The war in Ukraine is certain to be a definitive event for the coming one-year period—both directly and in terms of its fallouts. A combination of ‘fortuitous’ circumstances strengthens the Russian position significantly through the first month of the new year, and puts it in a sort of ‘win-win’ situation. Moscow did not orchestrate such circumstances, but wouldn’t lose the opportunity to calibrate its positioning either. Private channels are buzzing.
First of all, the Kremlin and the White House are in unison that what they were striving to put together on parallel tracks—a format for the first-ever security talks between Russia and Ukraine with the participation of American representatives, and the far more challenging roadmap to improve the wider aspects of the Russian-American relationship—should not get derailed.
Both Russia and the US have lobbies who disfavour or oppose rapprochement. But what distinguishes the present times is that Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin have much in common. Both are Great-Power statists, and rational self-interest is not the only motive for their action, as Max Weber once put it long ago. Both are conservative politicians and subscribe to a ‘besieged fortress’ mentality. Putin, the friendly, cooperative spymaster with nerves of steel, has chosen the route to intensify his engagement with Trump in a pragmatic decision.
But the clock is ticking and only a week is left for the expiry of the New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) on February 4. Lapse of the 2011 treaty would mean all bets are off in the trajectory of Russia-US relations—as, for the first time since the early 1970s, there will be no legally binding limits in US and Russian strategic nuclear forces. Putin’s September 22, 2025 initiative—formally proposing a one-year voluntary extension of New START’s central limits—is lying on Trump’s desk awaiting response.
Possibly, Trump prefers to accelerate the US’s advanced missile defence capabilities under the Golden Dome programme, which has the robust backing of the military-industrial complex, and a timely reminder that ‘nuclear superiority’ continues to be an American dream. The spectre that is haunting international security is a rapid and dangerous slide to an unconstrained environment in a time of heightened geopolitical rivalry.
Putin has alternative methods to counter the US pressure—for example, by developing strategic assets against which the US is defenceless, such as the hypersonic Oreshnik missile with its immense destructive power, or the low-flying, nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed cruise missile Burevestnik (under development), and the Poseidon, also nuclear-powered and ‘autonomous’ unmanned underwater vehicle carrying nuclear or conventional warheads designed to strike coastal targets with devastating tsunami-inducing potential. Make no mistake, Russia will not compromise on the big picture of strategic balance.
Putin’s distinct preference is to avoid a new arms race in an environment that will make intentions harder to read and crises harder to manage. He would rather concentrate on his hugely ambitious project to build on the phenomenal success he
has achieved through the past quarter century to rebuild his country that was on its back. Today, Russia’s economy is doing better than most Western ones, and Putin would rather finish the Ukraine war and work on a new phase of nation-building anchored on a decent relationship with the US, which, he is convinced, is possible during the Trump presidency.
However, the big question remains: can Trump deliver? A telling example would be returning the Russian diplomatic properties in the US that Barack Obama confiscated when he was left with just a fortnight to retire in January 1996, conniving with a vicious plot by the American Deep State to complicate ties with Russia. Michael Flynn, the national security advisor designate for the incoming presidency, telephoned the Russian ambassador and prevailed upon him not to retaliate as Trump intended to reverse Obama’s decision. Trump completed his first term in 2021 and is now in the second year of his second presidency, but hasn’t been able to return the properties to the Russians. He doesn’t even want to talk about it.
Putin’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov remarked last week, “Trump is an experienced politician, one who bases his approaches on the principles of harsh, ruthless business, and he defends his interests first and foremost, and the interests of his country. The methods he uses do not quite correspond with our approach to a multi-polar world. Trump is still a proponent of bringing everyone to their knees, of solving everything through force. He says he uses force to make his decisions. In our view, he bends others to his will. And those who bend will continue to bend. The main thing is not to do this ourselves.”
Are these flattering words sufficient enough? But then, in life, most things are on relative terms. What matters to the Russians is that Europeans, the most loyal vassal states Americans ever had, have been put in their place by Trump, and Nato’s destiny hangs by a thread. Volodymyr Zelenskyy has reportedly been told that all he has got is the security track at Abu Dhabi and he cannot expect Europeans to bail him out anymore.
Meanwhile, Russians and Americans are working through private channels on improving the wider aspects of the relationship between their two countries. The rollback in aggressive rhetoric in Trump’s remarks at Davos regarding Greenland shows that he will avoid a forceful scenario for now. Acting like a pragmatist, he’s able to change his tune in a characteristic manner.
On the other hand, Trump’s rhetoric toward Russia has not changed. He’s sticking to diplomacy, but is also trying to demonstrate that there are issues on the international agenda other than the Ukrainian conflict. The Pentagon’s National Defence Strategy released on January 23 mentioned Russia as a “persistent but manageable threat to Nato’s eastern members in the near future” and expects Russia to retain its military and production capabilities, as well as the ability to modernise its nuclear missile capabilities.
But the document also emphasises that the ‘European Nato’ surpasses Russia in economic and military potential, as well as in population. Interestingly, it envisions a specific scenario that European allies are capable of assuming the bulk of the responsibility for regional security with “important but limited support” from Washington.
M K Bhadrakumar | Former diplomat
(Views are personal)