‘JOSTLING for place in IOR’, ‘Chinese foot prints in the IOR’, ‘String of pearls strategy’ are some of the terms that strategists and analysts have routinely used when it comes to describing the Chinese maritime overture in our neighbourhood. The episode of ‘close encounters of the Chinese kind’ enacted in the Gulf of Aden, though orchestrated at a tactical level has many strategic overtones. The case in point is the recent reported stand off between two destroyers Haikou (DDG 171), and Wuhan (DDG 169) of the PLA Navy in the Gulf of Aden (part of an anti-piracy force) and an Indian submarine. The Chinese media claimed that the Indian submarine was forced to surface after an hour-long ‘hide and seek’ game. On the part of the Indian Navy, they have officially denied the incident.
Irrespective of the authenticity of the report, at the tactical level it is common for navies around the world to deploy their aircraft, submarines, shore intelligence gathering stations and even research vessels for stalking targets of opportunity from other navies.
In peace time warships on transit get wide publicity, particularly when they are deployed in ‘out-of-area’ operations and at times invariably invite the attention of the litoral/regional navies.
Such missions are aimed at collecting distinct electronic signatures obtained by emissions of various sensors.
Every equipment that radiates from any platform has a distinct fingerprint.
Such data can be stored in electronic libraries for future use and correlate in an event of hostilities. With the advent of beyond visual range (BVR) smart weapons, the process of positive identification of target is always a daunting one and such libraries facilitates engagement at extended weapon ranges.
Even the communication that emanates from the equipment on ships leaves an electronic imprint.
If the Indian submarine was in the area either by accident or design, it would immediately start looking for underwater signatures from the sonar, the propellers, pumps and other machinery of the Chinese ships in the area. (As it was in the submarine-tosubmarine hunting sequences in The hunt for the Red October). It would have been considered unprofessional, if they had let go of this opportunity.
The Chinese subs would have done likewise on encountering any warship as a standard practice. If the Indian submarine did surface there is every possibility that it had done its job by that time. However, in the process the submarine’s identity and its signature would have been compromised.
Some reports say that it was not an Indian submarine. It could well be the Iranian Kilo class submarine that is of the same class as the Indian sub with similar characteristics. The truth is only two players know the identity at the time of playing this game of Chinese checkers.
The Chinese ships were deployed ostensibly to prevent their ships from being hijacked by Somalian pirates. The present action by the PLA Navy was similar to the actions initiated by many nations to counter the upsurge in piracy attacks off the Somalian coast. As the ransom paid to pirates increased, they got emboldened to venture out to deeper seas to carry out attacks on larger ships. The case of MV Faina carrying tanks and other war materials is all too familiar. The ship and the crew were released after five months for a ransom of $3,200,000. Given these circumstances, there can be no complaints about the response from the PLA Navy.
The Indian government after pressure from the families of those held on MV Stalt Valor, deployed INS Tabar in the area to protect its commercial interests and Indian crew. The assertive actions of Tabar in destroying a trawler belonging to the pirates came in for lot of praise by the maritime community around the world. The role of the Indian Navy and the publicity given to its proactive action would not have escaped attention by the Chinese Navy and the leadership. While the action of other navies of the world and the Indian Navy may have prompted the Chinese Navy to accelerate the deployment of its own units, Chinese intentions are manifold.
Firstly it is the obvious compulsion to protect their own merchant ships, which were vulnerable to pirates.
More than 80 per cent of China’s energy needs are met from imports. Its economic growth is inextricably linked to the unhindered supply of energy goods and on the safe movement of cargo to and from its ports.
Secondly, this deployment presented an opportunity for the Chinese to evaluate the staying capability of their assets for extended deployments in far-flung areas. The issues of passage analysis, logistic support, rules of engagement, familiarity with the areas of operation, collection of bathymetric and oceanic data would help the PLA-N in fine-tuning future operations.
Thirdly, it is aimed at achieving strategic objectives and to signal to international players that they are now ready to foray in to areas that hitherto remained the exclusive prerogative of the US and its allies. This could also be the beginning of a new phase of operations in the Indian Ocean to challenge the regional maritime supremacy of India. The littoral nations would be observing which way the competition between the two Asian giants is headed? The ‘string of pearls strategy’ was meant to create spheres of influence in littoral countries to provide leverages in the IOR to counter the developing influence of India. Consistent with the long-term plans of PLA-Navy, it is clear that the Chinese have now enlarged the scope of their activity in the Indian Ocean Region to include ‘power projection’ and ‘force deployment’. China has served notice to the rest of the world that it now has a blue water navy determined to protect its interests in any part of the world.
(The writer is Head, Strategy and Security Studies, Centre for Asian Studies, Chennai)