The Türkiye-Saudi Arabia-Pakistan defence agreement signed in Mecca on August 7 has attracted the label ‘Muslim Nato’. It may be useful for headlines, but is less useful for understanding what the three seek to build. The key question is what ‘mutual defence’ means when wars are increasingly undeclared and hybrid, fought below the threshold of conventional conflict.
The agreement states that an armed attack on one will be regarded as an attack on all, resembling Nato’s Article 5. Yet it does not specify the nature or scale of assistance. That ambiguity may be deliberate: the pact’s deterrent value could depend on keeping its meaning open.
Wars today are rarely declared. They arrive through drones, missiles, cyberattacks, terrorism, proxy forces, maritime disruption, attacks on critical infrastructure and information warfare. The line between war and peace is increasingly blurred.
Saudi Arabia’s experience with the Houthi threat illustrates this. A weaker actor could impose costs through missiles and drones while threatening energy infrastructure and shipping. A future threat to Saudi Arabia need not involve conventional forces; it could involve drone swarms, attacks on oil facilities, maritime disruption or cyber operations.
This changes mutual defence. Pakistan’s useful contribution could be naval assets, maritime surveillance, intelligence, logistics, training and ammunition, while Türkiye could provide drones, electronic warfare and defence technology. Such cooperation could make the pact meaningful without making it a Nato.
Saudi Arabia has a particular reason to seek such redundancy. Recent turmoil has shown that even a wealthy, well-armed state remains vulnerable to relatively inexpensive asymmetric weapons.
The US remains Saudi Arabia’s principal external security partner. The Mecca agreement should therefore be seen not as abandoning Washington, but as an additional layer of insurance. For the US, this need not be unwelcome. Pakistani naval capabilities and Turkish defence technology could help Saudi Arabia protect shipping, infrastructure and territory, sharing some of the regional security burden.
The equation changes if the pact becomes a mechanism for military action against Israel. As long as it remains defensive, Washington could welcome greater regional responsibility. Saudi Arabia can deepen ties with Pakistan and Türkiye while retaining its US relationship and keeping open eventual normalisation with Israel.
The most practical area of cooperation may ultimately be less dramatic than combat; the ability to sustain a war. Modern conflict is increasingly a contest of endurance. Advanced weapons are of limited value if ammunition cannot be replenished, equipment repaired, shipping protected and energy supplies maintained.
The three countries possess complementary strengths. Saudi Arabia has financial resources and energy importance; Türkiye possesses a growing defence industry and experience with drones and other technologies; and Pakistan has a large military establishment, defence-production capabilities and operational experience.
Their cooperation could therefore focus on intelligence-sharing, joint exercises, maritime surveillance, logistics, maintenance, defence production, ammunition stocks, technology and contingency planning. This may be the most realistic path: converting solidarity into practical support without requiring every member to fight every conflict.
The agreement should be seen as aspirational—the signing may trigger progressively deeper cooperation rather than complete an operational military alliance.
The real difficulty begins with Iran. If Iranian missiles or drones attack Saudi targets, the Article 5-type provision would acquire a different meaning. Would Pakistan strike Iranian targets?
That appears highly unlikely. Islamabad has strong reasons to avoid direct confrontation with Tehran. Türkiye faces an equally difficult calculation: Iran is its neighbour, competitor and economic partner, while Ankara has vital interests in Syria, Iraq and the Caucasus.
This is why Article 5 language is easier to announce than execute. The provision may be designed less to create an automatic war mechanism than to make an aggressor uncertain about the scale of response. Its ambiguity may therefore be a feature, not a weakness. The pact’s deterrent value may exceed its war-fighting value.
There is a historical problem with invoking Islamic solidarity in military affairs. The Muslim world has rarely demonstrated sustained military solidarity when national interests have diverged; political, sectarian and geographical considerations have usually proved stronger than religious identity.
There is no reason to assume this pact will overcome those realities. It may succeed precisely by not demanding too much of Islamic solidarity. Saudi Arabia may need Pakistani ships, Turkish drones or intelligence without either country having to fight its war. Pakistan may need Turkish technology and Saudi resources without requiring either to enter combat.
That is a more achievable model of cooperation—practical solidarity through capabilities and resources rather than automatic military intervention.
The most revealing test of the pact’s political limits could eventually come not from Iran but from South Asia. Suppose Pakistan is implicated in a major terrorist attack in India and India responds militarily. Would Türkiye provide military assistance to Pakistan under the new arrangement?
Türkiye’s political support for Pakistan is well known. Saudi Arabia, however, is in a different position. Its relationship with India has expanded considerably across energy, investment, security and strategic cooperation. Would Riyadh risk that relationship to support Pakistan in a conflict with India?
If Türkiye assisted Pakistan while Saudi Arabia remained neutral, what would that say about the alliance’s cohesion? This illustrates the central problem with Article 5; the three may agree on mutual defence while disagreeing over when it should apply. That does not necessarily make the pact weak. It may make it more realistic.
The Mecca agreement is best viewed as a beginning rather than a finished military architecture. Its most consequential elements may ultimately be those that do not make headlines: intelligence, logistics, maritime security, defence production, technology, training and the ability to sustain conflict.
The Article 5-type clause provides deterrence precisely because its consequences are uncertain. The challenge is ensuring that this ambiguity does not become a source of miscalculation.
‘Muslim Nato’ may be an attractive description, but the pact does not yet justify it. Its evolution will depend on converting political solidarity into practical security cooperation.
In an age of hybrid warfare, the strongest defence arrangement may not promise to fight every war together, but ensure each member can withstand the conflicts it is most likely to face.
Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain (Retd) | Governor of Bihar and former Commander of the Srinagar-based Chinar Corps
(Views are personal)