The inexorable march of human conflict into the cosmos frontier is no longer a subject of speculative fiction—it’s a stark geopolitical reality. The serene void of outer space, once the exclusive domain of scientific exploration and peaceful cooperation, has been irrevocably transformed into a contested, congested and competitive arena central to national security.
For India, a nation whose security calculus is defined by contested borders and strategic competition in an era where dominance is defined by information, precision and the control of the celestial commons, the establishment of an operationally empowered Indian Space Force is an unavoidable strategic mandate for safeguarding national sovereignty in the 21st century.
The foundational argument for this assertion rests on a dual-axis framework: the use of space for terrestrial defence and the imperative for the defence of assets in space. The first paradigm leverages the orbiting sentinels that have become the central nervous system of modern warfare. From high-resolution synthetic aperture radar imaging that pierces cloud cover to monitor adversary artillery movements and border infrastructure, to secure satellite communications that form the network of distributed command, to the precise geolocation services of navigation constellations that guide everything from troop movements to smart munitions, space-based capabilities are the ultimate force multiplier.
For India, flanked by nuclear-armed adversaries engaged in their own rapid space militarisation, this ‘space for defence’ function is non-negotiable. The ability to maintain persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance over the northern and western borders and beyond is not an enhancement to security; it is its very bedrock in an age where threats can manifest with little warning.
However, to possess these capabilities is to paint a target on them. This leads to the second, and perhaps more complex, axis—the defence of space. Our orbital assets, both civilian and military, operate in a domain fraught with peril. The threats are dichotomous, yet debilitating. On one hand, there exist the non-military hazards of hypervelocity space debris and the corrosive effects of cosmic radiation. On the other hand, and far more sinister, are the controlled military threats wielded by adversarial states. These span the spectrum from non-kinetic attacks such as satellite communication jamming, GPS spoofing and cyber incursions into ground stations, to physical counterspace capabilities including direct-ascent anti-satellite missiles, co-orbital rendezvous and proximity operations by so-called “inspector” satellites that can disable or degrade assets, and the potential for high-altitude nuclear detonations to induce crippling electromagnetic pulses.
The evidence of this new battlefield is unequivocal and spans the globe. The US, recognising the centrality of space to its military and economic hegemony, established a Space Force as a separate branch of its military. China, in a calculated and sweeping reform, consolidated its space, cyber and electronic warfare capabilities under the Strategic Support Force, which has since evolved into the PLA Aerospace Force, creating the other of the world’s only two independent space forces. France has openly declared its intention to develop space-based weapons and Israel has demonstrated kinetic capabilities in the exo-atmospheric realm, with the first in-space combat recorded in November 2023. To believe India can navigate this domain through peaceful intent alone is a dangerous anachronism.
India’s own strategic community and armed forces are acutely aware of this new calculus. The Indian Air Force’s 2022 doctrine explicitly identifies space-based assets as “new centres of gravity” and highlights vulnerabilities to hostile action. The release of a joint military space doctrine post the kinetic actions qua Pakistan in May 2025 is a step forward, but a doctrine without a dedicated, empowered institution to execute it is merely theoretical. The creation of tri-service agencies is a recognition of the problem, but it is an administrative fix, not a transformative one.
We possess the foundational technological building blocks: proven anti-satellite capability, a robust and versatile satellite launch and fabrication ecosystem through Isro, and nascent but growing efforts in space situational awareness and simulated space warfare exercises. Yet, our current approach where efforts are dispersed across the Defence Space Agency, various wings of the armed forces and civilian research organisations is institutionally nebulous. It leads to duplicated efforts, blurred lines of accountability and a slowed response time in a domain where decisions must be made at the speed of light.
The creation of a dedicated Space Force, whether as an independent service branch, or at the very least, a fully empowered and elevated command within the Indian Air Force is essential to centralise planning, accelerate capability development, foster deeper civil-military fusion with Isro and the private sector, and provide a clear career path for warriors specialising in this domain. It would streamline procurement, focus research and development on military-specific resilience and survivability, and create a unified culture of space power advocacy.
What is non-negotiable, however, is that this establishment cannot be born of executive fiat alone, as was the case with the Chief of Defence Staff. Such a path breeds ambiguity in command structures, strategic posture, accountability and long-term budgetary authority. The gravity of warfare in a domain governed by international treaties and holding catastrophic escalation potential demands the fullest measure of solemnity, democratic legitimacy and legislative oversight that only Parliament can confer.
Parliamentary process would provide the necessary and rigorous public and political debate on its mandate, its rules of engagement, its relationship with the civilian space programme under Isro, the department of space, and other existing services, ensuring the vital continuity of India’s commitment to peaceful space exploration and its precise position within the national security architecture. A statute would provide unambiguous legal authority, ensure sustained funding and establish clear lines of accountability to the elected representatives of the people. It would signal to partners and adversaries alike that India’s move is a considered, permanent and serious pillar of its national security strategy, not a temporary bureaucratic rearrangement.
India has historically been a principled voice against the weaponisation of space and remains a party to foundational treaties like the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. Our participation in the Artemis Accords further underscores this commitment. However, a commitment to preventing an arms race in space cannot be mistaken for unilateral disarmament or strategic naivete in the face of its ongoing weaponisation. A robust, credible and formally constituted space defence capability is the most effective deterrent against adversarial adventurism. To wait for a crisis to reveal the folly of our current patchwork approach would be a failure of statecraft. The time for India to formally establish its Space Force is not tomorrow. It is today.
MP, lawyer, former Union I&B minister and author of A World Adrift
(Views are personal)
(manishtewari01@gmail.com)