When Donald Trump declared last week that “Iran militarily is effectively over”, he appeared to be signalling the end of major US operations against the Islamic Republic. “We’re just keeping it at status quo,” he said after meeting Qatar’s Prime Minister at the White House.
But what exactly is the status quo?
Flying against such a claim are some recent moves the Trump administration has made. On Monday, a third US aircraft carrier, the USS Roosevelt, arrived in West Asia, taking US military personnel deployed across its so-called Central Command to more than 50,000.
Meanwhile, back in Washington DC, Scott Bessent, the US Treasury secretary directing Washington’s campaign of economic pressure against Iran, was moved from his Washington home to a military base following reported threats attributed to Tehran. He joins other senior administration figures, including Secretary of State Marco Rubio and War Secretary Pete Hegseth, in military accommodation. New White House Chief of Staff Stephen Miller had previously moved into protected housing.
The circumstances differ, but moves are particularly striking. US Director of National Intelligence Jay Clayton warned in an intelligence memorandum last month that Iran had “substantially increased” its efforts to target American personnel abroad. The precise seriousness of the threat remains unclear, but the relocations illustrate the security concerns surrounding a confrontation that Washington has not formally brought to a close.
The contradiction is more than rhetorical. The US may have inflicted considerable damage on Iran’s military infrastructure, but it has yet to resolve two questions: what happened to Iran’s enriched uranium, and how much leverage does Tehran retain over the Strait of Hormuz?
Before the Israeli and American attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities in June 2025, the International Atomic Energy Agency estimated that Iran possessed 440.9kg of uranium enriched to 60 per cent. Although not weapons-grade, the material was considerably more highly enriched than is needed for civilian nuclear power.
The subsequent attacks, followed by another US-Israeli military campaign beginning in February 2026, have left the fate of the stockpile uncertain. In its latest report, the IAEA says it cannot establish the precise location or status of the Isfahan enrichment facility, or whether it contains nuclear material. Inspectors have visited the Bushehr nuclear power station but have not been allowed to return to the other key facilities bombed during the campaigns.
There are also signs that the attacks may have strengthened the arguments of those in Iran who want the country to acquire nuclear weapons. On November 12, Iran’s Assembly of Experts called for a review of the country’s defence doctrine and possible withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. This is not a decision to build a bomb. But it suggests that the argument for a nuclear deterrent is gaining ground inside Iran.
Then there is Hormuz. Iran does not have to close the strait completely to cause serious disruption. Even the threat of attacks on shipping can increase insurance costs and unsettle international markets. Projectiles and mines hitting tankers last week did not help.
The two issues have become intertwined in Qatar’s diplomatic efforts. A Qatari proposal earlier this month sought to link the reopening of Hormuz with renewed International Atomic Energy Agency inspections of Iran’s bombed nuclear facilities. Washington would lift its naval blockade and release some frozen Iranian assets. In return, Tehran would allow inspectors to return and restore freedom of navigation through the strait. Crucially, Iran would not necessarily have to surrender its enriched uranium. One possibility would be to dilute the material to a lower enrichment level.
Qatar’s foreign ministry said on November 10 that both Washington and Tehran had responded positively. Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani held discussions with Vice-President J D Vance and Trump in Washington.
But hopes of an agreement have since weakened. On November 12, Trump indicated that the US did not need a deal with Iran and redirected Vance away from negotiations exploring a possible agreement. Tehran had regarded him as one of the more pragmatic figures in the administration. Although officials involved in the negotiations still believed an interim agreement was possible, Trump’s intervention cast fresh doubt on Washington’s commitment to diplomacy. There were also fears that Israeli caretaker Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu might resume military operations and derail the negotiations.
Nor is the danger confined to the Gulf. European security officials are increasingly concerned about alleged Iranian attempts to retaliate against American and allied interests. A foiled plot against RAF Fairford, the British air base used by US bombers, has been linked by prosecutors to Iranian operatives and an Iraqi militia aligned with Tehran. American aircraft have also been evacuated from RAF Mildenhall following reports of an Iran-backed drone threat.
France has accused Iran of orchestrating cyberattacks against supermarket refrigeration systems, with similar incidents reported elsewhere in Europe. The allegations nevertheless underline how the consequences of the confrontation are spreading beyond West Asia, including to European countries that have been reluctant to take part in Trump’s military campaign.
For India, the uncertainty is consequential. It is one of the world’s largest energy importers and remains heavily exposed to disruption in the Gulf. China and India together accounted for 44 percent of crude oil passing through Hormuz in 2025. Any prolonged disruption would affect India’s energy costs, shipping and wider economy.
New Delhi must preserve its relationships with Washington and Israel while maintaining diplomatic channels with Tehran. It must also protect the interests of Indian workers and seafarers in the Gulf and ensure that shipping routes essential to its economy remain open.
The reports of Iranian attacks on Bahrain on November 15, condemned by Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Jordan and Egypt, underline how fragile the situation remains. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps claimed to have destroyed an American early-warning radar installation. The US Central Command denied it, saying American forces had intercepted two drones. The episode nevertheless demonstrates the continuing danger to American military installations in the region.
Trump may believe that the military phase of the war is effectively over. Yet the US naval blockade continues, the uranium stockpile remains unaccounted for and the future of Hormuz is still being negotiated. More troublingly, the debate inside Iran over acquiring nuclear weapons may have produced precisely the outcome Washington wanted to prevent.
The question for Washington is no longer simply whether it can inflict further damage on Iran. It is whether it can turn military and economic pressure into a settlement that provides reliable guarantees about Iran’s nuclear programme and keeps the Gulf’s shipping lanes open.
For India and the wider international community, that distinction matters. A president can declare that a war is effectively over. He cannot, by declaration alone, settle the questions that caused it.
Shyam Bhatia | Former foreign editor of The Observer based in London and author of Nuclear Rivals in the Middle East
(Views are personal)