Defence cooperation between two countries is rarely confined to the military domain. It builds habits of consultation, institutional familiarity and mutual trust that can influence the entire spectrum of bilateral relations. This becomes particularly important during periods of geopolitical uncertainty, when crises test the resilience of partnerships and trust becomes a strategic asset. For India and the United States, a deeper defence relationship could therefore do more than strengthen their respective military capabilities. It could provide a firmer foundation for their broader strategic partnership, including economic cooperation and trade.
The relationship between New Delhi and Washington has made considerable progress over the past two decades. Yet, despite growing convergence on the Indo-Pacific and regional security, bilateral cooperation has not always advanced evenly across different domains. Trade negotiations, for instance, have at times proved difficult, with differences over market access, tariffs and domestic economic priorities complicating efforts to reach mutually satisfactory outcomes. It is difficult to establish whether a stronger defence relationship would, by itself, have resolved these differences. But it is reasonable to argue that deeper strategic trust and a greater convergence of interests could create a more favourable environment for addressing them. Defence cooperation should not be expected to substitute for commercial negotiations; it can, however, strengthen the wider relationship within which such negotiations take place.
This is why India and the United States should view defence cooperation not merely as one component of their bilateral agenda, but as a potential strategic anchor for the relationship as a whole. Defence partnerships involve sustained engagement between governments, military establishments, research institutions and industrial enterprises. They require long-term planning, dependable commitments and a degree of confidence in the intentions and reliability of the partner. Over time, these interactions can build relationships that endure beyond individual political disagreements or differences on particular issues. When a crisis emerges, such institutional connections can facilitate communication, improve mutual understanding and help prevent tactical differences from escalating into broader strategic misunderstandings.
The task, therefore, is not simply to increase defence purchases but to develop a more ambitious and durable framework of cooperation. For India, strategic autonomy must mean the capacity to design, manufacture, maintain and upgrade critical defence systems, rather than simply diversifying its sources of supply. For the United States, a technologically stronger India offers a more capable partner in the Indo-Pacific, a potential contributor to resilient defence supply chains and an opportunity to deepen cooperation with a major democratic power. These interests are complementary, provided both sides are willing to move beyond a transactional approach.
The changing character of warfare makes this imperative more urgent. Artificial intelligence, autonomous platforms, robotics, advanced sensors, electronic warfare and counter-drone technologies are transforming military operations. Recent conflicts have demonstrated how relatively inexpensive unmanned systems can impose significant costs on sophisticated military platforms, while the integration of software, surveillance and precision capabilities can change the balance on the battlefield. India and the United States should identify priority areas in which joint research, development and production can generate tangible results. Counter-drone and anti-swarm systems, unmanned technologies, artificial intelligence applications and selected aerospace capabilities offer promising avenues for collaboration.
Such cooperation must also address the difficult questions of technology transfer and intellectual property. India cannot build lasting technological strength if its participation remains confined to assembling systems designed and developed elsewhere. Equally, American concerns over sensitive technologies and security safeguards cannot simply be disregarded. The two countries need clearer, more predictable arrangements governing co-development, production, intellectual property ownership and access to international supply chains. The objective should be to identify technologies that can be shared, establish workable safeguards and create partnerships in which both countries have meaningful industrial and strategic stakes.
India’s expanding private-sector defence industry has an important role to play in this process. Initiatives such as Innovations for Defence Excellence (iDEX) and the India–US Defence Acceleration Ecosystem (INDUS-X) provide a foundation for connecting start-ups, established manufacturers, universities and defence research institutions. The next step should be to translate these connections into sustained programmes of joint research, commercial production and technological innovation. American defence companies should see India not only as a market for their platforms but also as a partner in manufacturing and development. Indian enterprises, in turn, should have opportunities to become increasingly sophisticated contributors to global defence supply chains.
The strategic case for closer cooperation extends naturally into the Indian Ocean. Maritime security, the protection of critical infrastructure and the uninterrupted movement of trade and energy are central to the interests of both countries. Disruptions around the Red Sea and Bab-al-Mandeb illustrate how insecurity at strategic chokepoints can affect global commerce far beyond the immediate conflict zone. Cooperation in maritime domain awareness, information-sharing, surveillance, undersea infrastructure protection and regional capacity-building can translate shared concerns into practical action. Stronger industrial and technological collaboration would reinforce this effort by improving the capabilities available to both partners.
None of this implies that defence ties can eliminate disagreements over trade, tariffs or other sensitive issues. India and the United States will continue to have distinct domestic priorities, and a mature partnership must accommodate differences rather than assume they will disappear. Nor should defence cooperation become contingent on the resolution of every other bilateral issue. Its value lies precisely in creating a durable foundation that can withstand disagreements elsewhere and sustain engagement when political or economic circumstances become difficult.
The larger lesson is that strategic partnerships acquire depth when cooperation generates mutual confidence, shared capabilities and enduring institutional connections. For India and the United States, defence can play that role, provided the relationship evolves from procurement towards co-development, from technology dependence towards shared innovation, and from episodic engagement towards sustained collaboration. This would serve not only their security interests but also the wider ambition of building a more resilient economic and strategic partnership.
India and the United States do not need to agree on every issue to become more reliable partners. They do, however, need areas of cooperation that create enduring mutual stakes and reinforce confidence in each other’s long-term intentions. A stronger defence relationship can provide precisely such an anchor. If nurtured with strategic vision, it could help create the trust and institutional resilience necessary to navigate disagreements, seize economic opportunities and respond collectively to emerging challenges. The opportunity before New Delhi and Washington is not simply to build a stronger defence partnership, but to use that partnership to strengthen the relationship as a whole.
(Views are personal)
Shishir Priyadarshi,
President, Chintan Research Foundation