NEW DELHI: Before 2011, the Bangladesh-bordering seats of Bengal were defined less by overt polarisation and more by durable, deeply embedded political alignments. The Left Front exercised a near-hegemonic hold across much of South Bengal, anchored in disciplined cadre networks and the enduring legacy of land reforms. This dominance was not only electoral—it was structural, imbricated within rural society itself.
Figures like Narayan Mukherjee in Basirhat exemplified this continuity, securing repeated victories through organisational depth rather than rhetorical flourish. Yet this apparent solidity masked regional variations. In Muslim-majority seats of Murshidabad, Malda and parts of Uttar Dinajpur, the Congress retained a resilient presence, drawing upon localised networks and community linkages.
Structure of Border Anxieties
Border constituencies are animated by a complex, often overlapping litany of anxieties—historical, demographic, and existential. Foremost is the anxiety around citizenship and belonging, particularly among Matua refugees—Hindu migrants from Bangladesh. Many remain in a state of legal ambiguity, with their claims to citizenship often putative rather than fully secured. This produces an ineluctable sense of precarity that resurfaces with every electoral cycle.
Closely linked is the “bohiragato” (outsider) anxiety, though it manifests asymmetrically. Among sections of Hindu voters, it is construed as a fear of cross-border migration—frequently framed, and sometimes obfuscated, as “infiltration.” For Muslim communities, however, the same discourse is disquieting, as it risks impugning their legitimacy despite generations of residence.
Demographic anxiety further compounds this. In mixed constituencies like Bongaon and Basirhat, perceptions—often exaggerated or misconstrued—of shifting population balances acquire significant political traction. Reports of Rohingya presence or sporadic migration flows are frequently conflated into a broader narrative of existential threat.
Equally significant is minority anxiety in Murshidabad and Malda, where fears of disenfranchisement through NRC-like processes persist. Here, the apprehension is of insiders being rendered alien.
Finally, there is the enduring tension between welfare and identity—a contradiction that structures voter behaviour. Material benefits may be tangible and immediate, but identity-based insecurities often prove more politically incendiary.
How BJP, TMC Have Stoked & Addressed These Anxieties
In the post-2016 period, both the BJP and the Trinamool Congress have not merely responded to these anxieties—they have, at times, actively stoked them before attempting to resolve or redirect them.
The BJP’s strategy is strikingly calibrated. In Matua-dominated constituencies, it foregrounds the Citizenship Amendment Act and presents itself as the sole guarantor of legal recognition. This is not incidental—it directly appeals to voters by addressing their most visceral insecurity: belonging. The mobilisation of Matua leadership within the party reflects a deliberate, almost surgical approach to community consolidation.
In Muslim belts, however, the BJP pivots to a different register—one centred on infiltration, demographic change and electoral integrity. By foregrounding the spectre of undocumented migration, it seeks to consolidate Hindu voters through a narrative that is at once emotive and polarising.
Yet this strategy is double-edged. While it galvanises support in Hindu-majority constituencies, it simultaneously precipitates near-total consolidation of Muslims against the party, often pushing it to the margins in those areas.
The TMC’s response is more defensive, but no less strategic. It counters the BJP’s citizenship narrative by arguing that mechanisms like NRC would ultimately harm the very communities they claim to protect. Among Matuas, it emphasises welfare delivery and cultural recognition, attempting to undercut the BJP’s claims with tangible benefits and symbolic gestures. Among Muslims, the AITC positions itself as a bulwark against exclusion.
Electoral Behaviour of Border Constituencies
The 2011 election marked a decisive rupture. The TMC wave swept across border districts, dismantling decades of Left dominance. What followed in 2016 was consolidation: the TMC entrenched itself, while the Left lingered as a diminished force. The BJP, though still peripheral, was beginning to coalesce as an alternative. By 2021, the political field had been fundamentally reconstituted into a bipolar contest.
BJP makes inroads into Matua votebanks
In Hindu-majority and Matua-dominated constituencies, the BJP achieved significant breakthroughs. In Muslim-majority constituencies, the pattern was starkly different. The AITC secured overwhelming victories, with the BJP frequently relegated to third place. In some instances, smaller Muslim-identity parties absorbed dissenting votes, further marginalising the BJP.