Democracy is a sacred social settlement which presumes a covenant of consent, consultation and constant accountability. In India, it has been cunningly converted into a closed-circle club of convenience where the custodians of the Constitution have become collectors of comfort, connoisseurs of compensation and champions of cushy conveniences.
When a legislature launches a lightning session to supersize its seats, swell its stipends and stack its sinecures, it doesn’t strengthen the system. It sells it seat by seat, subsidy by subsidy, citizen by citizen. Last week, when the government’s Constitution (131st Amendment) and Delimitation Bills were defeated in Parliament, the setback was not the signal. The intent was. When a legislature votes to expand its own ecosystem, enrich its own entitlements and entrench its own excesses under the cover of a compressed three-day conclave it does not deepen democracy. It monetises it.
Democratic legitimacy rests upon a fragile framework, a fiduciary faith between the governed and those who govern. This framework demands not merely representation but relentless reasoning, rigorous responsibility and radical transparency. Had it been passed, the financial consequences for the ordinary taxpayer would have been staggering, permanent and almost entirely absent from the national conversation that this decision urgently deserves. The financial fallout for the everyday earner is staggering, systemic and silently sanctioned.
The Constitution (131st Amendment) Bill, 2026 introduced in the special session commencing was meant to expand the Lok Sabha from 543 seats (maximum 550 allowed) to 816 (maximum 850), adding by about half. Simultaneously, every state Assembly was set to swell, stretch and swell again by roughly 50 percent, producing over 2,000 additional legislators—in practice, a permanent, protected, perpetually-payable political proliferation funded entirely by taxpayers who were neither notified nor nudged.
The arithmetic of this expansion is precise, verifiable and deeply troubling. Each MP today costs the exchequer approximately Rs 4.29 crore annually, with aggregate expenditures comprising salary, allowances, constituency development funds, secretarial establishment, rent-free metropolitan accommodation, unrestricted air and rail travel for the legislator and immediate family, comprehensive medical coverage and the considerable invisible machinery of parliamentary entitlement. An additional 273 MPs would constitute an additional recurring annual burden of Rs 1,171 crore. This is not a one-time capital expenditure with a recoverable horizon. It is a permanent constitutional liability, compounding year upon year, generation upon generation, for the duration of the republic itself.
Over a single five-year parliamentary term, the direct cost of new members alone reaches Rs 5,855 crore, which excludes Rajya Sabha, parliamentary infrastructure expansion, security apparatus scaling and the associated bureaucratic establishment. Then there is MP Local Area Development Scheme, a peculiarly opaque pipeline of public funds. Each MP receives Rs 5 crore annually. With 816 MPs, that becomes Rs 4,080 crore a year—distributed, delayed, and dubiously documented, as repeated critiques from the Comptroller and Auditor General confirm. State Assemblies magnify this burden dramatically.
This is a constitutional commitment to continuous cost. Conservative calculations place the annual cost of state Assembly expansion at Rs 5,000-8,000 crore—a figure that deliberately dodges the looming liability of lifelong pensions, where a single five-year stint’s cumulative cost climbs to Rs 40,000-50,000 crore, with far fiercer, far fatter, far more formidable fiscal fallout. Expansion doesn’t correct this chronic chaos; it compounds it, clones it and conveniently conceals it. And yet, the most fundamental question remains: why this sudden surge, this legislative lust for largesse, when India’s geography remains fixed and finite?
Representation in India is territorial, not transactional. Constituencies are defined by boundaries, not by bodies. Given even expansion across regions, more people within a perimeter do not require more politicians. What this expansion truly signals is a calculated calibration of convenience: more seats for dynastic dynamics. More ministries for loyalist lobbies and more chairs for a political class already comfortably cushioned.
The performance record makes this expansion not just needless, but near-nonsensical. Barely 10 percent of MPs speak. The Lok Sabha sits for fewer than 100 days a year; Assemblies often convene for less than 50. Bills are rushed, rubber-stamped and rapidly ratified often in under an hour, where serious scrutiny should span months. Reports by PRS Legislative Research point to a decline in debate, dilution of diligence and decay of democratic discipline. The legislature is not lacking in numbers; it is lacking in necessary diligence. Add to this that 46 percent of MPs face criminal cases and 93 percent are crorepatis—an elite echo chamber far removed from the reality of citizens they claim to serve.
This is not a deficit of democracy. It is a surplus of self-service. The addition of about 2,350 legislators is not democratisation; it is a deliberate deepening of the patronage pyramid. No dissent, no debate, no defiance—just a perfect political pact of mutual profit. Across party lines, ideology is dissolved into a deliciously bipartisan buffet of benefits. The only constituency without representation in that chamber is the Indian taxpayer—present in payment, absent in power. This is not BJP versus Congress, right versus left. It is privilege versus public, entitlement versus equity. Can a legislature legally and morally legislate on its own largesse without the people’s permission?
With an annual expenditure of Rs 11,000 crore, the conservative aggregate of parliamentary and state Assembly expansion could build over a 10 lakh classrooms, thousands of kilometres of roads, and countless clinics in chronically neglected constituencies. These are not hypothetical hopes; they are practical, possible, profoundly impactful priorities. Instead, they have been postponed, pushed aside, and politically pre-empted.
India does not need a bigger Parliament. It needs a better, braver, busier one—one that sits longer, studies deeper, scrutinises sharper and serves sincerely. The political class didn’t try to just pass a Bill; it was padding its privileges, protecting perks and perfecting plunder. Strip away the spin, and the sentence is simple. The Bill push was not representation but was remuneration wrapped in rhetoric. This is not the voice of the people. This was institutional plunder, constitutionally disguised and unanimously executed by the very class entrusted to protect public interest. In the name of representation, India’s political elite have signalled their institutional greed on an unprecedented scale. It is brazen theft from the people, and an echo of entitlement which is amplified, institutionalised and invoice-ready.
Read all columns by Prabhu Chawla
PRABHU CHAWLA
prabhuchawla@newindianexpress.com
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