Twenty-three years after the United States invaded Iraq, the last American troops have left. Washington calls it the end of its military mission; Baghdad terms it another step towards full sovereignty. But history will certainly be less forgiving. Iraq was invaded on the claim that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction, an assertion that proved false, and the war was declared effectively won long before its consequences had even begun to unfold. The famous “Mission Accomplished” moment in 2003 captured the Iraq war’s central illusion: military victory could be confused with political settlement. The invasion toppled Saddam Hussein, but it also dismantled institutions, deepened sectarian divisions, fuelled civil conflict and helped create the conditions in which the Islamic State could emerge. Lakhs of Iraqis died, more than 4,500 American service members were killed and an entire region was thrown into turmoil.
The US left in 2011, only to return three years later when the Islamic State swept across territory, captured Mosul and proclaimed its caliphate. No doubt the US-led coalition eventually destroyed that territorial caliphate. US President Donald Trump now says there was no reason to turn a temporary mission into a permanent presence. Yet the distinction between ending a military mission and ending a multidimensional conflict is vital. The Islamic State has lost its territory, but extremist networks, sectarian politics, armed militias and regional rivalries have not disappeared. The larger question is what fills the space left behind. Baghdad must demonstrate that its own security institutions can contain both militia power and the threat of an Islamic State resurgence. The American withdrawal, therefore, might close one chapter without guaranteeing a stable next one.
For India, the lesson matters even more. Speaking at the Asia Society in New York, External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar recently stressed that terrorism is one of New Delhi’s central security concerns. He warned that a partner’s insufficient understanding of cross-border terrorism can affect bilateral relations.
That is Iraq’s enduring lesson. Terrorism cannot be defeated merely by taking over a territory, defeating commanders or changing regimes. Nor can security be outsourced indefinitely to foreign armies. The next phase must focus on capable national institutions, accountable governments, intelligence cooperation, and a refusal to distinguish between ‘convenient’ and ‘inconvenient’ forms of terrorism. Americans have gone home, but Iraq’s strategic consequences will endure in West Asia and far beyond for decades.