Based on interactions with American national security elites at the annual Aspen Security Forum in Colorado, Politico compiled a report six months into Donald Trump’s second presidency last weekend. The digital newspaper reported the Aspen delegates “accepted that this president has irrevocably upended the global order... former and current US and foreign officials, business leaders and analysts acknowledged publicly and privately that the Trump administration has dealt a lasting blow to much of the post-World War II consensus around free trade and long-term cooperation”.
Indeed, isn’t this how history rolls on—when a statesman appears out of nowhere with a sledgehammer and a bold agenda to break the crust? The demolition is painful to watch and the outcome difficult to predict, which is reflected in the industrial-scale demonisation of Trump by the self-styled ‘liberal globalists’. Trump has smashed not only “the norms and conventions that governed US trade relations, use of military force and engagement with stalwart partners and alliances”, as Politico characterised it, but also rolled back the agencies entrusted with foreign policy tasks including USAID, CIA, Pentagon and the state department.
Indian foreign policy elites seek solace that Trump’s policies will not have a long shelf life and could be easily reversed once he leaves office. However, former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice admitted at the closing panel of the Colorado summit, in her capacity as co-chair of the Aspen Strategy Group, “We have to recognise that we’re probably not going back to exactly that system”.
We find Trump’s pugilistic approach on India-Pakistan tensions to be irksome, as our attempts to influence it on the edges are being rebuffed. But US mediation between India and Pakistan has been a fact of life going all the way back to the Indus Waters Treaty. The difference today is that Trump is claiming credit for it, which is profoundly embarrassing for the Indian leadership. But then, our politicians are second to none in grandstanding either.
After Trump’s election victory in November, Delhi went overboard to propagate it was cruising the transition from the Biden era to Trump with delectable ease. The Prime Minister’s hastily arranged visit to Washington in February cemented such a perception. Today, if a contrarian assessment has arisen that the government’s foreign policy has collapsed, we are at fault for raising expectations sky-high. Apparently, we estimated a certain predictability about Trump’s policies. But his tariff war came as a rude shock.
However, Trump’s imposition of tariffs amounting to an extra 145 percent on Chinese imports was swiftly abandoned and replaced with a more favourable deal pending a resolution of the fentanyl issue. In recent days, relations have warmed further. China agreed to lift restrictions on the export of rare earths and, in return, the US eased restrictions on the sale of advanced computer chips to China. Jensen Huang, CEO of Nvidia, one of the world’s most valuable companies whose chips are used for advanced artificial intelligence tasks, was on a celebratory tour of China last week. Huang was ecstatic about the business possibilities with the “massive, dynamic, and highly innovative” Chinese market. He declared, “It is indeed crucial for American companies to establish roots in the Chinese market.”
Trump’s China strategy should be understood properly to sense that there is a method in his idiosyncrasies. Huang responded when asked in another interview whether his enthusiasm for the Chinese market would clash with the views of Trump and his Republican supporters. He said he had spoken before the visit with Trump, who had wished him well. “There is always room for two people in any house,” he said.
The US-India relationship remains on strong enough foundations to withstand the current turbulence. India’s strategic autonomy and multi-alignment doctrine are robust enough, too. Besides, it is not as if Trump’s pragmatism is not applicable to India or that he harbours some animus against India. Fortuitously, an opportunity is at hand for the government to reset its compass on two issues of far-reaching significance, which would have a sobering effect on the Trump administration. One, Trump’s threat to impose secondary tariffs of 100 percent on countries that buy oil from Russia; and two, Washington’s advocacy that Delhi should unceremoniously dump Russia as a defence partner.
In all probability, Trump is not going to impose sanctions on Russia—just as his Ukraine U-turn is less dramatic than it seems. Keeping Russian oil out of the world market may not even be in Trump’s interests. He is well aware that Putin would not be deterred by sanctions and there is no question of the Russian president suspending the special military operation in Ukraine without realising its objectives.
As for India’s defence ties with Russia, the upcoming government decision will be a defining moment as regards a production partner for the indigenous advanced medium combat aircraft and an interim fifth-generation platform. For both, Russia’s fifth-generation fighter Su-57 appears to be the most viable candidate—not only in costs, but also in terms of Moscow’s offer to set up Indian production and share technology.
India can learn from Russia and China’s playbook that transparency and firmness pay with Trump. Xi Jinping showed he won’t be a pushover if there was a tariff war; equally, Putin is immovable when it comes to a ceasefire in Ukraine without realising the objectives of the military operation. That said, desultory diplomacy is the hallmark of Trump’s strategy and India cannot be impervious to it.
Chinese social media chatter is speculating about a trilateral summit between Xi, Trump and Putin during the 80th anniversary of the victory against Japanese aggression and fascism. The Times newspaper, too, reported it last week. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov sounded sceptical initially, but conceded on Monday that such a meeting can’t be ruled out. Russian officials and state media have for years pivoted on the idea of a concert of big powers—à la Yalta conference in 1945—to uphold the balance of power. As for Trump, this would be a colourful new way to convey his political desiderata, a critical element of his diplomatic style.
M K Bhadrakumar | Former diplomat
(Views are personal)