Besides the obvious geo-strategic concerns owing to the ongoing impasse in Indo-Nepalese relations, impact on the 25,000 odd Nepali Gurkha troops (not including the additional 20,000 in Para Military forces or the Indian domicile Gurkhas), serving currently in the Indian Army, remains understudied and ignored. To understand the construct of the issue, it is key to understand the history, triggers and potential impactors in today’s realities.
British East India Company discovered the famed fighting abilities of the Gurkha during the Anglo-Nepalese war and soon after, inducted them in the British Army by 1815. Besides his fearlessness in battle, loyalty to the flag he served ensured that the Gurkha fought on the side of the Crown in the Anglo-Sikh wars, 1857 Mutiny, Anglo-Afghan wars, WW1 & WW2 amongst the many other wars across the globe, in the interim. Martial traditions and glory in battlefield had earned the Gurkhas enough claim to move the British Army to retain three of the Regiments in 1947, whilst, India retained six Regiments (an additional seventh was formed later). In all, recognising the ‘special’ historical, cultural and civilisational relationship with Nepal (overcoming the ‘non-requirement’ of adopting the Gurkhas in the Independent Indian Army, given the abundant availability of native stock), Nehru readily agreed to the Nepali Durbar requests of ensuring all privileges and rights to the Gurkhas, as applicable to native Indian soldiers.
The 1950 Indo-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship further cemented the common threat and security concerns stating, ‘neither government will tolerate the threat of the security of the other by a foreign aggressor’. Open borders and visa-less travel and negligible restrictions of work permits were symptomatic of the historical trust and the sanctification of the intertwined cultural affinity, paving way for the ‘special relationship’. No such bonhomie was extended to Nepal’s other neighbour, China, with whom Tibet had been a sore point resulting in the Nepal-Tibet-China wars.
Relations with India survived Nepal’s own internal change of guard from the supremacy of the Ranas to the Shah Monarchy. Annexation of Tibet by China and the Indo-China war of 1962 further consolidated the perceptions of the aggressive dragon versus the more peaceful neighbour in India.
However over time frost set in given India’s support for Nepali opposition leaders, trade disputes and integration of Sikkim in 1975. The stage was set for Kathmandu to increasingly ‘balance’ the power and influence of India vis-a-vis the China-Pakistan combine with aggressive bargaining on matters, economic and trade-related. A government-supported ‘big brother’ perception of India was facilitated and the same got accelerated with India’s initial refusal to retract from the terms of the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship and accede to Nepal’s demand for abrogation and removal of military check posts and liaison groups, owing to India’s own security considerations.
The ’80s saw the flurry of trade disagreements initiated by Nepal and Indian retaliatory counter-moves arm-twisting the landlocked country with severe economic restrictions and blockages that impacted the supplies and economy of Nepal. This also coincided with the anti-monarchy sentiments being expressed by the Nepali communists, who were ideologically inclined towards China and eager to put the Indian ‘big brother’ in his ‘place’. By 2008, monarchy was abolished and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoists) led government was sworn in, triggering the first signs of implications for the Nepalese Gurkhas serving in the Indian Army. The Nepali government initiated a halt to recruitment of Nepali Gurkhas in any international army, pursuant to, “Nepal’s foreign policy in the changed context, 2012”.
However, the issue didn’t flare beyond the confines of diplomacy — the fact that the serving and pensioners draw approximately `1,300 crores annually; besides other welfare schemes like extension of ECHS and polyclinics only ensured a soft pedalling, besides offering much-needed job opportunities. But, the newly democratised nation had aggressive and pent-up aspirations and political agendas, coupled with unrestrained dissemination and emancipation of social media-shaped narratives which made for strong political and electoral positions that catering to sub-sections of constituents, whilst, potentially positing centuries-old equations at the altar of reviews.
Still, the Defence Forces remained insulated from the dynamics of local Nepali assertion vis-a-vis India, the umbilical cord of the Indian Army proving too strong with Gurkha troops proving their mettle at any operational deployment to which they were tasked. Besides, there is the traditional symbolism of extending the reciprocal rank of ‘General’ to the respective Army Chiefs, irrespective of their parent regiment — respect and glory that Gurkhas have earned is purely battle-proven. Even the current Indian Army Chief, Dalbir Singh Suhag, is a proud ‘5 GR’ officer who insists on wearing his Gurkha slouch hat with the chinstrap on the lower lip, as opposed to under the chin (a unique 5 GR legacy that is not extended to other Gurkha Regiments). He follows the list of illustrious ‘Gurkha officers’ in the Indian Army, like the late General Bewoor and the irrepressible Field Marshal Manekshaw (or ‘Sam Bahadur’, his Gurkha moniker) who thundered famously, ‘If a man says he is not afraid of dying, he is either lying or a Gurkha’.
Times are changing, we have the latest ‘Madhesi’ crisis that potentially strains relations like never before. At an over-simplified level, the crisis positions the ‘Madhesis’ or the people from the plains (perceived to be supported by the India) at crossroads with the majority of the Nepali ‘hill people’, who incidentally form the bulk of Gurkha troops in the Indian Army.
This strain of Indo-Nepali cross-purposing is new, unprecedented and specific to the Indian Defence Forces. The Chinese would be more than eager to drive a wedge that goes beyond economic and diplomatic domains. This angle needs to be incorporated in our policy formulations with Nepal. From any perspective, we have more reasons to benefit from each other than for Nepal to seek strategic support from the ‘others’.
Lt General Bhopinder Singh (Retd) is former Lt Governor of Andaman & Nicobar Islands & Puduccherry
Email: bhopinder593@ gmail.com