The first phase of Myanmar’s general elections—held five years after the February 2021 military coup—concluded on December 28. Two more phases are scheduled on January 11 and 25. The results, which many international organisations including the United Nations have said will be no more than a sham to legitimise the military’s hold on the country’s politics, will be out by February.
The coup immersed Myanmar in a violent civil war along several ethnic and political faultlines, leading many to conclude that these elections will be violence-marred, besides deepening the existing social fissures. Thankfully, there have been no reports of major election-related escalation of violence in the first phase, although it is too early to predict whether this will hold for the rest of the phases and thereafter.
These elections do appear hollow considering only 57 political parties are contesting for the two Union legislative Houses and 14 unicameral assemblies, one each for its seven states and seven regions. Numerous other parties—including Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD), which won a landslide victory in the 2020 election and came to power before being ousted three months later by the coup led by General Min Aung Hlaing—will not be contesting.
The NLD and several other parties refused to register with the Union Election Commission, and have thereby been dissolved. According to estimates, these parties together received 70 percent of the votes in 2020 and won 90 percent of the seats in the Union as well as regional legislatures. Moreover, in 65 of the country’s 330 townships (sub-divisions), elections will not be held on security considerations.
By a provision of the country’s 2008 constitution, 25 percent of seats in all legislative Houses are reserved for the military. Of the two Union legislatures, the lower House called Pyithu Hluttaw (House of Representatives) has 440 seats, of which 330 are elected and 110 reserved for military appointees. The upper House Amyotha Hluttaw (House of Nationalities) has 224 seats, of which 168 are elected and 56 reserved for military appointees.
The important question at this critical juncture is, what now? Broadly, there have been two different approaches—one moralistic and the other pragmatic. The former is near-universal and needs no further explanation. The latter is best exemplified by China’s stance.
Singapore-based Chinese policy journal ThinkChina best explained this position in a recent article. China sees Myanmar from its own geopolitical interest and considers “a relatively stable Myanmar is far more aligned with Beijing’s core interests in Southeast Asia than a fractured Myanmar”.
Initially, Beijing considered the junta and General Aung Hlaing as anti-China, and this was reinforced by the latter’s consistent refusal to crack down on scam centres in the northern Shan state that were ensnaring Chinese citizens across the border. In the early months of the coup, it was widely reported that Beijing was leaving its options open and was in touch with both Suu Kyi’s underground National Unity government and General Aung Hlaing-led State Administrative Council.
It was even speculated that Beijing had a part in the formation of the Three Brotherhood Alliance between three powerful ethnic armed groups—Arakan Army of the Rakhine people, Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) of the Kokang people and Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) of the Ta’ang people.
In October 2023, this alliance made concerted assaults and delivered crushing defeats to junta positions in Shan state, capturing many important townships including the border trading hub Lashio. These wins were crucial for they emboldened other rebels across the country, stretching junta logistics and putting it under tremendous pressure.
It was at this point that China shifted its stance, realising a defeat of the military was most likely to splinter the country into many statelets, jeopardising Beijing’s geopolitical strategy, leaving it to deal with several territories and not one country, and inviting the entrenchment of rival power interests in the theatre. Interestingly, this need for centralisation to avoid disintegration has also complicated the civil war itself. As a report by the International Crisis Group indicated, there are several civil militias—Pyusawhti—fighting on behalf of the junta, too.
Beijing went ahead to broker peace between junta and the ethnic armed groups it exercised considerable influence on, in particular the MNDAA and TNLA. It also restrained the United Wa State Army, probably the best-armed ethnic group, from selling arms to others.
This led to the junta gaining lost grounds in many rebel-held regions. China also began encouraging the junta to go ahead with its election plan. Quite obviously, it is not democracy per se but its own strategic interest that prompted China to take this approach, as ThinkChina analyst David Mathieson cites.
Another analyst, Sun Yun, director of the China Programme at Stimson Centre in Washington DC, aligns with this view, saying the “only viable solution is gradual reform, not a complete revolution. A structured election is the most likely way to achieve this”.
India’s position, although not as visible as China’s, leans towards pragmatism. An indication is that Prime Minister Narendra Modi met with General Aung Hlaing on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Summit in Tianjin last August.
The alternation between military and civil rule has now become cyclic in Myanmar. Hence, the 2010 election after the adoption of the 2008 constitution, too, was boycotted by the NLD and several other parties. After Thein Sein, a retired military officer leading the Union Solidarity and Development Party, became president in 2011, he liberally allowed reregistration of deregistered parties. When byelections to 45 vacant seats were announced in 2012, the NLD decided to contest 44 seats and won 43. In the next general election in 2015, the NLD won by a comfortable majority.
The best-case scenario for Myanmar under the present sorry circumstance is for the election to provide an honourable exit to the junta, ushering back civilian rule, as in 2012. In such a cycle of events repeating lies the future of regional stability.
Pradip Phanjoubam | Editor, Imphal Review of Arts and Politics
(Views are personal)
(phanjoubam@gmail.com)