Two Bilaterals, One Signal
When Prime Minister Narendra Modi met Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian in quick succession on the side-lines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Bishkek on August 31, he was doing more than managing two important bilateral relationships. He was making a larger statement about how India sees its place in a world increasingly divided by geopolitical conflict and competing blocs.
The SCO itself is instructive. It brings together Russia, China, Iran, India, Pakistan and the Central Asian states, countries that the West views through very different lenses. Yet India is comfortable engaging all of them, even as it simultaneously deepens its relationships with the United States, Europe, Israel and the Gulf. That is not simply hedging. It is an assertion that India’s interests are too broad and its strategic choices too important to be defined by any single relationship.
The Modi-Putin meeting was particularly significant because it reaffirmed the depth and resilience of a relationship that has survived enormous geopolitical change. Defence, energy, trade and the wider international situation were on the agenda. Yet Modi also used the meeting to reiterate India’s position that the Ukraine conflict must move from continuing war towards an end to the war.
The meeting with Pezeshkian carried a different but equally important message. Against the backdrop of the continuing West Asia crisis and the vulnerability of the Strait of Hormuz, Modi reiterated India’s preference for dialogue and diplomacy while emphasising the importance of safeguarding freedom of navigation and commerce.
Two meetings, therefore, sent one broad signal: India will engage where its interests demand engagement, irrespective of the preferences of other powers.
The Middle Ground Under Pressure
The real question, however, is whether India can continue to occupy this middle ground - deeply engaged with Russia and Iran while simultaneously managing an increasingly consequential relationship with Washington.The answer is still yes. But the price of strategic autonomy is rising.
India’s relationship with Russia remains anchored in energy and defence. Russian crude has become an important component of India’s energy security, while the wider defence relationship remains substantial. But this deepening engagement now carries a more direct economic cost. The US Senate has passed the Lindsey Graham Act of 2026 by an 86–11 vote. In its present form, the legislation would authorise the US President to impose tariffs of up to 100 per cent on countries among the largest purchasers of Russian oil and gas, putting India and China squarely in the zone of risk.
The important distinction is that this is no longer merely the threat of an executive action that can be negotiated away through bilateral diplomacy. It represents a broader congressional push to weaponise access to the US market against countries that continue significant commercial engagement with Russia.
India has already experienced the costs of this approach. The question now is whether New Delhi will allow external pressure to determine its energy choices. Its answer so far has been clear: energy security, affordability and national interest remain the primary considerations.
This does not mean India is indifferent to sanctions. Quite the opposite. It means that India is learning to navigate a world in which sanctions, tariffs, export controls and financial restrictions are increasingly being used as instruments of geopolitical power.That is a very different proposition from either joining a bloc or defying one.
The West Asia Conflict and the Energy Calculus
The crisis in West Asia has, if anything, reinforced the logic of India’s Russian engagement. India imports more than 80 per cent of its crude oil, making the security of maritime energy routes a strategic rather than merely commercial concern. Any prolonged disruption around the Gulf or the Strait of Hormuz immediately changes the risk calculation for New Delhi.
Russia, by contrast, provides India with an important source of supply outside the immediate Gulf theatre. The lesson from the recent crisis is therefore straightforward: diversification of suppliers is not simply about getting the cheapest barrel. It is about ensuring that India has alternatives when geopolitical shocks disrupt traditional supply chains.
This is why the Modi-Putin meeting cannot be understood simply through the prism of Ukraine or US sanctions. Energy has become one of the central pillars of India-Russia relations.
But this creates an uncomfortable contradiction. India needs Russian energy for security and affordability; it needs the American market for export growth; and it needs both relationships for different aspects of its broader strategic interests.
That is the essence of India’s multi-alignment challenge.
Chabahar and the Architecture of Multi-Alignment
If Russian oil represents the economic dimension of India’s strategic autonomy, Chabahar represents its geopolitical dimension.
The Iranian port is critical to India’s long-term connectivity ambitions because it provides an alternative route to Afghanistan and Central Asia, reducing dependence on routes through Pakistan. But Chabahar is also where India’s strategic interests collide most directly with the US sanctions regime on Iran.
Washington’s temporary sanctions waiver for Indian operations at Chabahar expired in April 2026, after having allowed India to continue its engagement with the port despite the wider sanctions regime on Iran.
India is therefore faced with a familiar dilemma: abandon a strategically important project because of sanctions risk, or preserve the relationship while calibrating the pace and visibility of its engagement. The latter is more consistent with India’s broader approach.
India is unlikely to treat Chabahar as an ideological commitment to Iran. Nor is it likely to abandon it simply because Washington is uncomfortable with Indian engagement in Iran. Instead, New Delhi’s instinct will be to preserve the strategic option while avoiding unnecessary exposure of Indian banks, companies and institutions to secondary sanctions.
That is multi-alignment in practice: not choosing sides permanently, but retaining the ability to choose differently on different issues.
There is an important historical continuity here.India’s foreign policy has moved from Nehru’s non-alignment to Modi’s multi-alignment, but the underlying instinct is remarkably similar: preserve independent decision-making in a world dominated by competing centres of power.
The difference is that India today is no longer seeking autonomy by standing outside power centres. It seeks autonomy by engaging several of them simultaneously. It talks to Russia while deepening ties with the United States. It works with Iran while expanding strategic cooperation with Israel and the Gulf. It participates in the SCO while strengthening the Quad. It engages China despite profound differences, while simultaneously seeking greater integration with Western supply chains.
This is not diplomatic inconsistency. It is the consequence of India’s growing weight in the international system. India’s objective is not to make every relationship equally close. It is to ensure that no single relationship becomes indispensable.
Strategic Autonomy Has a Price
But strategic autonomy should not be romanticised. It comes with costs. The more relationships India maintains, the more competing expectations it must manage. Russia expects India to remain a reliable partner. Washington wants India to reduce its dependence on Russian energy. Iran wants India to remain engaged with Chabahar. The Gulf wants India to remain an important economic and strategic partner. Europe wants greater Indian alignment on trade, technology and security. China remains simultaneously a competitor, neighbour and major economic actor.
Strategic autonomy ultimately rests on the strength of India’s own economy, energy security, technological capabilities, financial systems and military capacity. The stronger these foundations become, the greater India’s freedom of manoeuvre. The weaker they are, the more expensive every foreign-policy choice becomes.
The Bishkek meetings therefore represent more than a diplomatic balancing act. They are a statement of intent. India does not seek a world without alliances or partnerships. It seeks a world in which partnerships do not become dependencies.
The real test of strategic autonomy is consequently not whether India can avoid choosing sides. It is whether India can continue to choose - issue by issue, relationship by relationship, and crisis by crisis - without allowing any external power to make those choices for it.
In a world increasingly divided into blocs, that freedom to choose may itself become India’s most valuable strategic asset.
Shishir Priyadarshi | President, Chintan Research Foundation & former Director, WTO
(Views are personal)