India’s foreign policy finds itself at a historical and strategic crossroads, navigating a geopolitical landscape far more complex than the binary choices of the 20th century. On one hand, New Delhi is a linchpin of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or Quad, deeply entwined with a Western-aligned security architecture intended to ensure a “free and open Indo-Pacific”. On the other hand, India currently holds the 2026 BRICS presidency.
This bloc has spent two decades evolving from a Wall Street acronym into the most formidable institutional voice of the Global South. This dual identity—strategic partner to the West and champion of the developing world—is being tested like never before. As the 2026 BRICS presidency unfolds, the friction between these two roles is no longer a matter of abstract diplomatic theory; it is manifesting in missed joint statements, aggressive tariff threats from Washington and a fundamental disagreement over the future of the global financial order. For India, the challenge is no longer just about ‘multi-alignment’; it is about whether it can lead a fractured Global South.
The journey to this moment began on November 30, 2001. In the sombre immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, Jim O’Neill of Goldman Sachs published a seminal paper titled ‘Building better global economic BRICs’. He argued that the G7 structure was an anachronism that failed to account for tectonic shifts in global productivity. O’Neill pointed out that, in terms of purchasing power parity, Brazil, Russia, India and China accounted for almost a quarter of global GDP. His thesis was simple: the world’s economic governance was incomplete without these emerging giants.
O’Neill was a banker, not a diplomat, and he viewed these nations through the lens of growth potential. Interestingly, he predicted India’s initial hesitation, noting it might be the “least eager” to join a formal club. He sensed that New Delhi might view collective obligations as an unwelcome constraint on its domestic policy or its ability to provide independent advice based on its unique developmental trajectory.
The transition from an economic concept to a political reality occurred in September 2006 on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly. India was represented by Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee standing in for Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. The resulting joint statement was a shot across the bow of the post-WWII order, asserting that in a shifting global scenario, “economic weight must equal political power”.
While Brazil and China were eager to frame the group as a counter-hegemonic force, India’s approach was more nuanced. New Delhi stressed that this new formation was “complementary” to existing structures, and did not envisage it as a replacement. This middle path has been the hallmark of Indian diplomacy for decades. Yet, the 2008 global financial crisis eventually forced a more assertive stance.
By the first formal summit in Russia’s Yekaterinburg on June 16, 2009, the tone had shifted. The ‘Great Recession’ had exposed the fragility of Western financial dominance and the risks of a unipolar economic world. Prime Minister Singh, usually a soft-spoken economist, firmly advocated a multipolar vision and an end to G7-centric governance. He famously remarked that the global economic crisis had shown that the existing structures of international governance needed reform to ensure that the developing world’s voice was heard.
What was once a four-nation club became BRICS in 2010 with the inclusion of South Africa. However, the true transformation occurred in the mid-2020s. In 2024, the bloc underwent a massive expansion, adding Egypt, the UAE, Ethiopia, Iran and Saudi Arabia. By 2025, Indonesia was added as a full member, coupled with partner country status for 10 countries including Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand and Vietnam, ensuring that BRICS controlled a staggering share of the world’s energy resources and maritime trade routes.
On the economic side, too, there has been significant activity. The bloc’s New Development Bank has approved infrastructure projects valued at about $43 billion, providing an alternative to the IMF’s often-stringent conditions. Meanwhile, the Contingent Reserve Arrangement, a $100-billion safety net, protects members from balance-of-payments crises. Most significantly, the launch of ‘BRICS Pay’ in 2026 has facilitated trade in local currencies, bypassing the US dollar and SWIFT network. The countries now share data from remote-sensing satellites and a vaccine R&D centre has been established to ensure medical sovereignty. A new BRICS Startup Forum enables entrepreneurs to access capital more easily. Instead of being an add-on to the G7, the group committed itself to “a just and democratic world order” in its 2024 Kazan Declaration.
This rise has met resistance from the US. Donald Trump perceives BRICS as a direct threat to his status as the unchallenged leader of the globe. In July 2025, he dismissed the group as “fading out”, but by October, he shifted to explicit economic warfare. He declared BRICS an “attack on the dollar” and threatened 100 percent tariffs on any nation that dared to move away from the greenback. However, his ‘tariff-first’ diplomacy hit a roadblock when the US Supreme Court intervened to limit executive overreach. Furthermore, his attempt to isolate Iran backfired as Tehran demonstrated economic and military resilience, and the American public showed little appetite for another conflict.
India took over the BRICS presidency in December 2025. Unlike the more than ₹4,000 crore that India is estimated to have spent on the G20 carnival in 2023, the ongoing presidency has been low-key. Our term follows a strong Brazilian presidency. Despite Trump’s clamour, the Rio de Janeiro Declaration of July 2025 unanimously condemned the US and Israeli attack on Iran, warning that unilateral actions dismantle the foundations of international law.
The current presidency has not started well. The deputy foreign ministers’ meeting on West Asia and North Africa on April 23-24 ended without a joint statement. Iran and the UAE were reportedly at loggerheads. India tried to soften the language, removing references to East Jerusalem as the Palestinian capital and using the term “occupying power” for Israel; but Iran wanted a stronger stance.
If such differences are not bridged at the foreign ministers’ meeting later this week, the September summit may prove difficult. India may have to choose a direction—either remain with the South, as has been the tradition, or align more closely with the West. Otherwise, things can fall between the two stools.
K M Chandrasekhar | Former Cabinet Secretary and author of As Good as My Word: A Memoir
(Views are personal)
(kmchandrasekhar@gmail.com)