So those questions: First, why did it take so long for the police to take action in the heinous May 4 incident in Manipur? Why did it have to be a ‘leaked’ video and not prompt police action that let the world know of what happened? How is it that allegations by the victims include the police accompanying the mob and then handing the victims over to the perpetrators? How does that happen?
In the militancy—and thus military—equations that the Northeast has had to live through for decades, those questions are better answered by counter-questions. The set is funnelled down through contemporary history, rather than by pontificating ‘commentators’ and television ‘specialists’ and their Northeastern mascots who find themselves busy figuring out ‘reason’ for the crime—right from an alleged ‘lack of administrative skills’ of the Central government to religion. Of politicians, the less said the better.
Hence, in response to the first question: How can Central Forces operating under the Armed Forces Special Powers Act, 1972, keep a woman in custody for a prolonged period, throwing to the wind all rulings of the Supreme Court? Does one know what that means for the woman?
To the second: There were no videos then, but just what happened to victims of the 1987 Operation Bluebird involving the armed forces at Oinam, also in Manipur. Why did that case fall through? Allegations include three rapes, five molestations, and women being forced to deliver babies in the presence of soldiers. For that matter, just what would it take to force elderly women to protest naked in front of the Kangla Fort in Imphal in 2004, holding a banner that read “Indian Army rape us”? That list is long and it includes a young woman named Thangjam Manorama.
To the third: If separatism and insurgency—and in this case, fratricide—are just all law and order problems, as every government claims they are, why involve the armed forces when we know that they while being trained to kill the enemy, cannot work in an insurgency situation without the local police? So why not train and empower the local police for the job rather than brutalise communities by deploying the armed forces? Why not give the local police the responsibility and make them accountable—and thus also give credit where it’s due—for fighting insurgency, the operative word being ‘responsible’?
The point being made should not be so difficult to comprehend: while all perpetrators must be brought to justice, the act of justice itself cannot be one-sided. In other words, brutalise a community, and you can expect brutality to creep up in some form or the other from within the community itself. It includes the case of a mob stripping and molesting a woman protester in Guwahati in 2012, and the lynching of an accused by a mob that included women, in 2015 in Dimapur. Some perpetrators then took selfies posing with the battered body of the man.
So where does one begin? Start by withdrawing the armed forces, stop using the AFSPA and the Assam Disturbed Areas Act, 1955 the piece of legislation (in this case empowering the police with brutality) that inspired the AFSPA in the first place. Start with an act of accountability, healing, trust, recognition and respect; not brutality and impunity. In a country divided on the basis of language, one should know the Northeast has well over 200. That means over 200 communities. If not dealt with sensitively and sensibly, that just could mean 200 conflicts. The results are there before us to see.
Pranab Bora
Editor of a portal in Guwahati
bora.pranab@gmail.com