On September 30, the last American troops assigned to the mission against Islamic State left Iraq—23 years after the invasion. Baghdad celebrated, but the harder question remains: can the State disarm militias on its own soil?
Across West Asia, the same gap between military power and political authority persists. Israel holds most of Gaza but has not ended Hamas. Washington has choked Iran’s oil exports but cannot force a deal. Riyadh can bomb Yemen but has not broken the Houthis’ hold on Bab al-Mandeb. The thesis is simple: force wins battles, not political settlements.
The withdrawal followed a timetable negotiated before the current war with Iran. After departing in 2011, American forces returned in 2014 to fight Islamic State. The latest exit allows Iran-aligned factions to claim victory. But Iranian dominance is hardly assured—Iraq’s competing interests and nationalism matter. Even so, the test is whether Baghdad can bring armed factions under effective State authority by its revised June 2027 deadline.
That task goes beyond collecting weapons. Some factions are embedded within publicly-funded security institutions while maintaining independent command structures and economic interests. Kurdish concerns about lost air defences and surviving Islamic State cells compound the risks. At the same time, Iraq’s dependence on Iranian gas and on dollar access via its central bank’s New York Federal Reserve account preserves the leverage of both Tehran and Washington.
The Iran war makes this transition hazardous. US-Israeli attacks began on February 28, killing Iran’s supreme leader and damaging its military capabilities. April’s ceasefire ended 40 days of full-scale fighting, but diplomacy failed to secure a durable settlement. Meanwhile, Tehran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-backed system has survived, despite sanctions and a US maritime blockade. Its capacity to threaten neighbouring infrastructure remains significant.
Tehran’s internal divisions now complicate negotiations, while reports of a third American carrier group heading towards the region and Iran’s preparations for renewed fighting underscore the risk. Neither diplomacy nor military pressure has secured an exit yet.
At Hormuz, more oil is flowing. American protection along routes through Omani waters, alternative pipelines and ship-to-ship transfers have helped exports recover. Yet attacks persist, refined-product flows remain weak, and gas shipments lag well below normal levels. Restored volumes do not signal restored security. For that reason, the G7’s planned release of 100 million barrels from emergency stocks may cushion prices, but it cannot resolve the insecurity that keeps freight and insurance costs high.
At the other end of the Arabian peninsula, Houthi advances along Yemen’s Red Sea coast have strengthened their leverage around Bab al-Mandeb. Their gains are both territorial in Yemen and strategic against Saudi Arabia. Coastal control lets them threaten the waterway’s southern approaches; it does not confer sovereignty over the strait or indicate that all shipping has stopped.
The geography leaves Riyadh exposed. Its East-West pipeline bypasses Hormuz by carrying crude to Yanbu, but tankers sailing from there towards Asia still have to navigate the Bab al-Mandeb. Moreover, the pipeline’s disruption by drones launched from Iraqi territory illustrates how the fronts overlap. An alternative route offers limited reassurance, as its infrastructure and exit remain vulnerable.
For Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, this threatens the confidence underpinning Vision 2030. Investment and tourism require stability; prolonged insecurity diverts resources towards defence. The Houthis’ claim of an Aramco strike in Riyadh on October 3, following a fire at the facility, remains disputed and unconfirmed by Saudi authorities. Even uncertainty over the extent of damage can unsettle investors. These pressures test his strategic judgement without indicating an imminent threat to his rule.
Saudi accusations of attacks on Makkah and on a power station serving the Prophet’s Mosque in Madinah, which the Houthis deny, have escalated the confrontation. Fighting around Taiz has intensified, and Yemeni government forces have announced attacks on Houthi strongholds. Separately, Riyadh is reportedly preparing a broader offensive, led by Yemeni ground forces under Saudi air cover. Retaking coastal positions could strengthen the kingdom’s bargaining position. However, a wider campaign risks repeating the costly entanglement that began in 2015, especially if fragmented local forces cannot sustain territorial gains.
The Saudi-Türkiye-Pakistan defence pact is facing an early practical test. Pakistan is reported to have stationed 30,000-40,000 troops in Saudi Arabia, along with air-defence support, potentially easing pressure on Saudi forces. Its commitments to defend the kingdom do not automatically entail combat in Yemen. An emergency meeting in Riyadh considered political engagement with the Houthis alongside security responses. Calling it a ‘Muslim Nato’ is premature, as its command structures and collective-defence procedures are still taking shape.
Gaza exposes the gulf between diplomatic frameworks and conditions on the ground. Nearly a year after the October ceasefire, Israel still controls most of Gaza and continues to conduct strikes. Reconstruction remains constrained by limited access, the absence of an agreed Palestinian administration and unresolved disputes over Israeli withdrawal and Hamas disarmament. Israel’s expansion of settlements in the West Bank and the displacement of the local population further undermine the territorial basis of Palestinian statehood.
Jordan’s warnings at the United Nations carry particular weight given its long-standing peace treaty with Israel. Amman views Palestinian displacement and Israeli expansion in southern Syria as threats to the security of its borders and water supplies. The danger extends beyond Gaza: control over territory, presented as a temporary security measure, can become permanent, threatening neighbouring States and closing off prospects for a negotiated settlement.
Lebanon faces the same danger. June’s framework remains stalled on the link between Israeli withdrawal and Hezbollah’s disarmament, even as Israeli operations continue. The UN Interim Force in Lebanon is due to cease operations at the end of 2026 and withdraw in 2027. Without stronger Lebanese State authority and a credible security transition, its departure could deepen the vacuum. Syria’s fragile transition also requires accountability without sectarian revenge, while external incursions complicate reconstruction.
These developments reveal an increasingly selective American security role. Washington retains formidable regional forces and supports Saudi defences, yet it declined requests for direct strikes against the Houthis. Consequently, regional governments are building additional partnerships. China’s economic weight confers influence, though it offers no alternative security guarantee. Qatar and Oman maintain valuable mediation channels. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the Arab League need to translate diplomatic coordination into practical arrangements for non-aggression, maritime security and regional stability.
For India, the stakes are immediate. It imports nearly 89 percent of its crude, and close to 1 crore Indians in the GCC states send home about 38 percent of India’s total remittances. Brent above $100 feeds directly into inflation. Abroad, New Delhi should use its UN stance on a two-State solution and safe shipping, and its ties across regional divides, to help restore unrestricted passage. At home, it needs larger energy reserves, protection for seafarers and standing contingency plans for Indian communities.
These developments show one clear lesson: military power alone will not create a stable order in West Asia. Lasting security requires governments able to disarm or rein in militias on their soil, agreements that are honoured and verified and a credible path towards Palestinian statehood. Without these foundations, shifting alliances may redistribute power while leaving the causes of conflict intact. The test of the emerging regional order is whether it can prevent the next war.
Ausaf Sayeed | Former Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs and former Ambassador to Saudi Arabia and Yemen
(Views are personal)