It was the kind of moment made for a striking poster—or a political meme: Tilvin Silva, ideologue and general secretary of Sri Lanka’s ruling Marxist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), smiling as he was welcomed in New Delhi last week by Vijay Chauthaiwale, foreign affairs head of India’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). If there was discomfort, the cameras recorded only the political significance of that moment.
Here was a man long known—and still able—to stir fierce anti-India sentiment over “Indian expansionism”, now wearing his warmest smile at the start of a familiarisation tour hosted under the BJP’s ‘Know BJP’ programme. The two parties are ideological opposites, and today’s BJP bears little resemblance to Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s vision of Gandhian socialism. Likewise, the JVP, once a revolutionary movement, has gradually shed some of its Marxist-Leninist character.
The BJP’s primary purpose was to strengthen BJP-JVP ties, facilitate an exchange of organisational experiences and formalise dialogue between the two political entities. Silva’s five-member delegation has spent time learning about the BJP’s organisational journey over four decades, its strong grassroots network, promotion of entrepreneurship, innovation and focus on youth, areas the JVP has its own lessons to offer with lived-in examples.
But this coming together is significant for many reasons. Unlike the JVP’s political evolution despite a multitude of misgivings, it may not be compared with that of the BJP’s aggressive ultranationalism and Hindutva ideology. The JVP has made its share of mistakes but, to its credit, has avoided the trap of driving a political agenda steeped in cultural-religious identity. To say the least, it is interesting then to find the JVP’s ideologue in the midst of the modern-day BJP’s outreach programme.
Indeed, the two political parties make strange bedfellows, and the moment is filled with symbolism. It shifts a chequered relationship to the present, one founded on political realism.
In both India and Sri Lanka, the line between the State and the ruling political party may sometimes appear blurred, but officially they do remain distinct. Although each ruling party promotes its ideology to the public to varying degrees, the State is officially separate from the political party. This pivot is all the more interesting given their strong ideological divide.
Two years ago, as the political tide began to shift in favour of Anura Kumara Dissanayake, New Delhi cautiously reached out to engage with Colombo's new leadership-in-waiting, despite a history of mistrust. When Dissanayake romped home in November 2024, his first official visit was to the Indian capital, which has prioritised political pragmatism and has made the first move towards the incoming administration.
The past two years have brought a series of bilateral engagements. Dissanayake made his first foreign visit as president to India in December 2024. When Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Sri Lanka in April 2025, the two countries inked several bilateral agreements. Following Cyclone Ditwah, External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar visited the island as Modi’s special envoy to support relief efforts and announce a $450 million reconstruction package. Sri Lankan Prime Minister Harini Amarasuriya later visited India, and Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh visited Colombo in September, days before Silva took wing to New Delhi.
BJP’s invitation to bond—between the most unlikely political outfits, one ultranationalist, the other rhetorically Marxist—comes at an interesting time when both countries are in realignment.
New Delhi currently engages across the political spectrum—including party-level exchanges and development aid across Northern, Eastern and Southern Sri Lanka. Similarly, India’s foreign policy is adapting to build direct channels with non-traditional and ideologically different political movements in the neighbourhood. In Sri Lanka, this means Delhi moving beyond traditional ruling elites to engage with the new and emerging forces.
Doing so is paradoxical yet pragmatic. And this applies to the JVP/NPP as well.
As New Delhi overcomes its deep-rooted reluctance, the current Sri Lanka administration is actively collaborating with it on economic and defence frameworks. It is worth taking a closer look at what this means in terms of political realignment through defense pacts, maritime coordination in the Indian Ocean and counternarcotics intelligence sharing.
The reality is that India’s neighbourhood-first policy is flagging and is being critiqued by its neighbours. A Pew Research Center survey published in August 2026 noted that Sri Lanka recorded the highest level of favourability toward India globally, with 79 percent positive expression. The survey outcome is debate-worthy, but it indicates an opportunity for India to shed its regional bully image and use it to its advantage.
The JVP’s anti-India stance belonged to a particular political era. Those who once led vehement campaigns now govern Sri Lanka, engage with India, and recognise the need for a functional relationship. For Delhi, this marks a new South Asian pivot: an opportunity to rebuild its regional image while keeping Colombo somewhat—but not entirely—distant from Beijing. India is unlikely to forgo the chance to retain Colombo within its sphere of influence sufficiently.
Then there are other considerations, such as ongoing bilateral friction points: Tamil Nadu fisher detentions and bottom trawling in the Palk Strait that need long-term solutions; the currently low-hanging fruits like Sri Lankan refugee resettlement; and potential political friction within the island nation over large-scale Indian investments in energy and ports. This tension needs to be diffused if projects are to move forward. There is also the unaddressed matter of practical power devolution and holding the postponed provincial elections India is keen to see.
For India, it is also a different track of engaging directly with non-traditional political forces to build diplomatic stability beyond political administrations and systems, the kind Xi Jinping’s Chinese Communist Party excels at.
The JVP/NPP does pledge to continue a non-aligned foreign policy—balancing relations with New Delhi while managing ongoing economic and regional commitments. Getting to know the BJP mechanisms offers the party a ringside view of how a movement is built to assume and hold power, even ruthlessly. And Colombo does not need to choose one country over the other. It needs to choose all its neighbours and even those with competing interests.
Dilrukshi Handunnetti | Award-winning journalist and lawyer; founder and director of Colombo-based Center for Investigative Reporting
(Views are personal)
(dilrukshi@cir.lk)