India has built an indigenous missile for almost every major conventional warfare role, from air-to-air and surface-to-air weapons to anti-radiation, anti-tank, anti-ship and long-range strike systems. The harder challenge now is building the industrial depth to produce these weapons in sufficient numbers and replenish stocks during a prolonged conflict.
The government’s decision, in the last week of August 2026, to open DRDO-developed technology for conventional missile systems to Indian industry has put that challenge in focus. What missiles does India have, what are their ranges, how indigenous are they, where are the gaps and can industry build the capacity needed to sustain production?
Timeline
May 2025: Operation Sindoor underlined the importance of precision weapons, air defence and adequate missile inventories during sustained military operations.
May 2025: Foundation stone laid for the ₹1,460-crore Navdurga defence testing range at Nagayalanka in Andhra Pradesh.
July 2026: Project Kusha, India’s indigenous long-range surface-to-air missile programme with a max range of up to 400 km, conducted its first flight test.
August 2026: Defence Minister Rajnath Singh approves transfer of DRDO-developed technologies for conventional missile systems to Indian companies for indigenous production, subject to qualifications, certification and regulatory clearances.
2028 to 2030: Phased induction of Project Kusha is expected.
Which conventional missiles does India have?
India’s conventional missile portfolio spans most major operational requirements.
Air defence includes Akash, Akash-NG, QRSAM (Quick Reaction Surface-to-Air Missile) and VSHORADS (Very Short Range Air Defence System).
Air-to-air capability is being built around the Astra family of indigenous air-to-air missiles. Anti-radiation weapons include Rudram, designed to target enemy radar and air-defence systems.
Anti-armour capability includes the Nag family of anti-tank guided missiles, along with air-launched systems such as SANT (Stand-off Anti-Tank Missile) and MP-ATGM (Man-Portable Anti-Tank Guided Missile).
Naval strike capability includes indigenous anti-ship missile programmes such as NASM-SR (Naval Anti-Ship Missile-Short Range).
Land-attack capability is being expanded through the Long Range Land Attack Cruise Missile and Pralay, a conventional quasi-ballistic missile.
Rocket artillery is represented by the Pinaka family of guided and unguided rockets.
BrahMos is a separate Indo-Russian joint programme, while MRSAM (Medium Range Surface-to-Air Missile) is an Indo-Israeli programme. The Agni series and K-series submarine-launched ballistic missiles are strategic systems forming part of India’s nuclear deterrent and are outside the conventional technology opening.
How far can these missiles strike?
The range depends on the weapon’s role. Astra Mk-1 has a range exceeding 100 km and provides the Indian Air Force with an indigenous beyond-visual-range air-to-air capability. Astra Mk-2 is intended to extend the range to around 200 km, while Astra Mk-3, also known as Gandiva, is being developed with solid-fuel ducted-ramjet propulsion for substantially greater range.
Pralay has a range of up to 500 km and is geared for conventional precision strikes against land targets. BrahMos has a stated range of around 450 km, with an 800-km version under development. Pinaka guided rockets have demonstrated ranges of around 120 km.
QRSAM provides short-range air defence, with an engagement range of up to about 30 km. At the longer end of India’s air-defence architecture is the Russian S-400. Project Kusha is intended to provide an indigenous long-range alternative, with its planned interceptor family designed to cover progressively longer engagement ranges.
If India has the missiles, where is the gap?
The principal challenge is production capacity and depth. India has demonstrated the ability to design, develop and test sophisticated missiles. The harder task is manufacturing them at sustained rates and expanding output when stocks are depleted during intensive operations.
There is also a question of redundancy. If a particular missile depends on one or two production facilities, disruption at those facilities can affect the entire supply chain. Multiple qualified manufacturers would provide additional capacity and reduce dependence on a single production line.
The third issue is the supply chain itself. A missile can be assembled in India while still depending on imported seekers, propulsion components, electronics or specialised materials.
What does indigenisation actually mean?
Indigenisation does not simply mean assembling the missile in India.
A modern missile combines an airframe, propulsion system, seeker, guidance and control systems, electronics, warhead and software. A weapon can therefore be assembled domestically while critical technologies or components remain foreign sourced.
For the armed forces, deeper indigenisation means being able to develop and manufacture these critical elements within India and produce them in sufficient quantities.
The government has said in a statement that more than 15,700 defence items have been indigenised, resulting in about ₹9,000 crore in import substitution. The sixth Positive Indigenisation List contains 405 items, including missile subsystems and defence electronics. Furthermore, domestic defence production has reached a record ₹1.78 lakh crore in 2025-26, with the private sector accounting for about 24% of output.
Which components are the biggest challenge?
Seekers, propulsion and advanced electronics are among the most critical elements.
The seeker detects and tracks the target; the propulsion system determines speed and range, while the guidance and control systems determine whether the missile reaches its intended target. These are also among the most technologically sensitive parts of a missile.
India has made progress in developing indigenous seekers and advanced electronics, including gallium-nitride technology. But dependence on foreign suppliers for specialised components remains in parts of the missile ecosystem.
This can become a wartime vulnerability. If an imported component cannot be replenished, domestic final assembly can eventually stop regardless of the production capacity of the factory.
How indigenous is BrahMos?
BrahMos is not wholly indigenous. It is an Indo-Russian joint programme incorporating technologies and components from both countries. Indian content has increased through the localisation of components, electronics, control systems and other subsystems.
Important Russian-origin elements remain, particularly in propulsion and other critical technologies and components.
BrahMos therefore illustrates the distinction between manufacturing a weapon in India and eliminating dependence on foreign technology. It also shows how localisation can increase as Indian industry develops the required capabilities.
What does India still lack?
The gaps are increasingly about range, numbers and technological maturity rather than the absence of missile designs.
In long-range air defence, the S-400 remains India’s highest-end operational capability. Project Kusha is intended to reduce that dependence.
In long-range air-to-air combat, Astra Mk-1 provides an indigenous capability, while Astra Mk-2 and later variants are intended to offer greater reach. India is also evaluating the Russian R-37M as an interim option while its longer-range indigenous air-to-air missiles mature.
Across the portfolio, the requirement is therefore not simply for more missile types, but for greater production capacity, deeper inventories and a more resilient domestic supply chain.
Can private industry manufacture missiles at scale?
India already has a substantial private defence manufacturing base. Adani Defence has invested more than ₹3,000 crore in an ammunition and missile manufacturing complex near Kanpur. Kalyani’s joint venture with Israel’s Rafael has been involved in anti-tank guided missile production near Hyderabad.
Larsen & Toubro, Tata Advanced Systems, Bharat Forge and other private companies have capabilities spanning aerospace, electronics, launchers, artillery and guided weapons. The government says DRDO has transferred technologies to more than 130 partner companies through technology-transfer arrangements.
But producing a complete missile is more demanding than producing a component. A manufacturer needs specialised explosive-handling infrastructure, precision machining, propulsion facilities, electronics production, testing arrangements and a reliable network of suppliers.
Will more private companies mean more missiles?
Not automatically. Technology transfer removes one major barrier because companies can work with an established DRDO design rather than developing a missile from scratch. They still need factories, equipment, tooling, skilled personnel and suppliers.
Most importantly, they need orders. Large and predictable orders can make dedicated production lines commercially viable, while small or irregular orders may not. The procurement model will therefore be as important as the technology-transfer policy.
Will private production reduce missile prices?
Not necessarily. Competition between qualified manufacturers should put pressure on prices where more than one company can produce the same system. But private companies must also recover investments in factories, machinery, tooling and specialised infrastructure.
The immediate benefit could therefore be higher capacity and greater resilience rather than a dramatic fall in unit costs. Domestic production can also reduce dependence on foreign suppliers and exposure to foreign exchange fluctuations.
Who certifies privately manufactured missiles?
Private production does not mean private certification. The Directorate General of Quality Assurance, or DGQA, handles quality assurance for relevant land-based defence systems. DGAQA and CEMILAC handle relevant airborne stores and certification.
DGQA has opened its laboratories and proof establishments to private industry. Self-certification and Green Channel mechanisms are also intended to reduce delays for established vendors that meet prescribed quality standards.
The challenge will be to accelerate certification without compromising reliability.
Where will these missiles be tested?
Testing could become a bottleneck as production expands. Major missile trials continue to depend heavily on the Integrated Test Range at Chandipur and Abdul Kalam Island in Odisha. More manufacturers and missile variants will mean greater demand for test and qualification infrastructure.
The government is expanding capacity. The ₹1,460-crore Navdurga range at Nagayalanka is intended to support tactical systems. The Defence Testing Infrastructure Scheme is also supporting industry-run testing facilities, with government assistance covering up to 75% of eligible project costs.
Production cannot be scaled up sustainably without enough capacity to test and certify the output.
What is the difference between having a missile and having a war reserve?
Having an indigenous missile does not necessarily mean having enough of it for a prolonged war.
The test has four stages. Can India design the missile? Can it manufacture it reliably and in sufficient numbers? Can production be scaled up quickly as stocks are depleted? And can critical components, sub-systems and raw materials be replenished during a crisis?
India has made substantial progress on the first. The next test is whether manufacturing, supply chains and replenishment can keep pace with wartime consumption.
What will show whether India has solved the problem?
Three indicators will matter.
First, whether private companies establish additional certified production lines for DRDO-developed missiles. Second, whether India localises critical components such as seekers, propulsion systems and advanced electronics. Third, whether testing, certification and procurement capacity expand quickly enough to support the additional manufacturing base.
India has spent decades developing the technology to build modern missiles. The next challenge is turning that technological capability into an industrial system that can produce, replenish and sustain those weapons at scale. For a long war, designing the missile is only the beginning. The real test is whether India can keep making it.