One year after Operation Sindoor, it is perhaps appropriate to move beyond the immediate emotion and symbolism associated with the operation, and examine what it may truly have achieved. Nations often celebrate military responses in the immediate aftermath of provocation, but strategic communities must ask harder questions. Did the operation fundamentally alter Pakistan’s calculus? Has the infrastructure of proxy war weakened irreversibly? Or has the conflict merely entered another phase of adaptation and pause?
Operation Sindoor undoubtedly marked another milestone in the evolution of India’s deterrence doctrine. Like Uri and Balakot before, it demonstrated that India was willing to impose costs for acts of terrorism linked to Pakistan-based groups and their support structures. Equally important was the manner in which the response was executed. India signalled resolve, both political and military, without recklessness, and retaliation without uncontrolled escalation. In an era when military action is scrutinised not only on the battlefield but also in diplomatic, informational and economic domains, this calibrated approach mattered.
Yet it would be strategically unwise to assume that one successful operation, however effective, can permanently transform the behaviour of an adversary whose statecraft has for decades relied upon irregular warfare. Pakistan’s dependence on proxy war is not merely tactical; it is deeply structural. Conventional asymmetry vis-a-vis India, domestic political fragility, the centrality of the military establishment within Pakistan’s power architecture and the enduring utility of jihadist groups as instruments of influence ensure that the temptation to revive proxy strategies never entirely disappears.
In fact, recent geopolitical developments in West Asia may produce precisely the kind of misplaced confidence that sections of Pakistan’s deep state have historically exploited. Periods of turbulence in the Islamic world often generate narratives of strategic opportunity within Rawalpindi’s security establishment.
Diplomatic flux, sharpening ideological sentiment and renewed great-power competition can create the perception that international attention is fragmented and that proxy actors may once again operate within widened grey zones. Pakistan’s establishment has repeatedly shown an ability to publicly deny sponsorship of terrorism while quietly sustaining the infrastructure that enables it.
History repeatedly warns us against premature declarations of victory over terrorism. Terror ecosystems possess an extraordinary capacity for regeneration. They survive periods of pressure, disperse geographically, mutate organisationally and return in altered forms when geopolitical conditions become favourable again.
The weakening of Al Qaeda after 2001 did not end global jihadism; it merely created space for the emergence of ISIS. The rise of ISIS itself was enabled substantially by the political vacuum, sectarian fragmentation and strategic mismanagement that followed the American invasion of Iraq and the turbulence of West Asia thereafter.
Once militarily defeated yet ideologically alive, ISIS searched for quarters to moor and finally settled in some ungoverned spaces in Afghanistan. The Islamic State Khorasan Province became active thereafter and could be the core organisation from which cadres could be drawn as mercenaries for a revisit to the early 1990s.
The contemporary instability across West Asia once again carries the potential to energise extremist ecosystems globally. Violent organisations thrive not merely on weapons and funding but on grievance narratives amplified through technology and transnational ideological mobilisation. Even conflicts geographically distant from India can influence radical discourse within South Asia through digital ecosystems that transmit propaganda instantaneously across borders.
India cannot remain insulated from these wider currents which could impact us from unexpected directions, too. The future battlespace extends far beyond the traditional image of infiltration across mountain passes or attacks on static targets. Technology is rapidly democratising the means of disruption. Cheap drones, encrypted communications, cyber coordination, AI-assisted propaganda and decentralised radicalisation networks are reshaping how proxy warfare may be conducted in the coming decade.
Already, security agencies have encountered increasing use of drones for movement of weapons, narcotics and financial assets across borders. Narco-terror networks now intersect with organised crime, arms trafficking and extremist financing in ways that blur distinctions between internal security and external aggression. Recruitment, indoctrination and operational guidance can increasingly occur remotely, often without physical contact between handlers and recruits.
This is where Afghanistan re-enters the strategic conversation. The region’s instability remains a variable with long-term implications for South Asia. Afghanistan has historically acted as both sanctuary and inspiration for transnational jihadist movements. The return of Taliban influence, tensions between extremist factions and the uncertain ability of regional actors to shape outcomes create conditions that could eventually spill across borders. Pakistan itself may discover that the ecosystem it once attempted to manage instrumentally is no longer fully controllable.
For India, therefore, the challenge is not merely to respond to individual attacks but to sustain long-duration national resilience. Counter-terrorism can no longer be viewed only through the prism of military operations. Cultural and social understanding through deep analyses should be an area of focus. The continuing erosion of extremism and separatist sentiment in Jammu & Kashmir must remain an unwavering priority. Equally important is vigilance in the Northeast and on the Indo-Nepal border, where adversarial networks may seek new vulnerabilities, logistical routes and influence spaces. The contest is now as much about preventing ideological penetration and social fragmentation as it is about neutralising armed cadres.
Operation Sindoor demonstrated that India possesses political will and operational capability. That message has been registered. But deterrence in the realm of proxy warfare is inherently more complex than conventional deterrence between armies. States employing proxies often calculate that deniability, ambiguity and time will eventually dilute the costs imposed upon them. They pause, recalibrate and probe again under altered strategic circumstances.
India must therefore guard against triumphalism. Strategic success lies not in believing that proxy war has ended, but in ensuring that the adversary progressively loses both capability and confidence in using it effectively.
One year after Sindoor, the broader lesson is perhaps this; India seeks peace, stability and regional normalcy. But peace cannot rest upon illusion. The long war against terrorism will not be won through a single operation, however successful. It will be won through sustained national resolve, institutional adaptability and the ability to anticipate the changing character of conflict before adversaries exploit it.
The shadow beyond Sindoor still exists. Recognising it clearly may itself be India’s greatest strategic strength.
Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain (Retd)
Governor of Bihar and former Commander of the Srinagar-based Chinar Corps
(Views are personal)