Operation Sindoor put India’s air power doctrine to a live test. Fighters, loitering munitions, precision-strike weapons and integrated air defences all delivered results. But broader questions linger.
A shrinking fighter squadron strength, delays in indigenous programmes and the prospect of an adversary inducting a stealth fighter before India’s own is ready have sharpened debate over the future of air power.
Air Marshal (Retd.) Anil Chopra, former Director General of Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies and former Commandant of Aircraft and Systems Testing Establishment, spoke to TNIE on a range of issues shaping the future.
Excerpts:
Drones are increasingly taking on missions once performed by manned platforms. How do you assess this shift?
Whenever a new technology emerges, people tend to declare older platforms obsolete. We saw that during the Russia-Ukraine war when drones destroyed tanks and many argued that tanks had become irrelevant. Yet countries continue to build and modernise tanks.
Similarly, after missile strikes on ships in the Black Sea, some predicted the end of surface platforms. But navies continue to invest heavily in them. The future is not manned versus unmanned. It is man-unmanned teaming or MUM-T. Humans will remain on-the-loop, if not always in-the-loop, especially in high-end combat ops.
Fighters will increasingly operate alongside loyal wingmen and autonomous systems, supported by greater stealth, networking, 360-degree battlespace awareness and next-gen weapons. The US Air Force has itself said that by 2040 there may be no role that unmanned systems cannot perform. But that does not mean manned aircraft will disappear. The future lies in balancing both.
Op Sindoor was a live test of modern air power. What did it tell us about drone warfare?
Op Sindoor underlined several trends already apparent from conflicts elsewhere. Loitering munitions proved highly effective against high-value and time-sensitive targets. They occupy a unique space between a drone and a cruise missile, combining the ability to search for a target with the ability to strike it. It also demonstrated the importance of a layered, integrated air-defence architecture. The Army-Air Force counter-UAS grid performed well and showed that the answer to drone threats is not a single countermeasure but a combination of hard-kill and soft-kill capabilities working together.
The broader lesson is that modern warfare increasingly depends on integration. Offensive systems, defensive systems, sensors and networks all have to operate together to generate battlefield advantage.
Long-range precision strikes are increasingly decisive in modern warfare, but weapons like BrahMos come with high cost and sustainment burdens. How should India think about its overall strike portfolio?
There is always a balance between cost and effect, and that balance depends entirely on the target. BrahMos is not a weapon you employ casually. It is designed for high-value objectives: major radars, air-defence networks, command centres, bridges, logistics nodes and critical airfield infrastructure. Neutralise the right radar and you blind an adversary across an entire sector. The cost of the missile has to be weighed against the operational value of what it destroys.
That said, cost and sustainment are legitimate considerations and the answer lies in building a layered strike architecture rather than dependence on any single system. DRDO is working across several categories to address this.
The Nirbhay subsonic cruise missile, broadly comparable to the Tomahawk class, offers a long-range precision capability at a different cost point. Work is also progressing on hypersonic strike systems, which will add a further dimension to India’s offensive portfolio. The aim is not to find one perfect weapon. It is to ensure that for every target category, India has an appropriate, effective and sustainable strike option.
The Tejas Mk-1A delays have become a recurring concern. What do they say about the challenges of building such a platform at home?
People often reduce the Tejas delays to a single cause, whether the radar, the engine or a particular subsystem. The reality is more complex. Building a modern combat aircraft is fundamentally a systems integration challenge.
A fighter aircraft integrates a radar, an electronic warfare suite, sensors, weapons, and mission computers, all of which must operate seamlessly within microseconds under combat conditions. Compatibility management across these systems is one of the most demanding aspects of fighter development. If it is not right, the aircraft may fly, but it will not fight at the level the Air Force requires.
IAF’s Project Management Team monitors timelines and flags issues to Air Headquarters and the Ministry of Defence. Technical decisions remain with HAL and ADA. There are also engine-related constraints that have affected timelines. GE has faced supply chain pressures, and India currently lacks a readily available alternative.
The deeper issue is one of sustained investment. India spends roughly 0.6% of GDP on research and development. China spends around 2.7% and the US more than 3%.
That gap does not show up immediately but compounds over decades. Self-reliance in combat aviation requires sustained investment in foundational techs, particularly aero engines, advanced materials and sensors.
Pakistan is reportedly set to induct the J-35 before the end of this year, which is well before India’s AMCA enters service. How serious is this fifth-gen gap?
If Pakistan does induct the J-35, it would change the regional air power equation. India needs to be clear-eyed about what that means and evaluate all available options seriously and without sentiment.
The Su-57 is one platform that comes into the conversation, given its operational status and India’s familiarity with Russian-origin systems. But acquisition decisions of this nature must be grounded in hard criteria and operational autonomy is perhaps the most important of them.
It is worth remembering that fifth-generation capability goes well beyond the airframe. Sensors, mission systems, weapons integration and networking define it as much as stealth does. An aircraft without that ecosystem solves only half the problem.
Importantly, AMCA is and must remain India’s long-term answer. If the gap materialises sooner than expected, India will have to address it squarely.