India’s operational and upcoming alternate airports, mainly in the Delhi National Capital Region (NCR), the Mumbai Metropolitan Region (MMR) and Goa, are set to add around 40 million passengers of annual capacity by the end of calendar year 2026, creating a critical release valve for congestion at older metro airports.
Over the next four fiscals, this capacity is expected to rise further, enabling these alternate airports to collectively handle 45–50 million passengers annually by fiscal 2030. The growth will be driven by the release of pent-up demand constrained at saturated airports and the steady expansion of catchment areas. However, the pace and efficiency of ramp-up will be central to determining the financial and operational success of these assets, says an analysis by rating agency Crisil Ratings.
While the credit profiles of established metro airports are expected to remain stable over the medium term, those of non-metro dual-airport systems warrant closer monitoring given traffic volatility and ramp-up risks.
India’s total airport passenger traffic is projected to increase from about 415 million passengers in the current fiscal to nearly 580 million by fiscal 2030, translating into a compound annual growth rate of 8–9%. This growth is underpinned by strong economic activity, untapped demand and the gradual easing of capacity constraints at select metros. However, traffic growth in the current fiscal is expected to remain muted at 0–1%, reflecting weak demand following a major aircraft mishap, temporary airbase closures amid uncertainties along India’s western border in the first half, and airline operational disruptions in the second half.
With these disruptions easing toward the end of calendar 2025, passenger traffic is expected to rebound to 6–7% growth next fiscal. This rebound will require commensurate expansion in airport infrastructure. As existing airports approach design capacity and face physical constraints on further expansion, the development of multiple airports within a single region becomes a structural necessity rather than an option.
According to Ankit Hakhu, director at Crisil Ratings, older airports in the MMR and NCR are already operating close to design capacity, with combined utilisation at about 87% last fiscal, and have limited scope for large expansionary capital expenditure due to space constraints. He noted that alternate airports in metro regions are expected to handle 20–25% of total regional traffic by fiscal 2030, supporting their long-term viability as connectivity improves.
However, he cautioned that timely ramp-up will be critical for scaling both aeronautical and non-aeronautical revenues within the first regulatory control periods.
The experience of India’s largest metros underscores this need. Mumbai’s older airport witnessed a slowdown in growth after fiscal 2017 due to capacity saturation, limiting the availability of peak-hour slots for airlines, while Delhi continued to grow. Over time, a similar constraint would have emerged in Delhi without the development of an alternate airport, reinforcing the rationale for dual-airport systems in high-density regions.
In contrast, other major metro airports such as Bengaluru and Hyderabad currently retain headroom for expansion, with utilisation at around 65% of design capacity last fiscal, reducing the immediate need for alternate facilities.
Global experience also supports the dual-airport model. Large metro regions such as New York–New Jersey and London operate multiple major airports that were running at high to full utilisation levels in 2024, reflecting sustained passenger growth and diversified traffic distribution across airports.
That said, alternate airports are not without risks. Gauri Gupta, team leader at Crisil Ratings, pointed out that traffic could undershoot expectations if supporting infrastructure and connectivity develop slower than anticipated, limiting accessibility and catchment expansion. Competitive intensity may also increase in regions where incumbent and alternate airports are operated by different entities. In addition, delays in aircraft deliveries could constrain airlines’ ability to deploy capacity at newer airports.
Despite these risks, the credit profiles of older metro airports are expected to remain resilient. Steady traffic growth, the diversion of incremental demand to alternate airports, regulatory safeguards such as tariff true-ups during periods of under-recovery, and strong sponsor backing should continue to support their financial health.
The risk profile is more nuanced in non-metro cities with dual airports. In such cases, especially where traffic growth is volatile or relatively weak, ramp-up at the new airport could be challenged if the older facility retains a strong value proposition through lower airline tariffs or closer proximity to city centres. This could lead to underutilisation of new infrastructure and pressure returns on investment.
Any material deterioration in aircraft availability or the emergence of pandemic-like disruptions would remain key monitorables for traffic growth and credit quality across both older and alternate airports.