The latest Quad Foreign Ministers’ meeting in New Delhi signalled a clear shift in the grouping’s trajectory toward a more practical, resilient, and carefully calibrated Indo-Pacific coalition even as the absence of clarity on the next leaders’ summit raised questions about its near-term political momentum. The initiatives unveiled by India, the United States, Japan, and Australia on maritime surveillance, energy security, critical minerals, infrastructure, and technology standards reflected a Quad focused on building strategic capacity rather than projecting military power.
Just as significant, however, was what the meeting did not produce — there was no clarity on the next Quad leaders’ summit. That absence triggered speculation about whether the Quad is losing momentum. But the reality is more nuanced. The grouping appears to be entering a more mature phase, one trying to grow roots in institutional cooperation across critical sectors, at least for the time being.
At the same time, the Quad continues to be shaped by a central geopolitical reality — China’s rise in the Indo-Pacific. Yet, its members continue to carefully avoid defining it as an anti-China military bloc.
Origin and evolution
The Quad, comprising Australia, India, Japan, and the US, is a partnership that represents nearly two billion people and roughly one-third of global GDP. Its origins go back to 2004, when the four countries coordinated humanitarian assistance after the Indian Ocean tsunami. It demonstrated the value of joint action in the Indo-Pacific.
A more formal dialogue began in 2007, but the grouping quickly lost momentum due to concerns about regional sensitivities, particularly perceptions in China. It was effectively dormant by 2008. The idea was revived in 2017 amid shifting regional dynamics, growing concerns about maritime security, and increasing awareness of supply chain vulnerabilities. Since then, the Quad has evolved from a cautious strategic dialogue into a fledging platform for cooperation across a widening set of sectors.
More practical agenda
The Quad operates through leaders’ summits, foreign ministers’ meetings, and an expanding network of working groups. Its agenda now spans maritime security, critical and emerging technologies, infrastructure development, climate resilience, health security, education, and supply chain diversification. Increasingly, the Quad frames its role as the provision of “public goods” for the Indo-Pacific. This includes initiatives on maritime domain awareness, disaster response coordination, secure digital infrastructure, undersea cable connectivity, and standards for emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence and semiconductors. The New Delhi meeting reinforced this trajectory. New initiatives on maritime surveillance, energy security, and critical minerals reflected a shift toward practical cooperation in areas that directly impact economic and strategic resilience.
The China factor
The Quad’s evolution cannot be understood without acknowledging the role of China. Its revival in 2017 was widely seen as a response to Beijing’s growing influence across the Indo-Pacific, from maritime assertiveness in the South China Sea to infrastructure diplomacy under the Belt and Road Initiative, and dominance in critical supply chains. That underlying context remains relevant today, but its articulation is not so very emphatic.
This is a deliberate choice shaped by several factors. India has long resisted any formal military framing, preferring strategic autonomy and flexibility. Southeast Asian countries remain wary of binary geopolitical blocs that could force alignment choices. Even Australia and Japan, while strengthening defence cooperation with the US, recognise the importance of maintaining broad regional acceptance. Its messaging increasingly emphasises reducing vulnerabilities in supply chains, energy systems, digital infrastructure, and maritime security rather than containing a country.
US-China recalibration and its impact
The Quad’s evolution is also taking place in the context of shifting US-China relations. Washington continues to view Beijing as its primary long-term strategic competitor. However, its approach has become more calibrated in recent years, moving away from outright decoupling toward “de-risking”, selective engagement, and managed competition. It has direct implications for the Quad. Rather than serving as a hard security alliance, the Quad is increasingly seen as a flexible network for building resilience in key sectors — particularly semiconductors, critical minerals, energy security and advanced technologies.
This shift is reflected in recent initiatives such as the Quad Critical Minerals Framework. Global supply chains for rare earths and critical minerals remain heavily concentrated in China, creating vulnerabilities in industries ranging from electric vehicles and semiconductors to defence manufacturing. The Quad’s response is framed as diversification, building alternative supply chains.
Similarly, the Quad Initiative on Indo-Pacific Energy Security reflects growing recognition that energy disruptions are no longer purely economic events but strategic risks with regional consequences. In this sense, the Quad is increasingly moving from traditional military balancing toward what could be described as systemic balancing, a strategy to strengthen the underlying structures that support regional stability.
Beyond summit diplomacy
One of the most discussed aspects of the New Delhi meeting was the absence of clarity on the next Quad Leaders’ Summit. Since leaders’ summits were elevated in 2021, they have become central to the Quad’s political visibility. They provided direction, symbolism and momentum. However, sustaining that rhythm has become more difficult due to complex global diplomatic calendars, shifting geo-political quicksand and ties between India and the US. The lack of announcement this time stood out because previous joint statements typically identified the next summit host. Instead, ministers only expressed a general expectation of future meetings.
The Quad can operate through engagement across a wide range of working groups covering maritime security, counter-terrorism, infrastructure, emerging technologies, health security, and supply chains. Foreign ministers have met three times in 18 months showing coordination is increasingly operational.
Platform for strategic public goods
A defining feature of the Quad’s evolution is its growing emphasis on delivering strategic public goods for the Indo-Pacific. This includes maritime domain awareness tools for smaller states, disaster response coordination mechanisms, trusted digital infrastructure, resilient undersea cable networks, energy security initiatives, and supply chain diversification. The Fiji port infrastructure initiative announced in New Delhi reflects this approach. Rather than competing in geopolitical signalling, the Quad is focusing on targeted infrastructure projects that address real regional needs.
Similarly, cooperation on undersea cables and digital identity standards reflects an effort to build secure, interoperable systems that support long-term digital growth across the Indo-Pacific. The underlying model is not that of a military alliance, but of a resilience-building network.
Challenges ahead
Despite its progress, the Quad faces several structural challenges. First, its agenda is broad and expanding — spanning security, technology, energy, agriculture, infrastructure and climate resilience. Maintaining focus will be essential to avoid dilution of impact.
Second, member countries continue to have differing approaches to China from time to time and regional strategy. While cooperation is strong, strategic priorities are not always identical. Third, the Quad must sustain credibility among regional partners who are cautious about great-power rivalry and wary of being drawn into rigid blocs especially one seen as led by the US. Yet these constraints are also what make the Quad distinctive. Its flexibility allows it to function without binding commitments, enabling cooperation where interests align while preserving autonomy where they do not. The Quad is not likely to evolve into a formal military alliance, nor is it likely to retreat into irrelevance. Instead, it can evolve itself as a practical coordination platform for Indo-Pacific resilience. Its future will be defined by its ability to deliver tangible cooperation in areas such as maritime security, critical minerals, energy systems, and digital infrastructure.