Sixty years ago, the first shots of the India-Pakistan War of 1965 were heard in the Rann of Kutch at Kanjarkot in February. That front was soon stabilized but Pakistan was emboldened. Further, General Ayub Khan felt that India was at its weakest having suffered a military defeat at the hands of the Chinese in 1962 and having lost Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in 1964.
Pakistan was also on a high as it was part of the CENTO and SEATO alliances. In 1963, it had handed over the Shaksgam Valley in the Gilgit Baltistan region of PoJK and thereby cemented a friendship with China, which a year later tested an atomic device. Pakistan’s focus was now back on Jammu and Kashmir and with this in mind it launched Operation Gibraltar.
The first signs of Operation Gibraltar were visible in early August 1965. Pakistan’s plan was audacious. Trained men, disguised as civilians, started infiltrating the Ceasefire Line (CFL) and ignited an insurgency. The groups named after eight historical Muslim invaders such as Salahuddin, Babur, Ghaznavi and Tariq, were sent along designated routes with specific objectives. Their aim was to create a ‘people’s war’ in the Valley with a view to justify Pakistan intervention by garnering local support. Though ambitious, Operation Gibraltar was fundamentally flawed.
Counter-Infiltration Operations
Recognising the magnitude of the threat, Army HQ tasked the Western Command to neutralize the infiltrators. 15 Corps under Lieutenant General KS Katoch then decided to choke off the entry points the infiltrators depended on. Battalions were redeployed to forward blocking positions in infiltration-prone areas. Artillery batteries were shifted to dominate likely approach routes and logistics were pushed up to sustain forward platoons on exposed ridgelines.
Signals Detachments with Brigade Headquarters ensured that intercepted enemy transmissions could be turned into actionable intelligence within minutes. Air-Observation Post (Air OP) helicopters, risky to fly in such terrain, were tasked with scouting infiltration camps for strikes.
Having successfully carried out a counter infiltration campaign, Lieutenant General Harbaksh Singh, the Western Army Commander, thereafter pushed for three major offensives to seal J&K from further infiltration. The first was in the capture of three dominating Pakistani posts in the Kargil Sector, thereafter, in Kishanganga Tithwal Sector where he had been a Brigade Commander in 1948 and finally, he concentrated on the strategic bulge between Uri & Poonch.
Kargil Sector: Recapture of Kargil Heights
In the Kargil Sector, the first step was to recapture the three Pakistani posts, which posed a constant danger to the Srinagar-Leh Road. On 14 August, a Task Force of 17 Punjab led by Major Balwant Singh captured Point 13620, Saddle, and Black Rocks. These objectives were attacked from three different directions. The troops had to climb up the slopes through the gaps in the minefield created by the engineers at night. All the three objectives were captured by the morning of 15 August, without any casualties.
Tithwal Sector
In the Tithwal Sector, the ‘Nusrat Force’ despite being supported by regular Pakistani troops did not function effectively. From August 13-18, the Pakistanis raided some Indian posts and indulged in intensive firing. In retaliation, the Indian troops crossed the ceasefire line on August 24 and occupied three Pakistani posts. It was during this action that a "Divisional Order' signed by Major Gen Akhtar Hussain Malik was captured.
On August 23, a combined patrol of 2 Rajput and 3/8 Gorkha Rifles secured the Ring Contour area across the ceasefire line. On 24 August, 1 Sikh attacked the Pakistani post on Richhmar Ridge. The attack was ably led by Major Somesh Kapoor, and the enemy, taken by surprise, fled in confusion.
On the night of August 25-26, 1965, Pir Sahiba was captured after a determined climb and close combat. This blocked key infiltration routes into Kashmir.
On September 3-4, the Gurkhas attacked the Sunjoi feature. After crossing minefields and fighting hand-to-hand, they successfully evicted Pakistanis from the feature. Two enemy counter-attacks were beaten back. By mid-September, Parni and Mirpur were occupied and on the night of September 20-21, 4 Kumaon captured Point 9013 after three hours of fierce fighting. The Indian forces now secured control over the Mirpur Sector up to the Kishanganga River.
Uri–Haji Pir: Closing the Gateway
Haji Pir Pass, at 8,652 feet, was the key. Whoever held it could control and dominate the main infiltration route between Pakistan-held territory and the Poonch–Uri axis. So long as the pass was in Pakistani hands, Gibraltar’s columns could keep coming. The pass was dominated by three adjoining hill features -- Bedori (3760 m) in the North-East, Ledwali Gali (3140 m) in the North-West and Sank (2895 m) in the North. The capture of these features was considered necessary for advancing to Haji Pir Pass.
The Haji Pir operation designed as a major pincer called for a Northern thrust along the Uri-Haji Pir axis and a Southern push from the Punch-Kahuta side. The objective was to cut all approach routes to the bulge.
The Northern advance was assigned to 19 Infantry Division under Major General SS Kalaan, with 68 Infantry Brigade commanded by Brigadier (later Lieutenant General) ZC Bakshi under his command. The operation was given the codename Operation Bakshi and conducted in three phases.
It began on the night of August 25 with Brigadier Bakshi himself following the Western thrust.The artillery shelled suspected enemy positions while 1 Para advanced towards Sank Ridge. The Pakistanis held fire until the attackers were within 45 metres, then opened up with all weapons. Next morning the attack was called off due to heavy casualties.
A renewed assault began at 2230 hours on August 26. Indian troops advanced towards Point 9591 at Sank under intense fire and, in a determined frontal charge, silenced enemy MMGs and LMGs. Pakistani troops withdrew to Sar feature. This was then captured and 1 Para pushed to Ledwali Gali.
However, the attack on the Bedori axis by 19 Punjab was stalled due to an unapproachable path. CO 1 Para Lieutenant Colonel Prabhjinder Singh was now tasked to capture Haji Pir Pass. A small, self-contained, mixed Company Group was formed under Major (later Lieutenant General) RS Dayal. The column started descending, at 1530 hours on 27 August, from Ledwali Gali into the Hyderabad nullah along the Spur. Soon it started raining heavily making the going very difficult. By 1900 hours the Company Group reached Hyderabad nullah. It was now completely dark and Major Ranjit Dayal decided to climb to the pass.
At 0430 hours, the company hit the old Uri-Punch Road, 10 km below the pass. Here, the troops were given a much-needed rest in a very cold and bitter morning before the final assault. They finally reached 700 metres short of the pass by 0900 hours.
The men again came under fire but Major Dayal decided to climb on to the Spur and assault the enemy from the Western side of the pass. The enemy could not withstand this daring daylight attack and withdrew in confusion. By 1000 hours on August 28, the objective had been taken and the Tricolour flew on Haji Pir Pass.
Major Dayal then repulsed the expected fierce counterattack on August 29, surviving a LMG burst in close-quarter-combat that pierced his web equipment but left him unscathed.
In one stroke, the main artery of Operation Gibraltar was cut. Major General SS Kalaan, Brigadier Bakshi and Major Dayal were awarded the Maha Vir Chakra.
Operation Faulad
Meanwhile 93 Infantry Brigade commanded by Brigadier Zora Singh had been pushing Northwards to establish a link up. There were many hill features between Punch and Kahuta which dominated the Punch-Haji Pir track. The enemy picquets also had cement emplacements for MMGs and shellproof bunkers.
Operation Faulad saw gallant actions fought for the capture of the Raja and Chand Tekri picquets, both of which were considered to be virtually impregnable. On the night of September 5-6, a simultaneous attack was launched on Raja and Chand Tekri picquets by 2 Sikh and 3 Dogra respectively.
As the approach lay along steep and slippery slopes, the assaulting troops had to crawl on all fours. When they neared the picquets, heavy automatic fire greeted them. A grim hand-to-hand battle raged for over two hours before the picquets fell. Raja picquet fought to the last man.
The Indian side also suffered heavy casualties. During the assault, Lieutenant Colonel NN Khanna, commanding 2 Sikh, laid down his life while leading his men bravely. He was decorated with the Maha Vir Chakra for his exceptional courage and leadership. But his troops summed up the battle with the words "Raja littateh Raja ditta".
With the fall of Raja and Chand Tekri, the back of Gibraltar Force was broken. The link-up was completed with the capture of Kahuta on 10 September and with that the mouth of the bulge was sealed. Defeated, Pakistan now decided to open up another front and launched Operation Grand Slam.
Chhamb Sector
The failure of Operation Gibraltar saw Operation Grand Slam put into effect by General Ayub Khan on September 1. A massive attack was planned in the Chhamb Jaurian Sector. This idea looked simple enough on paper: use armour and infantry to smash through Indian positions in the Chhamb Sector, cross the Tawi, capture Akhnur, and choke off India’s road link to Rajouri and Poonch. Without Akhnoor, Jammu itself would be under threat.
Pakistan believed this would either collapse Indian defences in J&K or force India to ask for peace under unfavourable terms. The reality, however, played out quite differently. India’s Armed Forces, despite being surprised by the scale of this attack, mounted a gritty and effective counter attack that foiled this ambition.
On September 1, Pakistan’s forces equipped with modern US-supplied Patton tanks, rolled across the ceasefire line (CFL). It was launched across the Southern most portion of the CFL and was aimed at Akhnur; thus, Pakistan aimed at cutting of Indian positions in Naushera, Rajauri and Punch.
Pakistan’s first column attacked Burejal to the South of Chhamb. 191 Infantry Brigade, under Brigadier Manmohan Singh, faced the brunt. The assault was repulsed but the post was attacked again by a second column that came across with an armoured squadron. A third column, with a squadron of Pattons, had already advanced through the gap between Moel and Paur at about 0030 hours. The Indian squadron of 20 Lancers with outgunned AMX 13 tanks commanded by Major Bhaskar Roy boldly faced the attacking column and knocked out ten tanks.
The main assault was launched by Pakistan from the direction of Pir Maungawali, along the general line Green Ridge-Bramal-Dewa, on the road to Mandiala. It was a Brigade attack supported by a Regiment of Pattons and a Motorised Battalion.
191 Infantry Brigade was under enormous pressure. In those early hours, the Indian defence looked fragile, but the soldiers on the ground did not collapse. The men in the trenches faced an enemy coming in strength, with armour, artillery, and numerical superiority. By fighting the enemy, they slowed the advance, giving time for reinforcements.
The Indian Air Force also stepped in to blunt the Pakistani assault. Inexplicably, on September 2, Pakistan decided to replace the Division Commander Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik with Major General Yahya Khan as the former was an Ahmadiyya and the latter was a favorite of General Ayub. This move gave time to the Indian forces to consolidate their defences around Jaurian.
191 Infantry Brigade was placed under the command of 10 Infantry Division and withdrawn to Jaurian. The Pakistani offensive had achieved surprise and made good progress initially but had lost its momentum by 03 September. The gallantry of Major Bhaskar Roy of 20 Lancers who skillfully placed and maneuvered his AMX-13 tanks in the face of superior enemy armour in Chhamb Sector stands out in the annals of our military history. He too was awarded a Maha Vir Chakra.
The collapse of 191 Infantry Brigade in the face of an overwhelmingly superior force created a critical situation. At this stage, it was decided to defend Jaurian with 41 Mountain Brigade and keep 28 Infantry Brigade as Corps reserve for the defence of Akhur while 191 Infantry Brigade was made responsible for the defence of Akhnur.
To tackle the crisis in Chhamb Sector, India, not left with any other option, mounted a counter offensive across the international border in J&K, Punjab and Rajasthan. The ‘go ahead’ for an all-out military response had been given by the Emergency Committee of the Cabinet chaired by the Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri on September 3. This was not a mere diversion. It forced Pakistan to do the one thing it had never planned for: split its armour. The powerful 1 Armoured Division, which was supposed to drive all the way to Akhnoor and beyond, now had to turn and face Indian thrusts threatening Lahore.
After the opening of a new front, India decided to launch a counter- offensive in the Chhamb Sector. For India, this battle was a harsh test. Troops in Chhamb fought under impossible odds, with inferior equipment, though bent but did not break. The Lahore thrust proved that sometimes the best way to defend is to attack. Chhamb, though scarred and battered, did not fall, and Akhnoor remained in Indian hands.
Conclusion
Operation Gibraltar was meant to be a covert blow, giving Pakistan deniability while undermining India’s hold on Jammu and Kashmir. Instead, it turned into a lesson in how bad assumptions and weak intelligence can set off a chain reaction. India answered this threat with calm but firm moves and soon Pakistan was on the ropes.
By the end of it all, Operation Gibraltar collapsed in less than a month, which prompted Pakistan to open a new front in Chhamb. India then retaliated by launching offensives across the Punjab and Rajasthan border. Pakistan’s gamble to 'liberate' Kashmir remained a pipe dream due to a combination of rapid strategic diagnosis, resolve and sector-specific tactics. Unfortunately, Pakistan is yet to learn its lesson.