From ties that remained cool during the Cold War era, India’s relations with the most important regional organisation in Southeast Asia, ASEAN, has come a long way.
ASEAN started as a regional organisation when five nations—Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand—established it in August 1967 at a meeting in Bangkok. Vietnam joined in 1995, Laos and Myanmar in 1997, Cambodia in 1999 and Brunei in 1984, making up the 10 that comprise ASEAN today.
India and ASEAN were not on the same side during the Cold War. India stuck to the principle of non-alignment and some ASEAN nations were allied to the US.
Tectonic geopolitical shifts like the disintegration of the Soviet Union created opportunities for the reassessment of India’s foreign policy. The impressive economic growth of ASEAN nations, China’s phenomenal rise as an economic power and technological advances that ushered in the digital era were strategic imperatives that became the driver of our policy changes.
Under P V Narasimha Rao as prime minister, India began its Look East policy in 1991, which was renamed Act East policy (AEP) by Narendra Modi in 2014. A special envoy to ASEAN based at Jakarta was appointed. In 1992, India became a sectoral partner. In 2018, the ASEAN-India commemorative summit was held in Delhi.
India and ASEAN still view each other as glasses half empty. Expectations are much higher than actual achievements. India has focussed much more on the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation, at the expense of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, signalling that its AEP intended to expand eastwards and into the Indo-Pacific region. The free trade agreement with ASEAN became operational in 2010 and by 2018, ASEAN had become India’s 4th largest trading partner.
Cultural and educational cooperation has also expanded. These include student exchanges, training for ASEAN diplomats, setting up of the ASEAN-India Network of Think-Tanks, and the ASEAN-India Eminent Persons Lecture Series.
Among the AEP plurilateral projects are the Mekong-Ganga Cooperation by six countries—India Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam—for cooperation in tourism, culture, education, transport and communication, health, traditional medicine, agriculture, SMEs, water management, S & T, skill development and capacity building. Another project is the Kaladan project worth around $ 500 million that will connect Indian sea ports to Sittwe in Rakhine state and Mizoram via Paletwa in Chin using multimodal routes.
This project will enable goods to transit Myanmar to Sittwe port from India’s Northeastern states, cutting down transportation costs. In 2024, India Ports Global Limited, an Indian PSU, won the contract for managing Sittwe port. This project has, however, faced considerable problems arising from the ethnic conflict in Myanmar.
Myanmar’s civil war has stymied the connectivity project. The trilateral highway project connecting India-Myanmar-Thailand has also been adversely affected.
Recently, a meeting in Bangkok was held to address the civil war in Myanmar comprising the nation’s foreign minister and counterparts from five neighbours, Bangladesh, China, India, Malaysia and Thailand. Myanmar’s FM outlined plans to hold polls in 2025 despite the ongoing civil war.
ASEAN-India security ties have progressed as China started flexing its military muscle that cast a shadow over ASEAN. India’s security ties with Vietnam and the Philippines have jumped manifold, with the Philippines acquiring the state-of-the-art Brahmos missiles from India.
India-Singapore joint military exercises have become a regular feature. India’s approach has been to ramp up security cooperation with willing countries of the ASEAN apart from cooperation on counterterrorism, cybersecurity, and maritime cooperation. The Indian Navy has periodically deployed its ships in the SCS, making port calls in ASEAN countries. China’s bullying tactics in the SCS have encouraged ASEAN countries to do some counter balancing, though its urge to remain neutral remains central to its thinking.
India’s decision to stay out of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) in spite of participating in negotiations was for a variety of reasons. The 15-member RCEP—Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam—is a blockbuster FTA whose member countries account for about 30 percent of the world’s population and 30 percent of global GDP. India’s decision was based on pragmatic reasons, mainly China’s ability to exploit it for dumping even more cheap goods in the Indian market. This was seen as a setback to the AEP.
The future of India-ASEAN ties will depend on the demands of changing geopolitics. China’s aggressive push with its Belt and Road Initiative has positioned it as the premier economic partner of ASEAN. Some countries like Cambodia and Laos have been more China-aligned while Indonesia, Vietnam and the Philippines have ongoing disputes with it over maritime claims in the SCS. China has actively pursued a policy of keeping the ASEAN divided on this issue and the code of conduct agreement in the SCS remains in limbo.
Under the AEP, India has sought to forge deeper and more comprehensive partnership with ASEAN to enhance cooperation. India’s goals to attain a $5 trillion economy requires greater engagement with ASEAN. Connectivity projects have been supported by $1 billion in Lines of Credit by India. For ASEAN, India’s growing economy provides opportunities and India’s military power enables ASEAN to counterbalance China
The last year marked a decade of the AEP; India-ASEAN collaboration developed to a stage where further cooperation is inevitable but grave challenges remain. The civil war in Myanmar is a major concern. The political upheaval in Bangladesh and the propensity of the current regime in Dhaka to distance itself from India are challenges that will have to be overcome.
While India is one market, ASEAN countries have different border regulations with rather high non-tariff barriers. India has to play catch-up with ASEAN-China trade, which tops $700 billion. Moreover, India as a member of the Quad provides ASEAN a hedge against China. The new administration of Trump in the US and the anticipation of a rise in China-US trade competitions may give impetus to India-ASEAN ties to expand mutually beneficial cooperation.
(Views are personal)
Pinak Ranjan Chakravarty | Former Ambassador to Thailand and former Secretary (economic relations), Ministry of External Affairs