosecuted for corruption under the Prevention of Corruption Act.
In that landmark judgment, the Supreme Court held that judges are not immune from prosecution under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. However, it also outlined significant safeguards, including mandatory consultation with the Chief Justice of India (CJI) before registering an FIR, Presidential sanction for prosecution on the CJI’s advice, and the possibility of prosecution even before impeachment proceedings are completed.
The judgment underscored the need to balance judicial independence with accountability, emphasising that no judge should be beyond the reach of law. At the same time, it stressed the importance of shielding judges from frivolous accusations that could be weaponised to undermine judicial authority. The ruling remains a cornerstone for addressing corruption allegations against members of the higher judiciary.
A fire, and lots of smoke
The latest controversy erupted on the night of March 14, 2025, when a fire broke out in what Justice Varma described was an outhouse in his official residence. Reports suggested that four-five bags of partially charred Indian currency notes were discovered by firefighters who doused the flames and captured digital evidence. Justice Varma categorically denied these claims, labelling them as part of a larger conspiracy to tarnish his reputation.
The case took a dramatic turn when Delhi Police Commissioner Sanjay Arora shared photographs and a video of the allegedly burnt cash with Delhi High Court Chief Justice D K Upadhyaya on WhatsApp. However, a first information report (FIR) is yet to be filed on the matter. A bench of the Supreme Court comprising justices Abhay S Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan on March 28 refused to entertain a plea for filing an FIR. “The in-house inquiry is ongoing. If the report sees something wrong, FIR can be directed or matter can be referred to Parliament.
Today is not the time to consider it,” the bench observed.
The bench was referring to a Supreme Court-appointed three-member committee investigating the alleged ‘cash burn’, a phrase that has a completely different connotation in the business domain. As part of the inquiry, the in-house committee comprising Justice Sheel Nagu (Chief Justice of Punjab and Haryana High Court), Justice G S Sandhawalia (Chief Justice of Himachal Pradesh High Court) and Justice Anu Sivaraman (Karnataka High Court judge) recently visited Justice Varma’s official bungalow at 30, Tughlak Crescent in Delhi.
In-house committee procedure
The in-house procedure formulated by the Supreme Court in 1999 was specifically designed to handle allegations against judges without compromising on judicial independence. This framework was established following a similar case in 1995 involving the then Bombay High Court Chief Justice A M Bhattacharjee, who faced allegations of financial misconduct. The procedure allows for a structured yet confidential investigation into allegations of misconduct against judges. It operates on the principle that the judiciary should internally address accusations against its members without the immediate involvement of external investigative agencies.
Under this procedure, allegations against a judge can be brought to the notice of the chief justice of the concerned high court, the CJI, or even the President of India. Upon receiving a complaint, the CJI may seek a preliminary report from the chief justice of the high court in question. If the allegations appear credible, a three-member committee comprising two high court chief justices and one senior judge is constituted to investigate the matter. The probe committee examines the evidence, interacts with relevant stakeholders, and submits a confidential report to the CJI on its findings.
If the committee finds sufficient evidence of misconduct, and if the charges are not grave enough for impeachment, the CJI may advise the judge to resign or retire. The judge could also choose to step down voluntarily to avoid further damage to his and the institution’s reputation. If the charges are severe and warrant stronger action, the CJI may recommend that the judge be stripped of judicial responsibilities. In such cases, the report is forwarded to the President and Prime Minister, setting the stage for possible impeachment proceedings.
The impeachment of a judge is governed by Articles 124 and 217 of the Constitution and involves an arduous multi-step process (see graphics). The procedure begins with a motion signed by at least 100 Lok Sabha MPs or 50 Rajya Sabha MPs, after which a three-member judicial committee conducts an inquiry. If the committee establishes misconduct, both Houses of Parliament must pass the motion with a two-thirds majority, after which the President of India can issue an order for removal. This process is extraordinarily complex. No judge in India’s history has ever been removed through impeachment yet.
Unanswered questions
In an unprecedented move, CJI Sanjiv Khanna publicly disclosed a preliminary inquiry report on the matter late on March 22 without sharing it with the collegium, drawing some internal criticism. Though he went with the metaphor that sunlight is the best disinfectant, the document dump deepened the enigma surrounding the case. The disclosed documents — including Delhi HC Chief Justice D K Upadhyaya’s redacted findings and Justice Varma’s response, raised more questions than answers.
Among the documents was a video shared by the fire service department showing remains of the sacks of burnt notes. Justice Upadhyaya’s report suggested evidence tampering warranting further probe, as it cited the police chief as saying that debris from the room that was up in flames was cleared the next day.
All that intensified public scrutiny and revealed glaring inconsistencies in the narrative thus far. For example, who ordered the removal of the debris? The police chief had based his claim on the version of a security guard stationed at Justice Varma’s residence, who revealed that the debris and half-burnt articles were cleared from the scene on the morning of March 15. On whose instructions was this done, and where is this debris now?
According to the report made public by the CJI, multiple half-burnt sacks containing “remains of Indian currency” were seen on the site. If so, why wasn’t the scene immediately sealed? Union home minister Amit Shah on March 28 set the record straight saying action couldn’t be taken in the absence of an FIR, which could not be booked because of the procedural issues described earlier.
Intriguingly, the security guard’s statement does not explicitly mention any currency being among the cleared debris. Was the money removed covertly, and if so, by whom? A few bits of burnt notes found outside the judge’s home later made the case more curious.
The Delhi HC Chief Justice’s secretary visited the outhouse along with Justice Varma the next day and noted the presence of charred remains. However, the secretary’s report to his boss made no reference to currency or financial remnants. Why?
Besides , the secretary’s report seemed to contradict the security guard’s testimony. If the debris had been removed in the morning, how could the secretary have observed burnt articles on the night of March 15?
Justice Varma, in his defence, dismissed the notion that he or his family members stored cash in the outhouse, deeming such an idea “incredible and incredulous”. The storeroom in question was reportedly accessible to staff, security personnel, and even Central Public Works Department employees. Why would anyone stash unaccounted wealth in an easily accessible, unguarded space?
Has the police seized the device used to record the viral video? Footage of the video showing burnt currency notes at the site, if genuine, would serve as a crucial piece of evidence.
Why did the police take over 17 hours to inform Delhi High Court Chief Justice Upadhyaya about the incident? The fire was reported around 11.43 pm on March 14. However, it wasn’t until 4.50 pm on March 15 that Delhi Police Commissioner Sanjay Arora briefed Chief Justice Upadhyaya about the outcome. This delay is particularly suspect given that the Commissioner allegedly already had possession of the incriminating video. What transpired within those crucial 17 hours?
Justice Varma alleged foul play, suggesting that the entire episode could be an orchestrated effort to trap him. If so, critical evidence should be present in the CCTV recordings from his residence. For context, the alert to the fire service came from Justice Varma’s secretary and the judge’s daughter.
Who is Justice Varma?
Justice Varma is a seasoned legal mind with 22 years at the Bar and a decade on the Bench. Born on January 6, 1969, in Allahabad, he obtained his law degree from Rewa University in Madhya Pradesh, before enrolling as an advocate in August 1992. His legal practice at the Allahabad High Court spanned constitutional law, labour disputes, corporate regulations and taxation. Rising through the ranks, he served as Uttar Pradesh’s Chief Standing Counsel from 2012 until his designation as a Senior Advocate in 2013.
In October 2014, he ascended to the Bench as an Additional Judge before earning permanent status in February 2016. His transfer to the Delhi High Court in October 2021 enhanced his stature before the accidental fire began testing his integrity big time.
Impeachment
The Constitution, while not using the term “impeachment”, provides that a judge of the Supreme Court can be “removed from office” by the President of India, acting on a motion submitted by Parliament
Grounds for sacking: A judge can be removed only for “proved misbehaviour or incapacity”
Impeachment motion: Can be introduced in either the Lok Sabha (with 100 signatures) or the Rajya Sabha (with 50 signatures)
Investigation committee: A three-member committee, comprising a Supreme Court judge, a high court judge, and a distinguished jurist, is formed to investigate the complaint
Report and voting: If the committee finds misbehaviour or incapacity, its report is presented to the House, which must approve it with a majority vote. The motion is then sent to the other House, which must pass it with a two-thirds majority
Final removal: If both Houses approve, the motion is sent to the President, who issues an order for the judge’s removal
Key ICJ recommendations
Ensure that the selection, appointment, and the transfer of judges are carried out by a statutory body, such as a judicial council, on the basis of objective, predetermined criteria consistent with international law and standards
Adopt a code of judicial conduct and establish a statutory mechanism to address complaints against judges to ensure a system of judicial accountability that is insulated from the executive
Introduce measures to regulate the post-retirement employment of judges so as to safeguard the judiciary from practices inconsistent with judicial independence and executive discretion
Take measures to remove arbitrariness in internal administration of justice, specifically the listing and allocation of cases in the Supreme Court and high courts
Key findings
Lack of a clear and transparent procedure of selection and of objective and predetermined criteria based on competence, merit, ability, experience and integrity. There is therefore an absence of adequate safeguards against selection for improper means and motive
The appointment process gives the government an effective veto power on recommendations made by the collegium, allowing the executive a determinative role in the composition of the higher judiciary
The transfer of judges does not require consent of the concerned judge. Transfers proceed on vague and overbroad criteria, such as ‘public interest’ and ‘better administration of justice’ without clear explanation. This allows arbitrariness, often making it impossible to distinguish between transfers being used as disguised sanction, transfers intended to be punitive or retaliatory and transfers for the better administration of justice and public interest
The power to initiate removal or impeachment proceedings is vested with Parliament, which is inconsistent with international law principles according to which the power of removal should be vested with an independent body composed of a majority of judges and not with either the legislature or the executive
Other than impeachment, judicial accountability mechanisms in India are insular and ineffective, making real accountability near impossible. The ‘In-House Procedure’ developed by the Supreme Court to inquire into complaints against judges is not provided for in statutory law. It is not based on any articulated rules or norms of judicial conduct that serve as a substantive basis to determine misconduct
Insular, ineffective mechanisms: ICJ
The practice of post-retirement employment of judges, particularly when the appointment is carried out at the discretion of the government, casts a shadow of perception of bias on the concerned judge while at the same time allowing for indirect executive influence over the judge while in office
Internal administration pertaining to listing and allocation of cases in the Supreme Court, while based on predetermined rules and procedures, are also subject to the discretionary power of the Chief Justice of India. Instances of irregular listing and allocation, presumably at the discretion of the Chief Justice, have given rise to seemingly arbitrary exercise of power by the Chief Justice, at times in a manner that suits the government
While the Constitution provides for judicial independence and the separation of powers between the judiciary, executive and legislature, a recent report by the Internal Commission of Jurists on ‘Judicial Independence in India, 2025,’ identified numerous deficiencies in legislation and administrative law and judicial practice that must be urgently addressed to uphold this constitutional mandate.
Transfer of HC judges
The procedure to transfer high court judges is provided under Article 222 of the Constitution as well as in the Memorandum of Procedure for appointment of HC judges. The CJI makes the recommendation after taking into account the views of the chief justices of the high court from which the judge is proposed to be transferred, as well the chief justice of the high court to which the transfer is to be effected. The CJI is also required to take into account views of other judges of the Supreme Court elevated from the two concerned high courts. After factoring in all these views, the SC collegium makes its recommendation to the Union law minister.
The ‘Third Judges case’ crystallised the position that in matters of transfer of judges between high courts, the opinion of the Chief Justice of India and the collegium would be determinative. The judgment in the Third Judges case and subsequent judgments after hearing legal challenges from high court judges challenging their own transfer, read together, have resulted in the present position whereby the consent of the judge being transferred is not required under the rationale that such a requirement would render the power to transfer nugatory. Underlying this position is the understanding that transfers are deemed to be bonafide and non-punitive, and that the only criteria to be considered while effecting a transfer is that of ‘public interest’.
