For nearly six decades, Naxalism has been a destructive political experiment. Born in Naxalbari in 1967, it did not remain a local revolt for long. It developed into a revolutionary doctrine that rejected India’s parliamentary system. From the forests of eastern India to the tribal belts of central India, Naxalism created a parallel ecosystem of fear.
For the ordinary citizen of these areas, Naxalism was never a fashionable intellectual proposition. It was fear. It was a gun outside the village. It was a road that could not be built. It was a policeman who might not return home.
That history matters because the extraordinary decline of Naxalism in recent years did not happen by accident. It was the result of political determination, security operations, intelligence coordination and development pursued under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, with Union Home Minister Amit Shah driving the execution of the government’s strategy.
Government figures show how dramatically the threat has receded: LWE-related violent incidents fell from 1,936 in 2010 to 234 in 2025. Deaths of civilians and security personnel fell from to 100.
Argument beyond forests
The collapse of Naxalism makes Modi’s warning about “dimagi Naxals” significant. An ideology does not necessarily disappear merely because its physical infrastructure collapses. Naxalism was always sustained by more than violence. It required a narrative—one that could portray the Indian state as the principal source of injustice, explain away the violence of Naxals as “resistance” and repeatedly shift the moral focus from those who picked up gun to the state that confronted them.
This is why the ideological dimension deserves scrutiny. The question is much more uncomfortable: when does sympathy for a grievance become sympathy for an ideology that rejects the constitutional order itself? A democracy must protect dissent, but it should not be expected to provide ideological respectability to political violence.
The Binayak Sen episode became one of the defining controversies around the Naxal debate. Sen was convicted by a Chhattisgarh trial court in 2010 in a case involving links with Naxal figures and was sentenced to life imprisonment; the Supreme Court granted him bail in 2011. He became a celebrated figure among sections of India’s civil-liberties establishment.
After his release, he was appointed to a Planning Commission health-related steering committee. Sonia Gandhi, meanwhile, chaired the National Advisory Council during the UPA years, an institution that brought together politicians, activists, academics and civil-society figures and was frequently criticised by its opponents for exercising substantial policy influence. The political significance lies in the ecosystem.
Afzal Guru became an object of political and campus controversy, with sections of the political establishment and student politics turning his execution into a debate about the Indian state, rather than keeping the victims of the Parliament attack at the centre of the national memory. Burhan Wani was not a Naxal, but his death in 2016 produced enormous public mobilisation in Kashmir.
Rahul Gandhi should not be casually labelled a Naxal. But his political choices deserve scrutiny. The Congress has every right to oppose the Modi government. What it cannot escape is the question of whether its politics increasingly rewards confrontation.
When Youth Congress workers staged a shirtless protest at the India AI Impact Summit and Gandhi praised them as “Babbar Sher”, the episode offered a glimpse of a political culture increasingly comfortable with provocation as a substitute for argument. The protest was not Naxalism. The point is larger: mainstream politics must not import the language of permanent institutional distrust from the political fringe.
No room for complacency
Whatever argument is made about the ideological battle, the record of the Modi government’s anti-Naxalism campaign is measurable. The government has expanded security infra, with hundreds of fortified police stations established in affected areas. By March 31, 2026, Shah declared that the government had fulfilled its commitment to eliminate Naxalism, after setting that deadline in August 2024. The geographical reach of Naxalism has collapsed, its organisational capacity has been shattered and the state has returned to areas where its presence was once challenged by violence.
Modi and Shah’s record in combating Naxalism deserves recognition. But victory cannot mean complacency. The country must remain vigilant against the ideological ecosystem that seeks to preserve or revive its worldview. The “dimagi Naxals” must be identified, exposed and isolated from the influence they seek to exercise, particularly over young minds. India has defeated Naxalism on the ground; it must now remain cautious that its ideology does not find a new route into public life. The guns may have fallen silent, but the nation must never allow the mindset behind them to regain legitimacy.
Pradeep Bhandari,
National media co-incharge and national spokesperson, BJP.