The Supreme Court is now examining whether legislators can invoke the merger provision solely on the basis of numbers, without the original political party merging. (File photo | ANI)
Explainer

Why the Anti-Defection Law is under fresh scrutiny

The repeated collapse of governments, allegations of horse-trading and claims that legislators were induced to switch sides prompted Parliament to enact the Anti-Defection Law.

Mukesh Ranjan

Recent defections by MPs from parties such as the TMC and the AAP, along with the Shiv Sena and NCP disputes over party splits and mergers, have brought the Anti-Defection Law back into focus. Several disqualification petitions remain pending before Speakers, while the Supreme Court is examining important questions on the interpretation of the Tenth Schedule, including the scope of the merger provision. Its ruling could shape how future defections, party splits and mergers are dealt with.

TIMELINE

  • 1967: Frequent defections after the General Elections popularise the phrase "Aaya Ram, Gaya Ram".

  • 1985: The 52nd Constitutional Amendment introduces the Tenth Schedule (Anti-Defection Law).

  • 1992: Kihoto Hollohan brings the Speaker's decision under judicial review.

  • 2003: The 91st Constitutional Amendment removes the one-third split exception while retaining the two-thirds merger provision.

  • 2020: Keisham Meghachandra Singh says disqualification petitions should ordinarily be decided within three months.

  • 2022: Shiv Sena split raises questions about party splits, mergers and the Speaker's powers.

  • 2023: NCP split sparks disputes over rival factions and the "real" political party.

  • 2025-26: TMC and AAP defections renew attention on the Anti-Defection Law.

  • Present: The Supreme Court is considering key issues relating to the Tenth Schedule.

What is the Anti-Defection Law?

The Anti-Defection Law regulates when elected representatives can lose their seats for changing political allegiance after an election. It seeks to discourage defections, promote political stability and uphold the electoral mandate.

The law was introduced through the 52nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1985, which inserted the Tenth Schedule into the Constitution.

Why was the law introduced?

The years following the 1967 General Elections witnessed frequent defections by legislators, often leading to unstable governments. The phrase "Aaya Ram, Gaya Ram"—coined after Haryana legislator Gaya Lal reportedly switched parties several times in a single day—became synonymous with political opportunism.

The repeated collapse of governments, allegations of horse-trading and claims that legislators were induced to switch sides prompted Parliament to enact the Anti-Defection Law. It operates through Article 102(2) for Members of Parliament and Article 191(2) for Members of State Legislatures.

What is the constitutional provision that deals with defection?

The Anti-Defection Law is contained in the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution.

A legislator may be disqualified if they voluntarily give up membership of the political party on whose ticket they were elected. An independent member who joins a political party after the election, or a nominated member who joins one after the period allowed under the Constitution, can also be disqualified.

A legislator may also lose membership for voting, or abstaining from voting, against the party whip without prior permission, unless the party condones the action within the time prescribed under the law.

Who decides whether a legislator should be disqualified?

Disqualification petitions under the Tenth Schedule are decided by the Speaker of the Lok Sabha or a State Legislative Assembly, or by the Chairperson of the concerned House in bicameral legislatures.

Are there any exceptions under the law?

Yes. The principal exception relates to the merger of one political party with another.

Legislators are protected from disqualification if at least two-thirds of the members of a legislature party agree to such a merger. The protection extends both to those who accept the merger and those who choose to remain with the original political party.

Was there always only one exception?

No. When the Anti-Defection Law was enacted in 1985, it also recognised a split by one-third of a legislative party as a valid exception.

The 91st Constitutional Amendment Act, 2003, enacted during the NDA government, abolished this provision after it came to be widely regarded as a route for engineered defections. Since then, only the two-thirds merger exception has remained.

Why has the merger exception become controversial?

Recent political disputes have revived a key constitutional question: Can legislators claim the protection of the merger provision without the original political party itself merging with another party?

Many constitutional experts argue that the Tenth Schedule requires two conditions to be satisfied. First, the original political party must merge with another political party. Second, at least two-thirds of the legislators in that party must support the merger.

Whether legislators can invoke the merger provision on the basis of numbers alone, without a merger of the original political party, is one of the issues now before the Supreme Court.

How have the courts interpreted the Anti-Defection Law?

The Supreme Court has clarified several aspects of the Anti-Defection Law over the years.

One important question concerns the meaning of the expression "voluntarily gives up membership." The Court has held that a legislator need not formally resign from the party to attract disqualification. Their conduct may itself indicate that they have voluntarily given up party membership.

Public statements against the party, support for a rival political party, participation in another party's activities or other conduct inconsistent with continued party membership may all be considered. As a result, the expression has been interpreted more broadly than a formal resignation.

Can the courts review the Speaker's decision?

Yes. Although the Tenth Schedule originally declared the Speaker's decision to be final, the Supreme Court in Kihoto Hollohan (1992) held that such decisions are subject to judicial review.

The Court also ruled that, as a general principle, courts should ordinarily wait until the Speaker has decided a disqualification petition before intervening. Consequently, while the Speaker's decision can be challenged, judicial review generally comes only after the Speaker has acted.

Is there a time limit for deciding disqualification petitions?

No. The Tenth Schedule does not prescribe any time limit for deciding disqualification petitions.

As a result, Speakers have sometimes delayed decisions for months or even years. Such delays can significantly influence political outcomes, as legislators facing disqualification may continue to sit in the House, vote on legislation, affect government stability and, in some cases, even become ministers before their cases are decided.

Delays may also influence the outcome of disqualification proceedings. If legislators cross over in stages and a decision is taken only after two-thirds of them have switched sides, they may subsequently seek protection under the merger provision.

What has the Supreme Court said about the delays?

Recognising the consequences of such delays, the Supreme Court observed in Keisham Meghachandra Singh (2020) that disqualification petitions should ordinarily be decided within three months. However, since this is only a judicial guideline and not a statutory deadline, delays continue to remain a recurring concern.

How have the TMC and AAP defections returned focus to the Anti-Defection Law?

The TMC has approached the Lok Sabha Speaker seeking an early decision on disqualification petitions against MPs elected on the party's symbol who later aligned with another political formation. The dispute has renewed attention on the absence of a binding timeline for deciding such petitions.

The AAP has also seen elected representatives resign or join rival parties, adding to the broader debate on whether the existing law is adequate to deal with political defections.

What questions did the Shiv Sena and NCP disputes raise?

The Shiv Sena and NCP disputes raised broader constitutional questions extending beyond individual defections. These include who represents the "real" political party, whether the legislature party can function independently of the party organisation outside the legislature, how constitutional authorities should resolve disputes between rival factions, and how the Speaker's powers under the Tenth Schedule interact with the Election Commission's authority over party recognition.

What are the main criticisms of the Anti-Defection Law?

Critics argue that the law gives excessive control to party leadership by limiting the independence of legislators. They also contend that the absence of a statutory time limit for deciding disqualification petitions enables prolonged uncertainty, while ambiguities surrounding the merger provision continue to generate litigation.

Another criticism concerns the broad use of the party whip. Many constitutional experts argue that it should be confined to votes affecting the survival of a government—such as confidence motions, no-confidence motions and Money Bills—so that legislators have greater freedom to vote according to their judgment on ordinary legislation.

What reforms have been suggested?

Several expert bodies have proposed changes to strengthen the Anti-Defection Law.

The Dinesh Goswami Committee on Electoral Reforms (1990), the Law Commission of India and the Election Commission have all recommended taking the power to decide disqualification petitions away from the Speaker. Instead, they have suggested that the President (in the case of MPs) and the Governor (in the case of MLAs) should decide such matters on the advice of the Election Commission.

The Dinesh Goswami Committee and the Law Commission have also recommended restricting the party whip to votes that determine whether a government remains in office.

What questions remain unsettled?

Several important constitutional questions remain unresolved. Can a legislator avoid disqualification by resigning before joining another party? Should the law address political migration immediately before elections? Does the merger provision apply only when the original political party merges with another party, or can legislators invoke it independently? How should disputes over the "real" political party be resolved? What is the relationship between proceedings before the Speaker and decisions of the Election Commission? And should Parliament prescribe a statutory time limit for deciding disqualification petitions? The Supreme Court is examining several of these issues.

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