Sunday, the hundredth day of Operation Epic Fury—the joint military campaign launched by the US and Israel against Iran—turned out to be one of dramatic developments. It started with Israel attacking a stronghold of Hezbollah in Beirut in response to earlier missile and drone attacks on northern Israel. Iran, which had forewarned Israel, responded with measured missile attacks on northern Israel. The day ended with a stern telephone call from President Donald Trump to Prime Minister ‘Bibi’ Netanyahu not to retaliate. But Netanyahu defied Trump to attack Tehran, Isfahan and Tabriz on Sunday night.
Reciprocal strikes continued the next day, with the Houthi forces escalating their involvement. However, later in the day, Iran officially announced the end of its military operations against Israel following a public push by Trump for a ceasefire, but confirming it would respond with severe strikes if Israel continued its offensive operations. It is significant that while Iran had earlier warned that it would escalate by striking both US and Israeli assets, not only did it confine its attacks to Israel, but also heeded Trump’s call to stop the attacks.
The hopes for ending the war, which had seemed imminent two weeks ago, were dashed by Israel’s major military attacks in southern Lebanon. When Netanyahu ordered Israel Defense Forces in southern Lebanon to advance towards Beirut, Iran immediately suspended the exchange of messages with the US for concluding a memorandum of understanding, insisting that a ceasefire across all fronts including Lebanon was a prerequisite. Tehran also threatened it would also close the Bab-el-Mandeb at one end of the Red Sea.
As Iran’s decision would further delay opening of the Strait of Hormuz, which has become an urgent priority for Trump, he immediately forced Netanyahu to stop bombarding Beirut. The US also hosted trilateral negotiations early this month where Israel and Lebanon agreed on a truce, contingent on complete cessation of fire by Hezbollah and its evacuation from South Lebanon. They also agreed to establish pilot zones in South Lebanon where the Lebanese Armed Forces would assume full control. This, however, was immediately rejected by Hezbollah, demanding full withdrawal of the IDF from South Lebanon, roughly 10 percent of the nation’s territory.
The Israeli ground invasion of Lebanon in recent days is deeply reminiscent of its 1982 campaign. Both military interventions were launched by Israel under the banner of ‘national security’ with the stated goals of neutralising cross-border threats, protecting northern Israeli communities, and establishing a buffer zone in southern Lebanon. Much like the 1982 Operation Peace for Galilee, which culminated in a brutal three-month siege of Beirut, the current conflict has witnessed massive aerial bombardments of the Lebanese capital, catastrophic infrastructure damage, and the displacement of more than one million civilians—amounting to roughly one-fifth of Lebanon’s population.
Historically, while the 1982 invasion forced the exit of Palestinian militants, it ultimately trapped the IDF in a costly, low-intensity war against a newly emerged Hezbollah. This occupation ended only in May 2000 when, facing rising casualties, Israel executed a hasty, unilateral withdrawal that left a strategic vacuum that Hezbollah rapidly filled.
History may not repeat itself. Although Israel remains focused on its long-term objectives of neutralising Hezbollah and toppling the Iranian regime—as evidenced by Netanyahu’s public defiance of Trump to ensure his own domestic survival and sabotage an MoU Israel considers counter to its interests—the reality remains that without a continuous supply of US interceptors, Israel cannot sustain its defensive or offensive capabilities with impunity.
In addition to ceasefire in Lebanon being a major stumbling block, the prerequisites for a US-Iran peace pact as detailed by Secretary Marco Rubio during his congressional testimony last week remain a hurdle. He specified that the MoU with Iran would establish a two-phase approach: first, the US would lift its naval blockade in exchange for Iran unconditionally reopening the Strait of Hormuz. Under this first phase, Iran must also pledge to negotiate a denuclearisation plan; however, any actual economic sanctions relief or the unfreezing of Iranian assets will remain linked to Iran’s concrete actions to dismantle its nuclear program during the second phase. Notably, Rubio did not list the curtailment of Iran’s missile programme or its regional proxy support as explicit prerequisites for lifting sanctions.
What Rubio conveyed to the US Congress was similar to Trump’s April 8 ceasefire announcement. However, unlike the April announcement which established a temporary two-week window to halt hostilities and initiate talks, discussions under the current framework will be based on a formal two-phase understanding.
The US’s concession to Iran’s insistence for a two-phased peace deal is notable. In return, Iran has relented on its demand for a total cessation of hostilities as a mandatory prerequisite for entering the second phase. Further, on the issue of Iran’s insistence to unfreeze at least half of its $12 billion assets held in Qatari banks, Doha has successfully negotiated a complex via media to grant a $6 billion Qatari line of credit restricted to Iran purchasing humanitarian and civilian goods.
Despite a severe economic crisis, Iran can sustain the status quo for several more months, given its well-established resistance economy. But if the stalemate at Hormuz drags on for another month or two, energy analysts project that oil prices could hit $120-150 a barrel; if the Houthis close Bab-el-Mandeb, the price may shoot up further. Thus, it is essential for Trump to resolve the Lebanon imbroglio to conclude the MoU.
However, the US may not maintain long-term focus on an open Hormuz Strait, similar to his lack of attention after the Gaza ceasefire. While this would offer a temporary reprieve for the global economy, regional instability would persist, prompting Gulf nations to establish alternative pipeline routes to bypass the Hormuz bottleneck in the future and big oil importers like India diversifying their sources of energy supply.
R Swaminathan | Former Ambassador to Egypt and former Permanent Representative to the Arab League
(Views are personal)