NEW DELHI: Dr. Ausaf Sayeed, a former Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs with 34 years of diplomatic service, is a leading expert on the Persian Gulf and Arab world. He has served as India’s Ambassador to Saudi Arabia and Yemen, and as High Commissioner to Seychelles, and has held diplomatic postings in Egypt and Qatar, among other countries. He speaks to Jayanth Jacob about the protests in Iran and the evolving India-Iran relationship. Excerpts:
Is the current wave of protests in Iran qualitatively different from previous uprisings in terms of geographic spread, social composition and durability, or does it follow familiar patterns seen in 2009, 2017–18 and 2022?
The 2025–2026 protests mark a definitive qualitative rupture rather than a repetition of 2009, 2017–18, or 2022. Geographically, the uprising has engulfed over 180 cities across all 31 provinces, collapsing the centre–periphery divide that previously allowed the state to contain unrest. Socially, it features an unprecedented coalition: historically conservative Bazaari merchants have joined workers, students, and marginalised border communities, transforming fragmented grievances into a unified national front. Politically, demands have shifted from reform to explicit regime change, rejecting the Islamic Republic’s ideological foundations entirely. This evolution is underscored by the deadliest repression since 1979—with confirmed deaths exceeding 3,000—signalling an irreversible, generational loss of faith in the system’s legitimacy.
Do these protests signal a crisis of governance or a crisis of legitimacy, and which of the two poses a more serious long-term challenge to the Islamic Republic?
While these protests stem from acute governance failures, they reveal a far more dangerous crisis of legitimacy. The economic data is stark—runaway inflation (40–50%), food prices up 70%, and a currency in freefall—yet these remain theoretically fixable policy issues. The qualitative rupture lies in the public’s diagnosis: a generation under 30 now views this hardship as inseparable from the regime’s ideological DNA—specifically its nuclear adventurism, IRGC entrenchment, and unaccountable “deep state”. By explicitly rejecting the 1979 revolutionary project, protesters signal that the social contract is not just broken, but void. Consequently, while brutal repression may restore temporary order, it only widens the trust deficit, ensuring that this legitimacy crisis—not mere administrative breakdown—remains the regime’s existential threat as the Supreme Leader’s succession looms.
How cohesive is the Iranian state today, particularly the relationship between the clerical establishment, the Revolutionary Guards and elected institutions, under prolonged internal and external pressure?
The Iranian state currently embodies a paradox: operational security cohesion masking structural political fragmentation. While the IRGC remains disciplined and dominant over the economy and coercive apparatus, the political system is fracturing. Elected institutions under President Pezeshkian are increasingly hollowed out by the “deep state”, and intensifying elite rivalries—visible in Parliament Speaker Ghalibaf’s manoeuvres against the executive—signal a contested rather than integrated leadership. Even the clerical establishment is eroding, with segments of the hierarchy alienated by the regime’s brutality despite their existential dependence on it. Consequently, the state’s survival has shifted from an ideological consensus to a brittle, transactional reliance on the IRGC, leaving it dangerously vulnerable to destabilisation during the looming post-Khamenei succession.
How has US policy toward Iran evolved under renewed pressure tactics, including tariffs and sanctions associated with a Trump-led approach, and are these measures more likely to weaken the regime or harden its resistance?
US policy under Trump has evolved into a “Maximum Pressure 2.0” strategy, escalating from selective sanctions to a hybrid of economic strangulation and kinetic warfare. Key escalations include the June 2025 Operation Midnight Hammer strikes on nuclear facilities and a January 2026 ultimatum imposing 25% tariffs on Iran’s trade partners to zero out revenue. While economically devastating—accelerating inflation and currency collapse—the strategy has strategically backfired. Instead of forcing concessions, it has empowered security hardliners who now view nuclear and regional capabilities as non-negotiable tools of survival. By driving Tehran deeper into Chinese and Russian orbits, this approach is entrenching resistance rather than engineering the orderly regime change Washington envisions.
How are Iran’s regional commitments and proxy networks affected by internal instability, and does domestic pressure constrain or encourage external adventurism?
Iran’s internal instability is cannibalising its regional posture, forcing a strategic retreat from power projection to defensive survival. The fall of Assad regime has severed the critical Syrian land bridge, while financial exhaustion has severely degraded support for Hezbollah and Hamas. Most tellingly, Tehran has inverted the “Axis of Resistance,” redeploying Iraqi and Lebanese proxies inward to suppress domestic unrest—a move that betrays deep distrust in its own security apparatus. While this fragility limits sustained external campaigns, it paradoxically heightens the risk of desperate, asymmetric escalations—including nuclear acceleration—as the regime attempts to project strength it no longer possesses to ensure its survival.
Where does India fit into Iran’s strategic calculus today?
In Iran’s strategic calculus, India has been demoted from a vital energy anchor to a constrained secondary partner. Bilateral trade has withered to ~$1.7 billion (a mere 0.15% of India’s total) as New Delhi aligns with US sanctions, ending any illusion that it can counterbalance Western pressure or rival China economically. Yet, geography ensures India’s continued relevance. The Chabahar port and INSTC provide Iran with a critical logistical lung—a route to Russia and Central Asia that bypasses both Pakistan and China. Consequently, while India cannot compete with Beijing’s $400 billion economic umbrella, it remains a vital strategic hedge, preventing Iran’s complete dependence on Chinese infrastructure and preserving a link to the non-Western world.
What is the future of the Chabahar port project, given sanctions uncertainty, regional geopolitics and Iran’s internal challenges—and can it still serve as a viable connector for India to Central Asia and Afghanistan?
Chabahar’s geography remains its greatest asset, but its survival now hangs on a sanctions cliff. While uniquely valuable as India’s gateway to Central Asia bypassing Pakistan, the port’s utility is being suffocated by Washington’s “Maximum Pressure 2.0.” With the current US sanctions waiver set to expire in April 2026 and a looming threat of 25% tariffs on Iran-linked trade, New Delhi has executed a “strategic retreat” in visibility: liquidating its $120 million investment liability and shifting operational logistics to Iranian manpower to shield Indian entities. Although officials maintain that “exiting is not an option,” the reality is starker: without a renewed waiver, shipping lines and insurers will flee, reducing Chabahar from the high-volume commercial hub once envisioned to a constrained, politically fragile connector kept alive only by diplomatic life support.
How should India balance its long-standing civilisational and economic ties with Iran against growing geopolitical risks, including sanctions exposure, regional instability and pressure from Western partners?
India is executing a sharp commercial decoupling while maintaining a calculated diplomatic presence. With Indian banks freezing non-humanitarian transactions and trade shrinking to a statistical footnote, New Delhi has signaled that protecting its US market access is paramount—a shift reinforced by repeated evacuation advisories. Yet, the diplomatic door remains deliberately ajar: India continues to lobby for Chabahar waivers, citing “strategic autonomy” and regional connectivity. The emerging model is one of minimalist survival: pursuing tightly ring-fenced projects and rupee mechanisms to preserve a skeletal strategic link, while strictly avoiding high-profile exposure to US tariffs or Iranian instability.