NOTHING illustrates the ephemeral nature of power more vividly than the death of Thiruvenkadam Velupillai Prabhakaran who controlled perhaps the most powerful guerilla organisation in the world and was raised to divine status as Sooriyathevan (Sun God) by his sycophantic followers.
The circumstances of his death were, as was his life, mired in controversy. His demise was anticipated before it happened. The discovery of his corpse was revealed in sections of the media even before it was found. Then the LTTE’s chief of International relations, Selvarasa Pathmanathan alias KP issued a denial of the death of his leader.
It appears that Prabhakaran and the LTTE had not been unduly concerned about the advancing armed forces for quite a while. They were confident the army would not be able to proceed beyond a certain point. This assessment got skewered after the fall of Paranthan, followed by Kilinochchi and then Elephant pass.
Even after losing the Jaffna-Kandy road or A-9 highway and all areas to its west the LTTE was confident of withstanding the army for much longer in areas east of A-9. The final option was to “carve” out an area of about 350-450 sq km in Mullaitivu district with access to the coast and then defend it strenuously. But the army’s rapid progress took the LTTE by surprise. The various military divisions and task forces had made sweeping strides into Tiger territory. As a result the LTTE and hundreds of thousands of civilians were boxed into a small space that kept shrinking as the army advanced.
It was then that the alarm bells began ringing.
The civilian casualty toll also started rising as more and more people were crammed into a shrinking enclave while the armed forces intensified operations. Now the diaspora got into the act. Tamils began engaging in worldwide protests and demonstrations. Tamil Nadu too started boiling. New Delhi was under pressure. It was here that Prabhakaran made four grave miscalculations. He overestimated the influence of the diaspora in the West and the pro-Tiger lobby in Tamil Nadu.
Prabhakaran thought the western nations could be made to exert adequate pressure on Colombo and make it call off the war. Likewise he thought the passions in Tamil Nadu could sway New Delhi into moving against the war.
He also badly underestimated the Rajapaksa regime as well as the armed forces. Prabhakaran did not expect the military to keep moving relentlessly as they did. Despite heavy losses the juggernaut kept on rolling forward.
More importantly he expected President Mahinda Rajapaksa to cave into pressure. Rajapaksa too did not succumb and went ahead with the military campaign.
But the biggest blunder of all was to believe that the LTTE could at some point deliver a crippling blow. This would demoralise the army, he surmised. The situation deteriorated but Prabhakaran living in a fool’s paradise was pretty sure that at some point the military drive would come to a halt. Thus he continued to stay put.
If Prabhakaran had wished he could have relocated clandestinely to the Wanni or Weli — Oya/ Manal Aaru jungles or escaped by sea to Southeast Asia. But he did not. Apparently he was relying on the massive counter-offensive being planned to destroy army defences in the Puthukkudiyiruppu region. But the debacle at Aanandapuram scuppered those plans. Even as the army drew closer and closer to the beleaguered Tigers senior deputies began entreating Prabhakaran to withdraw from the war zone. But Prabhakaran, stubborn and obstinate, would not listen.
As the situation became increasingly perilous Prabhakaran’s point man overseas KP tried to salvage the situation. KP the LTTE’s former chief arms procurer proclaimed as wanted by Interpol was now the global Tiger chief. Using perhaps the wheeler–dealer techniques learnt through hands on experience in the arms bazaars of the world the talented Pathmanathan tapped into his vast reservoir of contacts. The diplomats of at least four western nations, UN functionaries in Geneva and New York, a foreign cabinet minister and a few prominent western journalists were all in touch with KP. A tentative plan envisaged the LTTE surrendering to a third party, namely the UN, but with firm guarantees from two powerful Western nations. The possibility of troops from those countries landing in Mullaitivu to supervise the “surrender” was also not ruled out.
A three-tiered formula regarding the future of LTTE leaders and cadres was also mooted.
The top leaders not exceeding 50 along with families were to be given safe passage outside Sri Lanka to a secret destination. Middle-level functionaries would face trial in Sri Lanka and be given comparatively light sentences. They were to be rehabilitated after being given some vocational training. The low-level cadres particularly the new conscripts were to get a general amnesty. They would be on parole for a period of time and be subject to monitoring.
This project was shot down in its conceptual stage. The defence establishment on the verge of military victory was not going to let the Tigers off the hook. This reaction was predictable.
But what surprised some diplomats involved in the project was the LTTE attitude.
Apparently Prabhakaran was infuriated with KP. He reprimanded KP saying, Unakkum Porattatm vellum endru Nambikkai Illaiyaa”? (Do you also not have faith that the struggle will succeed?). That was that.
But with parliamentary elections drawing near in India another opportunity arose. The emotional climate in Tamil Nadu and incessant propaganda by the Tiger lobby had many candidates of the DMK and Congress jittery. Jayalalithaa’s new found love for Eelam was another cause for worry. The DMK and Congress were depicted as betraying the Tamils. Some newspapers predicted a clean sweep for the opposition.
A senior Central minister from Tamil Nadu made a fresh attempt for a ceasefire in Sri Lanka.
He even persuaded Sonia Gandhi to go along with the plan. The LTTE was asked to issue a declaration that it was prepared to lay down its arms pending negotiations. Even the Tiger declaration was drafted for LTTE approval. But the LTTE failed to utilise the opportunity. The Tigers consulted their chief supporters like P Nedumaran and Vaiko. Unwilling to let the Congress and DMK gain credit the duo advised the LTTE to reject the offer. So the LTTE said illai (no).
Meanwhile Colombo had declared two limited ceasefires. One was for three days from February 1 to 3. The other was for two days on April 3 and 14. The purpose was to facilitate civilians moving out from the war zone. But the LTTE imposed further restrictions and the number of civilians coming out dropped during ceasefire days. Time was running out. The govt resolved to get really tough. Brig. Prasanna de Silva commanding the 55 division was “transferred” to the 59 division stationed in the south of the ‘war zone”. A threepronged drive commenced with the 58 led by Brig. Shavendra Silva proceeding north to south, the 59 moving from south to north and the 53 commanded by Gen Kamal Gunaratne proceeding from west to east. After intense fighting resulting in thousands of civilian deaths the 55 and 58 linked up along the Indian ocean coast. The 53 hugged the lagoon and moved inwards. The people and Tigers were trapped and boxed in. There was heavy internal pressure on Prabhakaran.
The 2002 ceasefire had seen a lot of cadres marrying. Most marriages were between male and female cadres. Many of these families had two or three young children. The intensive shelling had resulted in a lot of deaths and more than 800 Tigers were seriously injured.
The LTTE leader had to do something. So Prabhakaran changed his mind again and asked KP to negotiate the surrender to a third party. But it was too late. The defence establishment was not interested. Colombo stood firm. So KP was informed that there could be no third party surrender.
The LTTE had to surrender “individually” to the army. Prabhakaran was furious. He and the senior Tigers went into a brainstorming session. Their response would be in three parts. One group of Tigers including Prabhakaran would break out, cross the lagoon and the Paranthan-Mullaitivu road. They would move into the vast Wanni jungles and operate.
Some would move to the East. A second group of Tigers would contact the army and negotiate terms of surrender. The third group was to engage in rearguard action.
Charles Antony, Prabhakaran’s eldest son, led the contingent tasked to fight to the last. Since Prabhakaran had often been accused of letting other people’s children die while cherishing his own, his firstborn was to be sacrificed.
The negotiation attempt was to be conducted by political commissar Nadesan and peace secretariat director Pulidevan. KP in Europe had interacted with several officials and diplomats. They in turn had been in touch with Colombo. A Tamil National Alliance (TNA) parliamentarian from the East had also contacted both the President and defence secretary. The LTTE was told explicitly to come out with white flags raised high.
Meanwhile, the LTTE also released seven security personnel in their custody. They turned themselves in to the 59 and informed them of the Tiger offer. They were advised to return and bring the Tiger political leaders. So Nadesan, Pulidevan and Vijitha the Sinhala wife of Nadesan came out with the released prisoners, carrying white flags.
Subsequently, all three were found dead in mysterious circumstances. The LTTE has charged that both were shot dead in cold blood.
But a government spokesman has said that some Tigers who disapproved of surrender killed Nadesan and Puli devan. The truth is yet to be revealed.
While these moves were on the LTTE launched a massive attack shortly after midnight on Sunday. This was because of numerology as Sunday was 17. Once midnight passed it was Monday 18. There was a time when the LTTE would not engage in major operations on 8, 17 or 26 because No 8 was considered unlucky.
These superstitions became irrelevant but at this critical juncture the “Eight” phobia was on. The attack was in three directions but mainly directed towards the Nandhikkadal lagoon area held by the 53 division. After fierce fighting led by Bhanu the three Tiger contingents broke through. One was led by Jeyam, one by Pottu Amman and one by Soosai. They numbered about 250- 300.
A very large number of Black Tigers died in the assault as boys and girls with explosives strapped on jumped army positions and blew themselves up. This created the “gaps” for other Tigers to penetrate the military cordon. The soldiers began an intensive artillery barrage in which many died. Also the army had set up layers of defence with more personnel at the back.
The LTTE cadres who broke through were to some extent sandwiched later and cut down. With the assault failing and many Tigers being encircled several LTTE cadres began consuming cyanide. Similarly the “defenders” led by Charles Anthony were also routed. Several survivors swallowed cyanide to avoid capture. Charles Anthony was found dead with bullet injuries. The group led by Soosai was initially successful.
Prabhakaran, wife Madhivadhani Erambu, daughter Duvaraga and younger son Balachandran were part of this contingent. The Prabhakaran family of four and 47 others managed to penetrate the Nandhikkadal defence ring and move north to the Puthumaatalan area. A message sent on behalf of Prabhakaran to Mullivaaikkal stated udaithukondu poyitram (we’ve broken through and gone). This message in turn was conveyed to KP in Europe who was naturally elated. Unfortunately it gave false hopes about the leader being safe.
Prabhakaran’s body was discovered before dawn on May 19 lying on the Nanthikkadal bank. Soldiers of the 4th Vijayabahu infantry regiment led by Lt Col Rohitha Aluvihare claimed to have found it. Prabhakaran had been shot at point blank range. Four of his bodyguards were lying dead in the vicinity.
Later it was claimed that the bodies of Madhivadhany, Duvaaraga and Balachandran were found in a bushy patch about 600 metres way from Prabhakaran’s body. Charles Anthony was already dead. The entire family had been wiped out. Expectations (shared by this writer) that the LTTE leader’s body would never be discovered or found intact, proved wrong. Pictures released by the Army and defence ministry showed him in uniform and later in underwear. Apparently he was not carrying the cyanide capsule.
Adding to the confusion was premature news about his death. It was anticipated on Saturday May 16 itself, when the military intelligence received information that Prabhakaran and Pottu Amman had either been killed in shelling or taken their own lives. Then on May 18, there was news about three persons trying to get away in an ambulance. The vehicle was destroyed by the army and the charred body of one person was supposedly that of Prabhakaran’s. Sections of the media went to town with the news that Prabhakaran’s body had been found.
But that was wrong and it was only the next morning that the body was discovered. On Tuesday, former eastern LTTE leader “Col” Karuna and ex-Tiger spokesperson Daya Master identified the body. Some journalists and army officers also confirmed it.
If Prabhakaran is really alive and turns up in future the army commander’s credibility will be severely eroded. Gen Fonseka cannot be unaware of this and therefore must have been very certain that Prabhakaran was dead. The onus now is on KP to either admit the LTTE leader’s death or furnish proof that he is still alive. Meanwhile many Tamils continue to believe that Praba lives. It is however imperative that the Government issue a comprehensive statement explaining the deaths of Prabhakaran and his family. Otherwise a Prabhakaran dead will be as controversial as a Prabhakaran living.
Jeyaraj is a freelance writer based in Toronto.
This is an edited version of the article appeared in the Daily Mirror. djeyaraj2005@yahoo.com.