Two hours after the Winter Session of Parliament was adjourned sine die at 2 pm on December 16, Prime Minister Narendra Modi called Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar to his office. National Security Advisor Ajit Doval was also summoned. After last-minute confabulations, the decision to announce Lieutenant General Bipin Rawat as the next Army chief was taken. General Rawat’s first-hand experience involving counter-terrorism operations in Jammu and Kashmir gave him an edge; he wears on his chest a Wound Medal awarded to soldiers injured in a conflict, which he received for an operation on the Line of Control (LoC) in the early days of his 37-year-old career. General Rawat’s appointment indicated a strategic shift in the Indian government’s military thinking. Gone is the conventional diplomatic response to Pakistan’s transgression.
Limited armed response is the new doctrine, as the surgical strikes in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) on September 29 showed. It was an example of powerful strike capability of the world’s third-largest standing army. Pakistan did not expect retaliation after 19 soldiers were killed and 37 wounded by terrorist attacks on the Army camp at Uri, Jammu. However, when the clock struck midnight on September 29, Dhruv Advanced Light Helicopters bearing 25 commandos from 4 Para and 9 Para (Special Forces) flew over the LoC into PoK. They were armed to the teeth, wearing camera-mounted helmets, which beamed back real-time visuals of the action to Army headquarters. They were carrying Israeli Tavor assault rifles, M-4 guns, grenades, smoke grenades, under-barrel grenade launchers (UBGL) and night vision devices. The commandos split into seven groups. They crawled three kilometers through rocky muddy ground, skirting landmines and Pakistan Army patrols. If caught, the results would have been disastrous.
Eventually, they reached their targets—terror launchpads in Bhimbar, Kel, Tattapani and Leepa areas where terrorists were waiting to infiltrate into India, backed by Pakistan Army. The terrorists were under electronic and satellite surveillance by Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) and Military Intelligence. Before the terrorists knew what was happening, 50 were killed, including Pakistani soldiers. The commandos crossed back into India without any casualties except for a few landmine injuries.
Previously, the Army was under vicious, escalated attack from separatists in the Kashmir Valley after the Jammu and Kashmir Police killed local Hizbul Mujahideen commander Burhan Wani. Initially, the Army had largely preferred to stay away from active involvement. The action upped the morale of the Indian Army and dampened the enthusiasm of the protestors. Pakistan escalated its response by non-stop shelling on Indian positions. Indian retaliation was no less. On both sides of the border, civilians fled their homes and villages. Unlike during earlier situations, the Indian Army refused to back down. On November 23, Pakistan Army’s Director General of Military Intelligence (DGMO) called his Indian counterpart for a resolution.
The death of Indian soldiers was the highest in six years—64 dead in terror attacks and killed by Pakistan Army action on the border. India and Pakistan fought two conventional wars in 1965 and 1971, and the Kargil conflict in 1999. India lost nearly 6,000 soldiers in these battles, and Pakistan over 13,500. Since 1988, Pakistan-backed terrorists have carried out over 47,000 attacks in the Valley alone, in which 6,270 security personnel have died and 23,000 militants eliminated. Since 2009, Pakistan has committed over 800 ceasefire violations—over half of them this year. On December 14, the government in its reply in Parliament said there has been a sustained terrorist escalation this year, sponsored by the Pakistani establishment.
Military experts maintain that Indian security forces have been carrying out covert operations against terror groups operating from PoK, but the Indian government publicly acknowledged it for the first time after the September 29 surgical strikes.
The year 2016 has witnessed multiple high-profile attacks on Indian soil by cross-border backed terrorist outfits. Seven Indian soldiers died in the fidayeen attacks on the Pathankot Indian Air Force base on January 2. Three militants were shot dead in the 72-hour-long gun battle. The swift Army action ensured that the terrorists couldn’t gain access to the Air Force’s air assets zone. The government realised urgent attention had to be given to Indian counter-intelligence capability, which had been compromised and downgraded after internal politics in the Army after its chief, General V K Singh, retired in 2012.
The Pathankot attack exposed loopholes in the security of military bases because heavily armed militants could enter an IAF base, more than 50 kilometres from the border. After the surgical strikes and subsequent loss of face to Pakistan Army, terrorists again attacked an artillery brigade in Nagrota, barely a kilometre from where the Indian Army’s biggest unit, 16 Corps, is posted. Even though seven Indian soldiers—including two officers—were killed, the militants couldn’t enter the officers’ mess or soldiers’ homes, or take hostages. The Pakistan Army’s brutality continues; two Indian soldiers were beheaded in J&K’s Machchal sector this August.
It’s not just the enemy at the border gates our soldiers have to fight. Hostile weather and difficult terrain is a challenge to the Indian Army. Pakistan has been asking for demilitarisation of Siachen and the Indian Army’s top brass has prevailed over an oscillating Indian political leadership. India pays a high price for protecting 3,000 square kilometres of icy slopes in Siachen. On February 3, 10 soldiers of 19 Madras Regiment were buried alive in an avalanche in the glacier. Lance Naik Hanamanthappa Koppad, who survived six days under the snow, became a symbol of the Indian soldier’s endurance. He died seven days later.
In Operation Meghdoot, which has been on since 1984, the Army has lost 35 officers and 887 men, guarding the world’s highest battlefield. And 19 Madras is now guarding the border with China at the Line of Actual (LAC) in Chushul, Ladakh.
The Army’s bane has been the short-sighted policies of the political leadership. Even after the Mumbai terror attacks on November 26, 2008, which claimed 164 lives, the Manmohan Singh administration contemplated a military response initially, but shied away at the last minute. “A battle is won by soldiers, while a war is lost by political leaders and generals,” notes Army historian Colonel J Francis in Short Stories From the History of the Indian Army Since 1947. During the Pakistani invasion of Kashmir in 1947 and the Indo-China War in 1962, then prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s vacillation cost Indian territory. As Pakistani raiders reached within 7 km of Srinagar airport on October 26, 1947, Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw, then a Lieutenant Colonel in the Directorate of Military Operations, urged the Defence Committee of the Cabinet that unless troops were sent to Srinagar immediately, India would lose Kashmir. A hesitant Nehru kept talking about consulting the UN until Sardar Patel roared at him, “Jawahar, do you want Kashmir or do you want to give it away?” Nehru acquiesced, and Patel told Manekshaw, “You have your marching orders.”
The sacrifices of Major Som Nath Sharma and Sepoy Dewan Singh of Delta Company, Kumaon Regiment, ensured that the Pakistanis could not take Srinagar. Major Sharma received the first Param Vir Chakra in the history of Independent India and Sepoy Dewan Singh was awarded a Maha Vir Chakra. Major Sharma had sworn, “I will either fight and die in battle or will one day become Chief of Army Staff.” Later, his brother Vishwa Nath Sharma became the Army chief. Major Sharma’s feelings were echoed by the Lion of Kargil, Captain Vikram Batra who swore, “Either I will come back after hoisting the Tricolour, or I will come back wrapped in it, but I will be back for sure.”
The Tricolour was kept flying by Indian soldiers in spite of political disasters. In 1962, Nehru refused to let the IAF participate in action against China. The Indian Army fought resiliently and valiantly with archaic weapons, limited ammunition and without winter clothing. The war was lost, but the enemy could not break its spirit. The last stand of Major Shaitan Singh at Chushul airfield in Ladakh in 1962, Major R S Dayal’s assault on Pakistani soldiers at the battle of Haji Pir in 1965, Major Chewan Rinchen (who fought in three battles in 1948, 1962 and 1971 when he retook Turtuk in Leh) and Rifleman Prem Bahadur Roka Magar of the Gurkha Regiment, who killed a Pakistani terrorist in hand-to-hand combat at the LoC exemplify the undying spirit of the Indian Army. In 1965, the Indian soldiers defeated the Pakistanis, who were equipped with better weapons like Patton tanks and Sabre fighter jets. It was believed that Patton tanks in all Pakistani regiments were painted with the slogan, ‘March up to Delhi’. Then Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri had declared India will give “a fitting reply”, hailed by General Harbaksh Singh, then GOC-in-C, as “the tallest of decisions taken by one of the shortest of men”. However, in all the battles India has fought, the political leadership in the end returned all captured areas to Pakistan, which were won at great cost of Indian lives.
In 1971, 90,000 Pak PoWs were returned, though 54 Indian PoWs never returned home. Last week, when India celebrated the 45th year of victory over Pakistan in Bangladesh, none of the missing PoWs found mention in speeches or citations. India’s defence budget is still an abysmal 1.74 per cent of the GDP, almost the same as it was prior to the 1962 conflict.
The Army is grappling with a shortage of necessary equipment. It has been unable to procure bulletproof jackets for nearly a decade. Soldiers fight with less than half the 3.5 lakh such jackets they require. The contract to procure 1.86 lakh jackets is still stuck. The Ministry of Defence asked 39 vendors to send proposals in December 2012. Only six responded. A Parliamentary Defence Committee report last year slammed the ministry for failing to provide jawans 217,388 high-ankle boots, 130,092 canvas running shoes and 447,000 balaclavas and other basic equipment. The Comptroller and Auditor General came down heavily on authorities for the poor quality of food supplied to troops deployed in operational areas of J&K and the Northeast, noting that they were past their ‘expiry date’.
The new Army chief, General Rawat, is expected to make a difference. General Dalbir Singh Suhag’s successor’s name was kept a secret until barely a fortnight was left for his retirement. Three months ago, General Rawat was summoned to Delhi from the Pune-based Southern Command. The file on General Rawat, which had gone to the Prime Minister’s Office for approval of the Appointment Committee of Cabinet, had three names. Rawat’s counter-terrorism experience won the day. Doval’s recommendation carried weight, too. Ministry sources said two days before the announcement, Parrikar called Rawat and briefed him on his new role. “The appointment was made with a strategic vision,” said a top government source.
Last month, Pakistan had appointed Lieutenant General Qamar Bajwa, a Kashmir expert who had earlier commanded 10 Corps along the LoC, the country’s largest military formation, as its army chief.
Given the support General Rawat has received from the ruling troika of Prime Minister Modi, Doval and Parrikar, he might make a difference. The General is known as a man of action, as his days spent with the UN peacekeeping mission, in charge of the North Kivu Brigade in Congo in 2008, show. The Congolese government was fighting an aggressive rebel force. The main casualities were civilians. General Rawat’s introduction of helicopter gunships and machine gun-mounted armoured vehicles changed the strategic equation in favour of the UN forces.
However, he did not garner a gallantry medal during the decade he spent in counter-insurgency operations in the Valley. He is expected to make up for it in the next three years at Army Headquarters in South Block. To execute his mandate, the indomitable will of the Indian soldier is his primary weapon.
Watershed Moments
On Jan 2, three terrorists attack Pathankot Air Force base, killing seven soldiers. The terrorists are eliminated in a fierce 72-hour gun battle.
Government disburses the first installment of One Rank One Pension (OROP) to over 25 lakh veterans and their families. OROP, a four-decade-old demand of ex-servicemen, was the NDA’s poll promise.
Hizbul Mujahideen commander Burhan Wani is gunned down by the Army in Bumdoora
village. Clashes erupt in Kashmir Valley between protestors and security forces. The agitation was fuelled by Pakistan-backed separatist groups.
On Sept 18, militants attack 12 Brigade in J&K’s Uri, killing 19 soldiers and wounding 37.
In retaliation to the Army’s cross-border surgical strike, the Pakistani army carries out a series of ceasefire violations, targeting Indian posts and civilians. Pakistan’s Border Action Teams behead two Indian soldiers in Machchal along the LoC.
Terrorists attack an artillery brigade in Nagrota, a kilometre from the Army’s biggest corps, 16 Corps. Seven soldiers, including two officers, are killed while thwarting militants from entering the officers’ mess, preventing a hostage situation.