India and the European Union described their 16th summit this January as a pivotal moment in the relationship. After nearly 20 years of negotiations, they concluded a comprehensive free trade agreement alongside agreements on human migration, strategic cooperation and security collaboration. The summit was the most significant milestone in India-EU relations since the launch of their strategic partnership in 2004.
Six months on from the summit, given the geopolitical upheavals elsewhere, the partnership’s strategic potential is clearer than ever. The focus now is on whether New Delhi and Brussels can convert their diplomatic aspirations into sustained implementation. The early signs are positive, but the difficulties that lie ahead are equally evident.
The biggest achievement so far has been the conclusion of the FTA negotiations. The two markets, accounting for nearly 25 percent of global GDP and around 2 billion people, now have the opportunity to access each other more freely. Beyond the economic gains, the agreement sends an important strategic signal at a time when international economic relations are increasingly shaped by strategic rivalry, disrupted supply chains and selective protectionism.
For India, the FTA provides greater access to one of its largest export markets while reinforcing its ambition to become Europe's trusted manufacturing destination. Europe, for its part, sees opportunities in India's rapidly expanding market as it strengthens engagement with the Indo-Pacific.
However, concluding the negotiations is only the beginning. The legal scrubbing of the FTA text is currently underway. Thereafter, the agreement will require ratification by the European Parliament and, where necessary, EU member States, as well as India's own domestic approval process. Negotiators on both sides remain optimistic that the process will be completed by December, allowing the agreement to enter into force in early 2027.
Progress has also been made in addressing the EU’s carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM). India has consistently argued that such climate-related trade measures should not become disguised protectionism. The negotiated framework seeks to assist smaller enterprises in adapting to CBAM requirements.
This is not a complete resolution of the problem, but a bridging compromise. CBAM continues to pose challenges for Indian industry because of the adjustment costs. Nevertheless, the mechanism incorporated demonstrates a shift from arguing over regulations towards management of differences.
Trade is the most visible pillar of the growing partnership. However, the agreement on geographical indicators and investment are not moving in parallel and require much negotiation.
Europe's strategic outlook has changed considerably, shaped by the Ukraine conflict, a growing recognition that China is not merely a systemic rival but also a challenge to European economic interests, and the continuing uncertainty in transatlantic relations. These have brought Europe closer to India's longstanding vision of a multipolar world.
As a result, defence industrial cooperation, counter-terrorism, cybersecurity and maritime security now enjoy a much higher profile in the India-EU partnership than they did even three years ago.Progress has also been made in addressing the EU’s carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM). India has consistently argued that such climate-related trade measures should not become disguised protectionism. The negotiated framework seeks to assist smaller enterprises in adapting to CBAM requirements.
This marks a significant transition. In New Delhi, the EU was long viewed primarily as a trade and development partner. In Brussels, India was often seen largely through a regulatory and economic lens. Today, strategic considerations play a much larger role in both capitals.
However, security cooperation still lacks sufficient intensity and institutional arrangements. India's bilateral defence partnerships with France, Germany and the US illustrate the difference. Working with the EU requires engaging with multiple institutions and member states. Translating the summit's decisions into meaningful maritime cooperation, defence technology collaboration and intelligence partnerships will require sustained political commitment and official-level attention, something that has not traditionally characterised the India-EU relationship.
On the positive side, there is growing recognition that technology has enormous untapped potential to strengthen the partnership. Both India and Europe are searching for greater technological resilience amid intensifying competition between the US and China. AI, quantum technologies, trusted telecommunications, semiconductors, green hydrogen and critical minerals have become central to building an economic security agenda with Europe, much as India has already done with Japan.
The January summit created a political framework for cooperation in these sectors. However, research institutions and European businesses will ultimately determine how these ambitions are realised. Joint innovation, investment facilitation and greater regulatory compatibility must emerge from the summit's declarations. European technological capabilities, combined with India's scale and expanding digital infrastructure, offer considerable complementarity, but progress remains uneven.
Greater attention must also be devoted to connectivity. Europe's Global Gateway initiative and India's connectivity partnerships share similar objectives of promoting sustainable infrastructure. Together, they can offer alternative development models in Africa and the Indo-Pacific.
Despite this convergence, concrete joint projects have yet to emerge. The emphasis must now shift from policy dialogue to co-financing infrastructure, digital connectivity and green energy investments through trilateral cooperation. This fledgling cooperation requires rapid consolidation if India and Europe are to enhance their strategic credibility among partner countries.
Europe's ageing population and shortage of skilled workers make mobility and talent partnerships increasingly important. India possesses a large pool of young professionals, and the India-EU Mobility Agreement can create valuable opportunities for students, academics and skilled workers through legal migration pathways. If implemented effectively, this could become one of the strongest pillars of the strategic partnership.
What, then, holds these ideas back?
India remains concerned about aspects of EU regulatory practices relating to sustainability, data governance and environmental compliance. European policymakers, meanwhile, continue to view India's position on Russia and its strategic autonomy with caution rather than recognising them as reflections of India's independent foreign policy.
These differences should not be exaggerated. A mature strategic partnership should be capable of managing such divergences without allowing them to undermine the broader momentum of cooperation. The real question is whether India and Europe have reached the stage where they can work through disagreements pragmatically.
The current global environment demands that the India-EU partnership become more purposeful, more resilient and more ambitious. The strategic logic exists. The challenge now lies in implementation.
The return of great-power rivalry, disruptions in global supply chains, uncertainty in the trading system and growing technological competition all strengthen the logic of India-EU cooperation. Both are committed to democratic governance, open societies, rules-based commerce and strategic autonomy. Neither wishes to become overly dependent on any single external power.
Six months after the January summit, therefore, the verdict is cautiously positive. If the FTA succeeds, the January summit may well be remembered not simply as the conclusion of one of the world's largest trade agreements, but as the moment when India and Europe finally recognised each other as indispensable strategic partners in an increasingly uncertain world.
Gurjit Singh | Former Ambassador to Germany and author of The Durian Flavour: India And ASEAN After A Decade Of The Act East Policy
(Views are personal)