NEW DELHI: As India moves closer to rolling out long-pending theatre commands, concerns over force restructuring, particularly the proposal for a dedicated rocket and missile force, have intensified, with Group Captain Ajay Ahlawat (Retd) warning that such a move could fragment command rather than strengthen it.
While Chief of Defence Staff General Anil Chauhan has indicated that the theatreisation plan is in its final stages and may soon be sent to the defence ministry, key debates persist over command structures, resource allocation and operational control.
In this context, The New Indian Express spoke to former fighter pilot and military affairs commentator Group Captain Ajay Ahlawat (Retd) to understand the implications of theatreisation, the Indian Air Force’s concerns and the proposal for a standalone rocket and missile force.
What is the core problem theatreisation is trying to solve within the Indian military?
“When we look at the current Indian military system, it is fundamentally disjointed. We are trying to coordinate from a structure that was never designed for integration. What we need is harmonisation at the planning stage, including procurement harmonisation and, from there, synergy in execution, such as joint fires. The military ultimately functions on command and control. A joint commander should be able to issue an order that is executed seamlessly, without being filtered through service-specific doctrinal biases. At present, those silos exist.
Take a basic example. Tactical radios used by the Air Force and the Army are similar, but they run on slightly different software and are procured at different costs from the same vendors. Even in systems like IACCS (Integrated Air Command and Control System), where inputs such as Akashteer feed in, integration is still evolving. Theatre commanders will have to enforce that synergy.”
How should theatreisation ideally be structured at the doctrinal level?
“The starting point is not theatre commands. It is a National Security Strategy (NSS). That strategy must define India’s comprehensive national power and its ambitions, whether regional or global. From there flows a military doctrine, followed by domain-specific doctrines and then theatre-specific doctrines. Right now, we are attempting structural reform without fully aligning doctrine. War-gaming has already shown that service-specific doctrines create friction, which is why integration is necessary.
However, challenges are natural. Services want to protect their turf. These concerns manifest in two ways: competition over senior appointments and control over financial allocations. We have studied models like the US and China, but our implementation has to be tailored to Indian realities.”
What are the Indian Air Force’s key concerns within the theatre command framework?
“The Indian Air Force’s concern has always been about the fragmentation of air power. Air assets are limited and are most effective when centrally controlled.
Earlier, there was a proposal to give the Air Force an Air Defence Command, a functional command. However, that is not equivalent to geographical control, which the Army and Navy would have under theatre commands. That imbalance is a valid concern.
The current understanding attempts to address this. Strategic air assets like Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS), air-to-air refuellers and electronic warfare (EW) aircraft will remain under Air Headquarters for centralised allocation and be deployed to theatres as required. However, fighter squadrons, already limited to 29, cannot be fragmented arbitrarily. The balance between centralised control and theatre-level execution will be critical.”
Where do you stand on the proposal to create a dedicated rocket and missile force?
“Raising a separate rocket and missile force is not the right approach. It is a controversial idea and, in my view, it will complicate the system rather than strengthen it. What we actually need is a robust joint fires concept under the theatre commander. Rockets, missiles and UAVs are all elements that must be integrated within a theatre’s Area of Responsibility (AOR). If you carve them out into a separate functional command, you are again creating silos. Firepower cannot be treated as a standalone vertical. It has to be part of an integrated operational plan.
No one denies the importance of these capabilities. In fact, we need more of them. But creating a separate structure will dilute accountability and complicate command and control. Theatre commanders must have the authority to employ all available firepower within their domain.”
What is the likely roadmap for implementation and how long before theatreisation becomes operational?
“The proposal is expected to be submitted to the Ministry of Defence soon. After that, the ministry will examine it, particularly the financial implications, and send back observations. Once those are addressed, it will require approval from the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS). There is also a possibility that this may require legislative changes, either a new law or amendments to existing Acts governing the Army, Navy and Air Force.
This is not a short process. Even after approvals, implementation will take time. Realistically, we are looking at a minimum of one to two years before theatre commands become operational. Structural clarity is essential. The plan to create three theatre commands—Western, Northern and Maritime—with cross-service deputy commanders is a step forward. However, the success of theatreisation will ultimately depend on how well integration is achieved, not just structurally, but doctrinally and operationally.”